They point to the fact that in November 2008, six months after the US, France and Britain sent naval warships close to Burmese waters with offers of emergency assistance for survivors of Cyclone Nargis, the junta sent its highest-level delegation to Pyongyang for secret meetings to discuss a new weapons deal.
But suggestions that the West’s actions are the primary inspiration for the junta’s efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction are misplaced. The regime has been moving in this direction for years, and it is even arguable that the protracted process of restoring pseudo-civilian rule has become little more than a means of buying time for the generals to realize their grandiose military ambitions.
Seen in this light, the junta’s seeming lack of interest in presenting this year’s election as a genuine democratic exercise takes on ominous significance.
In fact, it could mean one of three things. It’s possible that the regime really believes that many in the West are credulous enough to buy the same empty promises of change once again. Or it could signal the junta’s confidence that Beijing will continue to watch its back indefinitely, as long as there’s something in it for China. Or, most worryingly, it may be an indication that the generals are more interested in following Pyongyang’s example than in keeping up the pretense of moving toward democracy.
The first possibility is very real: Many in the West—particularly Europe—seem deluded enough to believe that the generals really mean it this time when they say they want to hand over power. The second is also quite plausible: Beijing continues to offer its staunch support for the regime, and has even played an important role in cultivating the relationship between Naypyidaw and Pyongyang (when the two sides formally restored relations in 2007, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao said, “North Korea and Burma are both friendly neighbors of China. We are happy to see and welcome the improvement of their bilateral ties”—giving no hint of any concern about the implications for regional stability).
The third possibility, then, is the least likely, especially given the primitive state of Burma’s nuclear program. At this stage, it is still in the realm of worst-case scenarios, rather than an imminent reality. But even this demands a serious response, lest Burma become the next North Korea.
To ensure that this does not happen, we first need to recognize that despite their geopolitical similarities as international pariahs operating within China’s sphere of influence, Burma and North Korea are two very different countries. Although both countries are ruled by ruthless regimes, Burma still possesses a civil society that still survives even after nearly 50 years of military rule. Burmese people also have more contact with the outside world than North Koreans, making them less susceptible to government propaganda. In fact, popular opposition to the Burmese junta is almost universal, and even within the military there are many who would willingly abandon the regime under the right conditions.
Since late last year, the Obama administration has attempted to engage the regime, perhaps with an eye to identifying some of the more forward-thinking figures within the military’s future leadership. To date, however, these overtures have been rebuffed.
The administration has always known that it would not be an easy task to reach out to the regime, so it is not likely to abandon its efforts at this stage. But if it wants to make the recalcitrant generals more amenable to listening, it will have to do more to step up the pressure. It could do this most effectively by raising the junta’s secret weapons program for discussion at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), where the US now stands a better chance than ever of making some headway in its efforts to censure the regime.
Until now, these efforts have been blocked by China and Russia on the grounds that Burma does not represent a threat to regional stability. But this stance is becoming harder to maintain in the face of new evidence to the contrary. Even if the regime’s allies insist on sticking to this position, it will be difficult for them to deny that the regime has been in violation of UNSC resolutions banning arms trading with North Korea.
It is important for the world to recognize that it cannot allow the Burmese generals to continue down the path they’ve taken. Burma is not North Korea, but the country’s military rulers are no less capable than their fellow despots in Pyongyang of holding their neighbors to ransom if they believe their own survival is at stake. They have taken the first steps toward realizing their nuclear dream; now the international community must act to prevent it from becoming a nuclear nightmare for the rest of us.
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