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But, as the new faces are not very experienced, the new body will be not do much work and will not last long. This new formation cannot last long and we expect there will be more changes soon. 3. Regarding the rivalries between the factions of Maung Aye and Khin Nyunt, Maung Aye’s group has been getting the upper hand but still cannot absolutely beat Khin Nyunt’s faction. Tension between the factions and more private dissension are likely in the days ahead. There will be conflicts between the three different branches and problems because of differences in seniority. 4. One unusual feature of this new structure is two newly-created posts, Secretary 3, and the minister for Military Affairs. Previously Tin Hla was supposed to be promoted to Secretary 3, but it didn’t happen. Now, Win Myint has been appointed as Secretary 3 instead. So, another new post had to be created for Tin Hla so he wouldn’t be disappointed. Win Myint was previously the quartermaster general and before that the Western divisional commander, an unpopular post because there are few opportunities for financial gain in the western region. (The military junta usually appoints less capable individuals to this post.) SPDC Cabinet It is comprised of 40 members in 40 ministerial posts. Than Shwe is still in the prime minister’s post together with two deputy prime ministers, Maung Khin (Air Force) and Tin Htun (Navy). The Navy and Air Force have never had any real influence or power in the history of dictatorial rule in Burma. It merely looks like the power of the Navy, Air Force and Army are somewhat balanced in this structure. The Cabinet members have much more experience than most of the SPDC members. Almost all of the Lt.-Generals who were in Ministerial posts under the SLORC have been transferred to the powerless advisory board. 29 out of the 40 are old men while only 11 are new to the ministerial structure. The formation looks inflated as some posts are really not needed but just created for the appearance of power sharing, for example the newly created military affairs ministry. Tin Hla, the minister for military affairs, was once a former 22nd division commander, and is a hardliner and one of Maung Aye’s men. The minister of cooperatives, U Than Aung (a former Lt. Col. and also a Maung Aye man), is almost as corrupt as Tun Kyi, Kyaw Ba and Myint Aung and is still in the same ministerial post. The railway minister, U Win Sein (former Lt. Col), who is considered as having one of the most hardline policies against Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, is also still left in the same ministerial post (U Win Sein even told a SLORC meeting this year that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi should be sentenced with the death penalty). These two examples show that the newly formed SPDC might not change its policy on Aung San Suu Kyi and the democratic forces, and that those with good support from above are not removed, regardless of their activities and policies. Advisory board This board is very unusual, and the military has never created this kind of advisory board before. One thing for sure is that this board was created for the Lt.-Generals; in particular, Kyaw Ba, Phone Myint, Myint Aung, Tun Kyi. They will have no power to influence the newly formed SPDC. Will the SPDC resolve the current political problems or is it committed to launch a real change? The debate on whether the transformation of the SLORC to the SPDC will lead to a real change or not will, in fact, be proven very soon through the means it uses to tackle the current political problems. —How will they deal with the national convention? —Will they try to solve the underlying political problems following the agreements on mere ceasefires with the armed ethnic groups? —What will be the SPDC opinion on the KNU and the KNPP? —What will be their opinion on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi? —What kind of relationship will the SPDC have with Ne Win, the person who is most responsible for human rights violations in Burma? (Because the relationship between the SLORC and Ne Win was very close.) In conclusion, the new structure was formed not to resolve the country’s current political problems but just to resolve the military’s own internal conflicts. Maung Aye’s group has gotten the upper hand over Khin Nyunt. Their aim is also to fool the people of Burma and the international community that some changes are being made to handle the current political and economic woes. They will probably issue an amnesty and start releasing some political prisoners who have already finished their prison terms. They will announce that they do not recognise the results of the 1990 general elections. They will put more pressure on the ceasefire groups in many ways, including military pressure.