In addition, for the first time in 23 years, Burma’s notorious censorship board allowed an article written by Suu Kyi to be published in the Pyithu Khit News Journal, and the Messenger News ran an exclusive interview with the Nobel laureate as a cover story as well—although the censors took 10 months before allowing the interview to be published and cut all of its political content. Burmese officials also lifted a ban on exiled media websites, including The Irrawaddy, and other international media websites, but access to the sites is still sporadic and some analysts question whether the new Internet openness is permanent or only temporary.

Then when the International Day of Democracy rolled around, not only did the new government allow Suu Kyi and the NLD to commemorate the event, it held its own ceremony featuring speeches by former top junta generals, who are currently leading members of Parliament, singing the praises of the democratic form of government.

The totality of these events have left many, both inside and outside of Burma, exclaiming that the dark skies of repression over Burma are rapidly clearing and sunny political weather is near at hand. But skeptics point out that encircling all of these displays of openness are the same instances of authoritarian abuse that were present during the black era of the junta, and there is no sign that those abuses will dissipate anytime soon.

At the top of the list of unresolved issues are Burma’s undemocratic 2008 Constitution and election laws, the more than 2,000 political prisoners held in Burmese jails, the ongoing human rights abuses by the military and the escalating armed conflicts with ethnic groups.

The lop-sided terms of the military-drafted 2008 Constitution were the main reason that Suu Kyi and the NLD boycotted the 2010 election, and opposition members have publicly called for the document to be amended to eliminate the provisions giving the military 25 percent of the seats in Parliament and establishing the military dominated National Defense and Security Council, provide more transparency with respect to the actions of the Executive Branch, put more power in the hands of the Parliament and be more inclusive of the general population. The problem is that any amendments to the Constitution require the approval of more than 75 percent of the MPs. This means the military must approve the amendments, which in turn means that Thein Sein and Suu Kyi can talk all they want, but unless the generals are on board with proposed reforms, the Constitution will remain the same.

Another thorny political issue is the status of the NLD, which won the 1990 general election in a landslide but was not allowed to form a new government and assume power, then was officially dissolved by the junta last year for refusing to register for the 2010 election. Despite the fact that it has been disbanded, the party continues to operate in defiance of attempts at intimidation and threats from the authorities. And while it is impossible to go back to 1990, it seems the NLD leaders and dissidents want to see the Burmese government publicly acknowledge that year’s election outcome.

With respect to political prisoners, the new government appears to be taking the old approach of resolving the issue by denying it even exists in the face of airtight factual evidence. Some government ministers have audaciously claimed that there are no political prisoners at all, while others have argued that even if some prisoners are being held for their political views, the number is in the hundreds, rather than the over 2,000 documented by the Thailand-based Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP).

In denying that the government holds a large number of political prisoners, if any, top Burmese officials point to the fact that many included in the list compiled by the AAPP were sent to prison for violating the country’s criminal laws. But this is the reddest of red herrings, because these “criminal laws” that they refer to include the vague and draconian state security laws such as the Electronics Act and other acts outlawing “illegal associations” and covering the “disturbance of peace and stability.” Under these laws, any activist student, politician, monk or ethnic leader engaged in opposition political activity could be charged with a criminal violation at any time, and even if they weren’t so engaged, the junta often framed them to make it appear as if they were.

The new government seems to be equally two-faced about conflicts in the ethnic areas, where human rights abuses such as using forced labor and rape as a method of intimidation continue to be documented. While professing to want peace, Thein Sein has labeled the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) “a mere insurgent group” and blamed them for the current armed conflicts even though the government has encroached on the KIA’s long-established territory, sold off Kachin State’s natural resources and evicted tens of thousands of Kachin State residents from their land to make way for the massive Myitsone Dam.