As a dissident who openly turned his back on sanctions and, since 2003, has attempted engagement with the junta, albeit with little or no success, I welcome US Sen. Jim Webb's highly publicized visit to my native country.
In spite of my own failures in practicing "diplomacy without license," I can see virtues in a carefully developed engagement approach which compliments and strengthens—as opposed to undermines and contradicts—Aung San Suu Kyi-led opposition and ethnic minority resistance.
However, there are serious historical, analytical and empirical issues that need to be addressed if Washington's efforts at engagement with the regime are going to contribute concretely to both moving Burma's domestic politics forward and the economic betterment of our people. Not many analysts, Burmese or foreigner, pushing for engagement have yet raised these vital issues.
Some kind of self-censorship is prevalent among the writers and analysts who are currently pushing for engagement with the regime for fear of reprisal or in exchange for entry visas.
Instead, some of my fellow “engagers” are getting ahead of themselves. They sound increasingly preachy in their analyses and shrill with their pushes for engagement.
I didn’t just advocate engagement. I walked the walk. I gave up my US asylum voluntarily and returned home to Burma, having left my 5-year-old daughter in California in her American mother’s care. In good faith, I tried to work on both confidence building measures and more substantive issues, with both Gen Khin Nyunt’s camp, and,
post-2004 purge, with those who were responsible for his demise, for almost a decade.
While pro-sanctions dissidents and political NGOs obstinately refuse to acknowledge that China, India, Thailand and Russia, with their vested Burma interests, will not heed their pro-democracy calls, the engagers fail to recognize that the military regime has absolutely no desire to reconcile in any meaningful way with political opposition parties, dissidents or groups.
The regime may be likened to a clever fish which has learned to eat the bait around the hook.
If Western engagement with the military is to contribute to the Burmese opposition's uphill battle for genuine democratic and economic change, its overriding rationale cannot be Washington's needs to contain the growing power of capitalist China.
If Webb's push for "engagement" is for the normalization of US-Burma bilateral relations on the basis of a mutual fear of capitalist China, then sooner or later Washington will begin to treat the genuine process of democratization—Aung San Suu Kyi and 2,100 dissidents behind bars as well as oppressed and downtrodden ethnic communities in Burma's low intensity war zones—as an afterthought at best and an obstacle in pursuit of US commercial and strategic interests at worst. Where Washington goes, other Western interests will follow.
A clash of serious interests, rationales and values is already on the horizon.
While the generals are reportedly hailing the senator's red-carpeted visit as a "success," Aung San Suu Kyi appears to be the odd man out in this potentially new strategic equation between the two capitals.