Currently, the government wants international recognition, the lifting of sanctions and the opportunity to become the chair of Asean in 2014 and host the Asean summit that same year. So there is ample reason for it to believe that by offering an olive branch to Suu Kyi, it hopes to win a golden bough from the international community which—turning the myth on its head—provides Burma with passage out of the political underworld.

It will be important to watch closely for signs of the government’s true motives—if nothing tangible happens in the near future, then that is an indication that this is all a government PR ploy to achieve the desired international benefits. But if concrete positive actions begin to appear, then there will be reason to hope for true progress in Burma. 

Some observers say that there is a power struggle now taking place between a moderate faction allied to President Thein Sein and a more hard-line faction consisting of some of the most ardent and dictatorial members of the previous regime, who include Kyaw Hsan and current Vice President Tin Aung Myint Oo.

This can cut both ways, because on the one hand, the emergence of a moderate faction may provide the best opportunity for legitimate dialogue with government players who understand the benefits of democratic change and human rights. But on the other hand, it means that there is an ever-present danger that the hard-line elements may step in and take matters into their own hands if they sense they are losing their grip on power.

With respect to the particulars of the negotiations between the government and Suu Kyi, some Burma watchers believe that President Thein Sein doesn’t have executive power to free all political prisoners at once, but there are rumors following the talks that some prominent political prisoners may be released soon, and he may be able to push through a significant reduction in prison sentences for others.

Thein Sein’s more moderate faction may also be concerned about the outbreak of an all-out civil war as a result of the Burmese military’s push into ethnic cease-fire areas.

In his press briefing, Kyaw Hsan inflammatorily blamed the renewed conflict in Kachin State on the Kachin Independence Army, but Thein Sein’s moderates may be trying to enlist the help of Suu Kyi, who has offered to act as a mediator, to tamp down the tension. She will have to make sure that she is not seen to be siding with the government, however, so that ethnic groups maintain full confidence in her.

More than anyone, Suu Kyi is aware of the Burmese government’s past use of the divide and rule strategy, and of the fact that the regime used meetings with her to manipulate domestic and international opinion. With this in mind, she is sure to have her own time limit for the talks, and will likely pull out if they do not bear fruit within that period.

But while she must remain vigilant and firm, Suu Kyi should now be pragmatic as well as strategic, and capitalize on any opportunity that arrives at her door.

She now has a platform to point out that regime policies over the past two decades have caused Burma to lag far behind its neighbors, and to argue that it is in both the interests of the oppressed Burmese people and those running the government that the country move forward in a more democratic fashion.

Therefore, Suu Kyi and the international community must send the unified message that this is no time for the Burmese leaders to fool around with public relations gimmicks meant to deceive the people of Burma and foreign governments.

In addition, both Western governments and Asean should continue to keep up the diplomatic and political pressure, because the right pressure applied at this particular moment—a time when the Burmese leaders need the international community’s cooperation to achieve some of their clearly stated goals—just might work.