Burma’s Opposition Must Wage Proxy Fight

Than Shwe may want to see his USDA members seizing most of the remaining seats. Transforming the USDA into a political party and contesting the 2010 election will give the junta a great advantage because this thuggish group can exploit the existing nationwide organizational structure and also presents a constant reminder that it’s a fearful power that can intimidate the public to vote for its members. But it is not likely to happen because the constitution clearly states that "Civil Services personnel shall be free from party politics." This clause will invalidate a majority of the 24 million USDA members, who are public servants, if the group turns itself into party.

The constitution also forbids political parties and candidates for parliament from receiving any support directly or indirectly from the state, including the use of state property and money. As the USDA currently enjoys such advantages, it runs afoul of the regime's own constitution. If the military wants to create a new political party or parties, they will not carry any resemblance of the USDA in terms of name recognition, resources or and intimidating power.

These are some causes of grave concern for Than Shwe. Perhaps that's why he has kept delaying the promulgation of electoral law, which was reportedly ready to be published early this year. Than Shwe wants more time to secure his bet for more power.

The opposition, for its part, is not likely to take part in the 2010 election unless the regime concedes constitutional reform. However, it is not clear if a political party that does not contest the election will be deregistered. The constitution vaguely states that a party must "accept and practice a genuine and discipline-flourishing multi-party democracy." But if the election law forbids a party such as the NLD to have legal existence for its refusal to participate in the election, the same law will have to impact on ethnic ceasefire parties such as the United Wa State Party, Kachin Independence Organization and New Mon State Party. Most ethnic ceasefire groups have two wings—a political party and the army. It will be a tough choice for Than Shwe to make.

Aside from this principle stance, the practical power implication suggests that the credibility and legitimacy of an election and new power arrangement will be greatly hurt so long as ethnic ceasefire groups refuse to disarm and Aung San Suu Kyi's NLD does not take part in the election. With the new constitution and elections, the military thus cannot expect to minimize the cost of conflict. The most visible costs will be the continuation of international isolation and further damage to the country's economy.

In fact, the opposition could create leverage not only by being outside the regime's election process, but also by opening a new proxy front within the regime's game plan. Constitutional reform is still the most important policy demand, but the opposition should not shut their eyes to the 2010 election.

While the opposition does not take part in the elections representing the NLD, UWSP and NMSP, they must set up proxy political parties to engage in the 2010 election. Through proxies, the opposition must attempt to seize the mainstream platform in order to maximize civilian control of the regime's game. At the same time, the opposition groups such as NLD, NMSP and etc must stand strong outside the reins of an "illegitimate" constitution and election, and continue their fight for genuine reconciliation. The opposition must be savvy in combining both inside-out and outside-in strategies to usher in political change.

Just because they loathe the undemocratic constitution, the opposition should not consider total disengagement from mainstream politics. If history were any guide, the total dissociation of the Communist Party of Burma and the Karen National Union from post-independence mainstream politics made the two strongest forces gradually recede from the center stage of politics, and the power of the both groups also dwindled over time. The opposition, including both democracy forces as well as ethnic groups, should not overlook the reality of basic maturity in politics—that you cannot always get your own way, especially when one group in the conflict maintains an asymmetric power advantage.

Thus far, the KIO, other Kachin ceasefire groups and some representatives of civil society set up the Kachin State Progressive Party (KSPP) in June 2008 to contest the 2010 elections and has reportedly already begun campaigning, while the KIO remains determined not to surrender arms. This is a wise and proactive move since it will allow Kachin to control the Kachin State parliament and be represented in the national parliament. NLD and other ethnic groups should follow suit.

In fact, the formation of proxy parties and participation in the 2010 elections will help preventing a split within the opposition groups.