On June 9, after the KIA refused to move away from the areas near the hydropower plant—which is also only a short distance from China’s strategic oil pipeline running from the Bay of Bengal to Yunnan Province—the two sides exchanged gunfire near the plant, effectively ending the 17-year-old ceasefire and forcing Chinese workers to return home. Further armed clashes ensued in the following days, with bomb explosions reported in major towns in Kachin State.
Analysts believe, however, that this latest conflict—which occurred only a couple weeks after Burma and China announced the establishment of a “comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership” during Burmese President Thein Sein’s visit to Beijing in March—could not have come as a shock to China, as happened in 2009 when the Burmese government launched a surprise offensive against a small Kokang ethnic militia that drove at least 30,000 war refugees into China.
In 2009, there were not many Chinese investments in the Kokang area and China publicly reprimanded Naypyidaw for creating instability at its border. But this time, China seemed almost looking for a fight, or at least was not adverse to one, and a week after the conflict began it merely called for “restraint on both sides.”
Dr. Zarni, a Burmese visiting fellow at the London School of Economics, described the conflict as “a war of business which transcends ethnicity.”
“This has very much to do with territorial expansion and development projects by China and the Burmese army, which only represents the Burmese ruling elite, not the Burmese public,” he said.
This piece is a summary of Ba Kaung’s article that appears in The Irrawaddy’s latest e-magazine. To read the full version visit: http://issuu.com/irrawaddy/docs/irr_vol.19no2_june2011_issuu/10?viewMode=magazine&mode=embed
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