The second meeting in two weeks between Burmese government minister Aung Kyi and opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi provides reason for cautious optimism that Burma will see some meaningful progress in the future. But based on past experience, all stakeholders must remain wary and maintain pressure on the government. 

The joint statement released following last week’s meeting stated: "Both sides will cooperate on stability, tranquility and development of the country as a gesture of fulfilling the genuine needs of all the people."

Aung Zaw is founder and editor of the Irrawaddy magazine. He can be reached at [email protected].

In a rather bizarre twist, during the same week that Aung Kyi and Suu Kyi met in Rangoon, the government’s minister of information, Kyaw Hsan, held a rare news conference in Naypyidaw, where he told reporters that Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD)—which was officially disbanded for failing to register for the 2010 election—should re-register as a political party.

"In view of national reconciliation, the government is delicately and carefully handling the issue of the NLD, which has no legal right to exist, offering it opportunities to serve the national interest in cohesion," Kyaw Hsan said.

“If the NLD wants to get involved in politics, it should set up a legal party through formal procedures. Anyhow, the government is doing its best to invite the NLD to its national reconciliation process," the minister of information added.

On the positive side, Kyaw Hsan used the term “national reconciliation,” which had previously been abandoned under the Than Shwe regime in favor of the foreboding phrase, “national reconsolidation.”

This indicates at least some softening of the government’s hard line stance on talks with the opposition and ethnic groups, but there has been no mention of any changes to the 2008 Constitution, which stacks the deck on behalf of the ruling party and the military to the detriment of the NLD and all other opposition parties. And if the NLD re-registers, it will be required to state that it agrees to act in accordance with a Constitution that it has dismissed as undemocratic.

Hearing these types of mixed-messages, Suu Kyi and the NLD have lately been tip-toeing along in hopes of not stepping on a political landmine that would result in a government crackdown on their activities.

Suu Kyi’s one-day trip to Pegu is a good example—during the excursion she did nothing to provoke the government, seemed to receive its coordination and revealed nothing of the dialogue between her and its officials, saying she did not want to create false hope.

In addition, Suu Kyi has recently issued a few statements under her own name, without mentioning the NLD, prompting observers to suggest that the Nobel Peace Laureate is taking personal pains to avoid a clampdown on the party.

Although most would agree that it’s too early to say whether the meeting between Aung Kyi and Suu Kyi will lead to any breakthrough, some senior NLD leaders and Suu Kyi’s personal lieutenants were upbeat after the meeting, indicating that the discussions were quite substantive.

Suu Kyi, no doubt, made sure to ask the government to act in good faith and to take meaningful steps towards reconciliation, such as releasing all political prisoners, ceasing the military offensive in ethnic regions and confirming the legitimate status of the NLD, with her as its leader.

If the government delivers what Suu Kyi has asked for and the NLD decides to re-register, the party will likely participate in the 2015 election. And if the NLD does stand in the election, the manner in which the government conducts the polls will be a true test of whether meaningful change is taking place in Burma.

All in all, with respect to the meetings between Aung Kyi and Suu Kyi, it is important to welcome the discussions and encourage more meetings with the goal of achieving real progress as a result of the dialogue.

But in the past, the Burmese government has used talks with Suu Kyi in order to appease and gain benefits from the international community, and once those benefits were in hand the regime went back to its oppressive ways.

Currently, the government wants international recognition, the lifting of sanctions and the opportunity to become the chair of Asean in 2014 and host the Asean summit that same year. So there is ample reason for it to believe that by offering an olive branch to Suu Kyi, it hopes to win a golden bough from the international community which—turning the myth on its head—provides Burma with passage out of the political underworld.

It will be important to watch closely for signs of the government’s true motives—if nothing tangible happens in the near future, then that is an indication that this is all a government PR ploy to achieve the desired international benefits. But if concrete positive actions begin to appear, then there will be reason to hope for true progress in Burma. 

Some observers say that there is a power struggle now taking place between a moderate faction allied to President Thein Sein and a more hard-line faction consisting of some of the most ardent and dictatorial members of the previous regime, who include Kyaw Hsan and current Vice President Tin Aung Myint Oo.

This can cut both ways, because on the one hand, the emergence of a moderate faction may provide the best opportunity for legitimate dialogue with government players who understand the benefits of democratic change and human rights. But on the other hand, it means that there is an ever-present danger that the hard-line elements may step in and take matters into their own hands if they sense they are losing their grip on power.

With respect to the particulars of the negotiations between the government and Suu Kyi, some Burma watchers believe that President Thein Sein doesn’t have executive power to free all political prisoners at once, but there are rumors following the talks that some prominent political prisoners may be released soon, and he may be able to push through a significant reduction in prison sentences for others.

Thein Sein’s more moderate faction may also be concerned about the outbreak of an all-out civil war as a result of the Burmese military’s push into ethnic cease-fire areas.

In his press briefing, Kyaw Hsan inflammatorily blamed the renewed conflict in Kachin State on the Kachin Independence Army, but Thein Sein’s moderates may be trying to enlist the help of Suu Kyi, who has offered to act as a mediator, to tamp down the tension. She will have to make sure that she is not seen to be siding with the government, however, so that ethnic groups maintain full confidence in her.

More than anyone, Suu Kyi is aware of the Burmese government’s past use of the divide and rule strategy, and of the fact that the regime used meetings with her to manipulate domestic and international opinion. With this in mind, she is sure to have her own time limit for the talks, and will likely pull out if they do not bear fruit within that period.

But while she must remain vigilant and firm, Suu Kyi should now be pragmatic as well as strategic, and capitalize on any opportunity that arrives at her door.

She now has a platform to point out that regime policies over the past two decades have caused Burma to lag far behind its neighbors, and to argue that it is in both the interests of the oppressed Burmese people and those running the government that the country move forward in a more democratic fashion.

Therefore, Suu Kyi and the international community must send the unified message that this is no time for the Burmese leaders to fool around with public relations gimmicks meant to deceive the people of Burma and foreign governments.

In addition, both Western governments and Asean should continue to keep up the diplomatic and political pressure, because the right pressure applied at this particular moment—a time when the Burmese leaders need the international community’s cooperation to achieve some of their clearly stated goals—just might work.