| DECEMBER, 1997 - VOLUME 5 NO.7 |
The SLORC started restructuring itself into the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) on November 15,1997, announcing a series of notifications: No. 1/97, 2/97, 3/97. Burma watchers have offered different opinions about what the changes really mean. In fact, the military always makes superficial changes whenever it faces a political crisis. Over the past 35 years, the military junta has changed the name of country three times, changed the constitution twice and has adopted four different names for its ruling body — the latest being the SPDC. Now the military junta has again changed its name and changed some positions, but there has been no move toward the much-needed democratisation process. Also, the military junta could not yet come up with an appropriate strategy in the areas of politics, economics, social welfare and education. As there has yet been no clear policy explanation in the notifications, the junta does not seem to have considered or even recognized the current demanding issues in Burma; in particular, national reconciliation, democracy, human rights, and tripartite dialogue. As the change is only one in name, the transformation from the SLORC to the SPDC should be considered as the same as the previous change from the BSPP to the SLORC. Like the Burmese saying, no matter how many times a snake sloughs off its skin, it is still the same (poisonous). Moreover, the change did not come about as the result of a legal process and the SPDC has no more legitimacy than the SLORC did. Therefore, we are not pleased with the latest transformation. Why did the SLORC change? It is necessary to question why the SLORC changed its name to the SPDC. The junta has been facing a serious crisis and the possibility of a general uprising. There are three main reasons for the change, namely: 1. Economic crisis in the country 2. Discrepancy among the military factions. 3. International pressure Economic crisis in the country Obviously, the current economic woes have an impact even on the military itself as well as the general public. Prices of basic necessary foodstuffs such as rice, cooking oil, chili, onion, garlic, beans, etc... are skyrocketing. Also the price of meat, including chicken, beef, pork has also increased incredibly up to round about 500- 600 kyats per viss (1.53 kg). One viss of prawns is now 3,000 kyats. Shortages of petrol and electricity in the country have resulted in rising petrol prices. For example, a gallon of gasoline now costs 180 kyat in Rangoon and Mandalay, and it is not available as necessary in the rest of the country. A normal truck can get only two gallons of petrol a week. Consequently the transportation of commodities from one place to another has decreased. The monthly salary of government employees is 1,500 kyat per month maximum. Every month, they have to repay 500 kyats for the government loans which they were forced to take last year. Also, 200 kyat is cut for rice rations. Moreover, other taxes are deducted for so many reasons such as social welfare, electricity, water supply, house rental, fire brigade, entertainment, religious ceremonies, horse parades and boat racing ceremonies, and finally they are usually left with only 6-7 kyats in hand. They have no money for health care and education for their children, and they are hardly surviving with rice in the amount of 200 kyat. Unfortunately, the widespread destruction of rice fields following the recent floods in Mon State, Irrawaddy division, Arakan State, Karen State and Pegu division will lead to the shortage of food in the very near future. The problem of currency inflation is also getting much worse, and it is because of the military’s unlimited printing of kyat notes, laundering money from the drug trade, and the uncontrollable circulation of counterfeit kyats. One dollar is now equivalent to almost 300 kyat and the kyat is expected to drop even further in the future. Because of the serious instability of the kyat, business people have lost faith in it. As a result, the prices of land, housing, and gold have risen dramatically. For example, the price of land in Golden Valley in Rangoon is almost as high as became almost similar to that of Mac Helton in the US. Rental charges for opening offices are now US $1,000 to $2,000 per room. As the 1996 “Visit Myanmar Year” campaign failed, hotels are left with many empty rooms. In one recent check at the Traders Hotel, only 10 rooms out of 400 were occupied. There were only a few visitors at the Novotel as well. Two months ago, 500 employees, including nine foreigners, from the hotel business were let go. The unemployment rate has increased and almost one million Burmese workers have crossed into Thailand to find jobs. Universities have been shut down for one year already, causing the anti-government sentiments of the students to grow more and more. At the same time, the monks’ anger toward the government has also grown because the monks’ examinations have been postponed since April 1997, many monks continue to be detained in prisons, and the military’s theft of precious stones from the abdomen of the Mahamyatmuni Buddha image in Mandalay. And these issues are causing resentment to build not only among the general public but also within in the military itself. With the peoples’ anger at the military elites growing, general strikes could take place at any time for any reason. Discrepancy among the military factions Secondly, rivalries among different military factions are also becoming more obvious. It is mainly because of the corruption and unequal opportunities for personal profit, particularly among the Military Intelligence Units, Army, Navy and Air Force at different levels. At the same time, there have been long-standing power struggles between the OTS (Officer Training School) and the DSA (Defense Service Academy) batches in the military. These conditions are likely to lead to the collapse of the junta. Three major factions have been clearly identifiable in the military since a long time ago. These are the Kyaw Ba-Tun Kyi-Myint Aung faction, the Maung Aye-Tin Oo faction and Khin Nyunt’s intelligence faction. As usual, in the military history of factional politics, two factions invariably ally to beat the other one. Here again, the Maung Aye-Tin Oo faction and the Khin Nyunt faction made a temporary alliance in order to defeat the Kyaw Ba-Tun Kyi- Myint Aung faction. There have been reports that the corrupted Lt. Generals faction (Kyaw Ba et al.) have recently faced interrogation by other members of the SPDC. In reality the issue of corruption was just an excuse to remove them from power, and this should be seen as the result of a power struggle among the military factions. Later, it is likely that a power struggle will emerge between Maung Aye and Khin Nyunt’s groups. International pressure Thirdly, international pressure has been mounting. SLORC generals become depressed when the US imposed economic sanctions on the junta. It is still impossible for the junta to improve their bad image for their appalling human rights abuses, their involvement in the drug trade and their money laundering activities. ASEAN governments and other governments which are friendly to the junta such as Japan and other potential business partners have been really worrying about the junta’s worsening image and its instability. They have been quietly suggesting that the junta make some superficial changes so that it looks more respectable. Moreover, it is also obvious that U Ne Win played an important role in this restructuring as it happened just after his trip to Indonesia and Singapore. The general scenario of the country is much worse than the situation was in 1988. The junta also realises that the current bad situation is likely to lead to a general strike. Therefore, the junta has made some preparations in case there is a mass movement, in particular, the emptying of Insein prison by transferring prisoners to other prisons in order to arrest more activists and even some critics in the military itself. Opinion on the current change 1. Rivalries among the different military factions have become more intense than ever before. In this current change, the Maung Aye-Tin Oo faction got the upper hand over the Khin Nyunt faction. Most of the new faces in the SPDC, in particular Khin Maung Than, Sit Maung, Ye Myint and Kyaw Win are Maung Aye's absolute followers while the remaining members will not dare to oppose him. But, both factions seem to share the same negative opinion about the democracy movement. In fact, the only issue which at times unites and at times divides them is their own personal interest. 2. The SPDC is primarily a policy-making body, and it has much more power than the other two branches: the Cabinet and the Advisory Board. Basically, the SPDC consists of two main groups, the four old top brass and the other 15 new faces who do not have much experience yet. Than Shwe appears to have a symbolic post but no power. He is getting old and is not in good health. Now 67 years old, he should retire, but the problem is that if Than Shwe retires, Maung Aye who has the same seniority as many other generals in particular, Kyaw Ba, Maung Hla, Ket Sein, Hla Myint Swe and Tun Kyi who are still in the military — would have to replace him. Maung Aye doesn’t want to replace Than Shwe until he can put his own supporter in his current position. Maung Aye handled this move cleverly by kicking his rivals out of influential roles through sending them to the newly formed advisory board and cabinet posts. At the same time, he brought in new faces and also young regional commanders to take over economically profitable and influential posts in the SPDC. Overall, what we can say is that Maung Aye now has relatively more power than his rivals. But, as the new faces are not very experienced, the new body will be not do much work and will not last long. This new formation cannot last long and we expect there will be more changes soon. 3. Regarding the rivalries between the factions of Maung Aye and Khin Nyunt, Maung Aye’s group has been getting the upper hand but still cannot absolutely beat Khin Nyunt’s faction. Tension between the factions and more private dissension are likely in the days ahead. There will be conflicts between the three different branches and problems because of differences in seniority. 4. One unusual feature of this new structure is two newly-created posts, Secretary 3, and the minister for Military Affairs. Previously Tin Hla was supposed to be promoted to Secretary 3, but it didn’t happen. Now, Win Myint has been appointed as Secretary 3 instead. So, another new post had to be created for Tin Hla so he wouldn’t be disappointed. Win Myint was previously the quartermaster general and before that the Western divisional commander, an unpopular post because there are few opportunities for financial gain in the western region. (The military junta usually appoints less capable individuals to this post.) SPDC Cabinet It is comprised of 40 members in 40 ministerial posts. Than Shwe is still in the prime minister’s post together with two deputy prime ministers, Maung Khin (Air Force) and Tin Htun (Navy). The Navy and Air Force have never had any real influence or power in the history of dictatorial rule in Burma. It merely looks like the power of the Navy, Air Force and Army are somewhat balanced in this structure. The Cabinet members have much more experience than most of the SPDC members. Almost all of the Lt.-Generals who were in Ministerial posts under the SLORC have been transferred to the powerless advisory board. 29 out of the 40 are old men while only 11 are new to the ministerial structure. The formation looks inflated as some posts are really not needed but just created for the appearance of power sharing, for example the newly created military affairs ministry. Tin Hla, the minister for military affairs, was once a former 22nd division commander, and is a hardliner and one of Maung Aye’s men. The minister of cooperatives, U Than Aung (a former Lt. Col. and also a Maung Aye man), is almost as corrupt as Tun Kyi, Kyaw Ba and Myint Aung and is still in the same ministerial post. The railway minister, U Win Sein (former Lt. Col), who is considered as having one of the most hardline policies against Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, is also still left in the same ministerial post (U Win Sein even told a SLORC meeting this year that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi should be sentenced with the death penalty). These two examples show that the newly formed SPDC might not change its policy on Aung San Suu Kyi and the democratic forces, and that those with good support from above are not removed, regardless of their activities and policies. Advisory board This board is very unusual, and the military has never created this kind of advisory board before. One thing for sure is that this board was created for the Lt.-Generals; in particular, Kyaw Ba, Phone Myint, Myint Aung, Tun Kyi. They will have no power to influence the newly formed SPDC. Will the SPDC resolve the current political problems or is it committed to launch a real change? The debate on whether the transformation of the SLORC to the SPDC will lead to a real change or not will, in fact, be proven very soon through the means it uses to tackle the current political problems. —How will they deal with the national convention? —Will they try to solve the underlying political problems following the agreements on mere ceasefires with the armed ethnic groups? —What will be the SPDC opinion on the KNU and the KNPP? —What will be their opinion on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi? —What kind of relationship will the SPDC have with Ne Win, the person who is most responsible for human rights violations in Burma? (Because the relationship between the SLORC and Ne Win was very close.) In conclusion, the new structure was formed not to resolve the country’s current political problems but just to resolve the military’s own internal conflicts. Maung Aye’s group has gotten the upper hand over Khin Nyunt. Their aim is also to fool the people of Burma and the international community that some changes are being made to handle the current political and economic woes. They will probably issue an amnesty and start releasing some political prisoners who have already finished their prison terms. They will announce that they do not recognise the results of the 1990 general elections. They will put more pressure on the ceasefire groups in many ways, including military pressure. They may launch a military offensive against the United Wa State Party and some other ethnic groups under the pretext of an anti-drug campaign. Burma's last military body Finally, as the SPDC cannot resolve the current political and economic crisis, the people may well take to the streets again like in 1988. As a result of this general strike, the SPDC will be terminated and discarded like previous military led organisations. Anyway, I do believe that the latest military-led body, the SPDC, will be the last one, and will be a stepping stone toward a democratic future. Lets bravely move forward and achieve victory. This opinion piece on the current regime changes first appeared on BurmaNet and was written by Moe Thee Zun, former student leader in 1988 and currently vice-chairman of the All Burma Students' Democratic Front.