In politics, direct and frontal attack is rarely wise. Occupying the flank by co-opting the opponent's game plan for one's own purposes is a powerful ploy.

Co-option strategy, however, is a double-edged sword. It presents the risk of being swallowed by the dominant establishment, or at least having one’s reputation damaged, but it also conceals great power and maneuverability.

It depends on how one manages to play it right in a relatively conducive political environment. If well managed, it will become strength. In any case, never rule out this option in exchange for, or fixing solely on, the honor fight when the time is not ripe. To the advantage of oppositions in Burma, a multi-pronged strategy is always called for.

Mainstream oppositions, including the National League for Democracy (NLD) and major ethnic ceasefire groups, have announced they will not take part in the 2010 elections unless the military allows a constitutional revision and inclusive political process. Instead of bringing about a much-needed state-building process in which all parties rally together and make their voices heard, Burma's constitution conceded 25 percent of legislative seats to the armed forces and denied protection of fundamental ethnic rights in a multi-ethnic nation.

More importantly, the constitution allows the military virtually to run the country with the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC), and even to stage a coup d’état "if there arises a state of emergency." The opposition's principled stance of refusing to endorse the military's constitution and contest the 2010 elections, therefore, deserves understanding and support.  

However, it does not mean that there is no gap in the castle wall. The opposition should also look at the situation from a power perspective. By dissecting the junta’s constitution, the opposition will find the devil lies in the details over which Snr-Gen Than Shwe should lose sleep.

First of all, the new post-2010 election power arrangement will create two power centers—military and government. These two power centers will nonetheless be at loggerheads over the command structure and personal interests. Even within the single power center, the Burmese military has repeatedly mired itself in purges resulting from battalion forces versus the intelligence faction, and other rivalries.

Now, after the elimination of the intelligence faction, various reports confirm that there are serious animosity and tension between the military personnel and the thuggish Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) members regarding the latter's interference with the military's administrative mandate and other issues of self-interest.

The election, so long as it demonstrates a relatively competitive nature, can make elite rivalry become public issues. The government's operation with two centers of power—no matter who pull the strings—could lead to either a serious internal split or miserable inefficiency of the ruling body.

Secondly, the constitution carries destructive seed for the military to grow into a center-versus-periphery conflict. Though Than Shwe enshrined ultimate power for the commander-in-chief of the military in the constitution, he failed to provide similar authority to regional commanders in their localities, who are key pillars in the military regime's power structure.

The constitution requires the president to seek approval from the commander-in-chief in all major issues at least via NDSC procedure, but it does not guarantee any special power to regional commanders. Constitutionally, regional commanders are under the control of Chief Ministers of the Regions or States, who could well be civilians in most cases.

Even if the president appoints military Members of Parliament or retired army officials as Chief Minister of the Region or State, the regional commander who is so used to being a warlord in his domain will find it hard to accept constitutionally the prescribed power of the Chief Minister. This may in turn lead the regional commanders to oppose not only local power arrangements but also Naypyidaw's control.

The third loophole in the constitution is that if non-military parties sweep to victory or win a clear majority of the remaining seats (aside from the 25 percent reserved seats for the military), a non-military candidate can become president or at least non-military parties can control the legislative agendas. According to the constitution, parliament has the right to enact a long list of laws ranging from defense and foreign affairs to economic and social sectors. Thus, Than Shwe appears to be determined to fill the remaining parliamentary seats with members of a military-backed political party.

However, this leads to the fourth problem—another self-defeating clause of the constitution.