The international community needs to take the threat of a nuclear-armed Burma seriously
For decades, Burma’s ruling regime has been regarded primarily as a menace to its own people. But with recent reports confirming long-held suspicions that the junta aspires to establish Burma as Southeast Asia’s first nuclear-armed state, there is now a very real danger that it is emerging as a threat to the rest of the region.
At the moment, the paranoid generals in Naypyidaw are far from realizing their dream of developing the ultimate deterrent to foreign invasion. But it would be a mistake to underestimate the regime’s determination to acquire some sort of nuclear weapon, no matter how primitive, with which to ward off any threat from countries it regards as hostile to its survival.
Judging from the muted response to recent revelations contained in a report by the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), however, it seems that many remain unconvinced that the regime’s nuclear ambitions represent a credible threat. Of course, it makes sense to proceed with caution before jumping to any conclusions; but it would also be a mistake to wait until it is too late to deal with the eventuality of a nuclear-armed Burma.
The DVB report is hardly the first to present evidence suggesting that the regime’s military ambitions now extend beyond its traditional goal of crushing perceived threats from within, but it is certainly the most thorough. Based largely on the testimony of ex-Maj Sai Thein Win, a Burmese army defector and weapons expert who smuggled out numerous photographs and documents to back up his accusations, the report leaves little room for doubt about the junta’s intentions. According to Robert Kelley, the nuclear scientist and former director of the International Atomic Energy Agency who authored the report for DVB, the evidence “leads to only one conclusion: this technology is only for nuclear weapons and not civilian use or nuclear power.”
But even before Sai Thein Win came forward, there was good reason to suspect that the junta was not satisfied with its 400,000-man army and impressive armory of weapons for suppressing the country’s dwindling array of ethnic insurgencies. Indeed, for the past decade at least, it has sought to strengthen its military might in ways that would serve to neutralize external as well as internal challenges to its hold on power.
According to Jane’s Defense Weekly, the regime first purchased low-altitude surface-to-air missile systems from Bulgaria and short-range ballistic missile air defense systems from Russia in 2001. The following year, according to Burmese defense analyst Maung Aung Myoe in his 2009 book, “Building the Tatmadaw,” it acquired 36D6 radar from Ukraine, designed to detect air targets at low, medium and high altitudes, and to perform friend-or-foe identification.
Some analysts attribute the regime’s sudden interest in upgrading its arsenal to a series of border skirmishes with Thai forces in 2001-02, when Thailand reportedly deployed Suppression of Enemy Air Defense Systems (SEADS) before sending its F-16 jet fighters into border air space, severely disrupting communication lines between the Burmese army’s command centers and frontline troops.
It is interesting to note how soon the regime’s quest for ever more sophisticated weaponry took it in the direction of North Korea. According to Maung Aung Myoe, the Burmese generals began secret talks with the reclusive Communist regime to buy Hwasong (Scud-type) missiles as early as 2003. Although it remains unclear if the regime ever actually acquired these missiles, military analysts note that Burma has received a number of suspicious shipments from North Korean vessels over the past few years.
This North Korean connection appears to have done more than just provide the junta with another arms supplier. Increasingly, Naypyidaw seems to be considering Pyongyang’s brand of belligerent diplomacy as the basis for its foreign policy, possibly as a backup plan to ensure its survival if the upcoming election and transition to “disciplined democracy” fail to silence its Western critics.
If Burma does take this route, it would certainly present a real dilemma for the West. In the past, the regime has attempted to neutralize its critics by insisting that they choose between supporting the democracy movement led by Aung San Suu Kyi or promoting the well-being of the masses by providing aid and lifting sanctions. In the future, the choice could become even starker: forget Suu Kyi, or learn to live with a nuclear-armed Burma.
Some have argued that the West bears some responsibility for pushing the regime into the arms of North Korea.