Last week, the government amended the Political Parties Registration Law in a manner that opened the door for both the NLD to re-register and Suu Kyi to run for Parliament, if they so choose. But for Suu Kyi and the NLD to make that decision, and for the international community to determine whether to offer the regime certain rewards for its steps toward reform, all must take a look at the reforms that have yet to be instituted, which far outweigh in number and substance those that have taken place.
In ethnic regions, fighting between ethnic and government forces has continued and in some cases escalated, and the US government and independent human rights groups continue to issue credible reports of ongoing human rights abuses in those areas. Over 1,000 political prisoners remain behind bars for no apparent reason other than to provide the government with bargaining chips for future international carrots. The Constitution remains heavily in favor of the military.
The list of needed reforms would take several editorials to name and explain thoroughly, and for many strong critics, this is enough evidence to conclude that the situation in Burma has changed only on the surface and the steps taken thus far—all of which are not full measures and are easily reversible—are only intended to gain legitimacy rather than materially change the lives of the Burmese people. “You can put lipstick on a pig, but it is still a pig,” they say.
To many foreign governments and observers, however, President Thein Sein’s reform agenda counts and the steps he has taken so far are significant. They say that reforms will be gradual, but they are inevitable unless hardliners lurking in the shadows are allowed to reemerge and force a u-turn from the positive direction the country is heading. In order to keep Burma moving forward, they argue, Thein Sein needs support from the international community and should be rewarded for his efforts thus far.
Whatever the case, we are convinced that Burma is presently going through a transition, but are unsure about where it will lead. The dilemma is that if the regime is given most of what they want for what they’ve done so far, then the reform process might stop in its tracks and some of the more reversible reforms might be taken away; while on the other hand, if the regime is given no rewards then the hardliners may step in, reassert control and return the country to the dark days of repression under the previous regime. Given this, the rewards “in kind” approach advocated by both Suu Kyi and the US is the best strategy from both a political and negotiating standpoint.
The man to watch is President Thein Sein. He has been the leader in making the conciliatory gestures and small concessions to the public and opposition thus far, and has reaped praise for his efforts. The question is whether he will have the power and political will to go further and institute the serious reforms demanded by the Burmese people and the international community.
The required reforms are not only in the political field, but also in the social, economic, health and education sectors. Hopefully, Thein Sein and the rest of the government leaders will realize that the country has enormous untapped potential if it is able to make the required changes and re-integrate into the regional and world community. Therefore it is in the government leaders’ own best interests, as well as the Burmese people’s, to make the changes demanded of them.
On the occasion of the one-year anniversary of the rigged election, we recognize and appreciate the steps that have been taken by Thein Sein’s government thus far that go beyond what most thought possible when the polls had closed. But many more concrete and meaningful reforms are still needed if the president wants to demonstrate that his words are serious and he is truly listening to the opinion of the Burmese people.
When that day arrives, we will give Thein Sein our full kudos. Until that time, we will keep them in hopeful reserve.