LAIZA, Kachin State – “When we were young, we stepped on jade stones when we walked, found gold nuggets when we panned the rivers and saw tall teak trees when we passed by the forests,” said the Rev Lazum Tuja, a middle-aged ethnic Kachin and Christian priest, in a March sermon.

“But now, all of this is gone from Kachin State, mostly to China,” he told his congregation. “Since we are being looted of all our possessions, this is the dark age of the Kachin people.”

Lazum Tuja’s emotional sermon reflected the frustrations of his flock in the resource-rich Kachin State of northern Burma. Over the past two decades, the Kachin people have seen the depletion of their natural resources due to the growth of massive development projects conducted by Chinese companies with the support of the Burmese government. They have also experienced the consequent displacement of large numbers of local people and negative environmental impact on their communities.

Most of this has occurred since 1994, when the Burmese army signed a ceasefire agreement with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the second strongest ethnic armed group in Burma with an estimated 4,000 troops. The KIA has been engaged in an armed struggle for Kachin autonomy since 1961.

During the ceasefire, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), the political wing of the KIA, put its emphasis on infrastructure development in Kachin State and temporarily set aside its aspirations for autonomy at the request of the former military regime, which argued that political issues could be resolved once the new “civilian” government was in place.

On the surface, the ceasefire brought relative peace to a region previously scourged first by fighting between the Allied forces and the Japanese Imperial Army during World War II, and later between the Burmese army and the Kachin rebels, who are renowned in Burma for their fighting skills.

But it was peace without a meaningful political solution, and so the Kachin people were in a powerless position when the Burmese government began forcing them to relocate en masse without any proper compensation—leaving behind their livelihoods, culture and ancestral homes—to make way for Chinese state-owned companies such as China Power Investment to build massive hydropower dams across Kachin State. To make matters worse, much of the electricity generated from these dams will not be for the consumption of the Kachin people, but for export to neighboring China, and the revenues from the projects will to go into Naypyidaw’s coffers.

As a result, there has been widespread local resentment against the Chinese-led dam projects in Kachin State, the most prominent being the Myitsone Dam—one of the largest hydropower dam projects in the world which is currently under construction at the confluence of the Irrawaddy River. To add fuel to the fire, there has was has been escalating tension between the Burmese army and the KIA since 2009, when Naypyidaw issued its order for the KIA to join the government’s Border Guard Force (BGF).

The BGF plan was intended to place ethnic militias like the KIA and the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the country’s strongest ethnic armed group, under the central command of the Burmese army. The Burmese government set a number of deadlines for the KIA and UWSA to accept the BGF, but each repeatedly rejected the plan.

In Kachin State, the expiration of the BGF deadlines loomed large not only on the military front, but also on the political front. Kachin political parties were banned from joining the election on grounds that their leaders were linked with the KIA, whereas the ethnic political representatives from Shan, Mon and Arakan States were allowed to participate and won seats in the new Parliament.

When the election brought forth a “civilian” government led by former military generals, it was clear to the Kachin leaders that the new government would not make the political compromises that the former junta chiefs had led them to expect. In addition, the mostly Christian Kachin population were saddled with a Buddhist Kachin chief minister in their state, a man who represents the government-backed United Solidarity Development Party that controls Parliament.

Soon after the election, the Burmese government ratcheted-up the pressure on the KIA, forcing it to shut down its liaison offices in urban areas in Kachin State and then ordering the withdrawal of KIA troops from the area near the hydropower plant that Chinese interests are constructing on the Tapaing River, a tributary of the Irrawaddy, in Bhamo District bordering China’s Yunnan Province. KIA officials were indignant about being ordered to leave areas where they have been active for decades, and took it as a sign that the Burmese army was poised to launch an all-out offensive against its troops.

On June 9, after the KIA refused to move away from the areas near the hydropower plant—which is also only a short distance from China’s strategic oil pipeline running from the Bay of Bengal to Yunnan Province—the two sides exchanged gunfire near the plant, effectively ending the 17-year-old ceasefire and forcing Chinese workers to return home. Further armed clashes ensued in the following days, with bomb explosions reported in major towns in Kachin State.

Analysts believe, however, that this latest conflict—which occurred only a couple weeks after Burma and China announced the establishment of a “comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership” during Burmese President Thein Sein’s visit to Beijing in March—could not have come as a shock to China, as happened in 2009 when the Burmese government launched a surprise offensive against a small Kokang ethnic militia that drove at least 30,000 war refugees into China.

In 2009, there were not many Chinese investments in the Kokang area and China publicly reprimanded Naypyidaw for creating instability at its border. But this time, China seemed almost looking for a fight, or at least was not adverse to one, and a week after the conflict began it merely called for “restraint on both sides.”

Dr. Zarni, a Burmese visiting fellow at the London School of Economics, described the conflict as “a war of business which transcends ethnicity.” 

“This has very much to do with territorial expansion and development projects by China and the Burmese army, which only represents the Burmese ruling elite, not the Burmese public,” he said.

This piece is a summary of Ba Kaung’s article that appears in The Irrawaddy’s latest e-magazine. To read the full version visit: http://issuu.com/irrawaddy/docs/irr_vol.19no2_june2011_issuu/10?viewMode=magazine&mode=embed