Resolving Ethnic Conflicts in Burma—Ceasefires to Sustainable Peace

It is essential that communities and their representatives are included in peace initiatives, as well as ethnic diaspora in neighboring countries and beyond.

Comprehensive and sustainable peace-building in Burma requires engagement with a broad range of stakeholders. This is particularly important for those communities who do not feel themselves well-represented by armed opposition groups and affiliated organizations. For example, many Karen communities (particularly Buddhists and Pwo-speakers) feel unrepresented by armed groups dominated by Sgaw-speaking Christians.

Government Initiative

In his speech to the joint Hlutaw Union Parliament on March 2, the president called for an “an all-inclusive political process for all stakeholders,” stating that “there must be mutual assurances and pledges to end all hostilities.” This historical opportunity for peace should be seized. However, there is a danger that hastily agreed ceasefire agreements could unravel later.

At present, the government’s approach to ceasefires is implemented by two sets of rival actors: Aung Thaung and Thein Zaw, and the Railways Minister Aung Min (the president’s personal envoy). This dual-track approach has created some confusion among ethnic groups. There are also questions regarding the extent to which the Burmese Army buys into recent ceasefire agreements. Burmese military field commanders have proved adept at manipulating conflicts. Will they acquiesce in civilian government-led peace initiatives?

Recent Ceasefires

Over the past few months, preliminary ceasefires have been agreed between the government and armed non-state groups representing the Chin (Chin National Front or CNF), Wa (United Wa State Army or UWSA), Mongla (National Democratic Alliance Army or NDAA), Shan (Shan State Army-North and South or SSA-North and SSA-South), Karen (Karen National Union or KNU, Democratic Karen Buddhist Army or DKBA, and KNU/Karen National Liberation Army Peace Council) and Mon (New Mon State Party or NMSP). Talks have just taken place with Karenni/Kayah (Kareni National Progressive Party or KNPP), and are on-going with the Kachin (Kachin Independence Organization or KIO).

For many of these communities, there is a profound lack of trust in the government, and particularly the Burmese Army. Also, in the case of several groups, there are internal differences of opinion and strategy. For example, some KNU leaders are seeking to move forward with an exploratory peace process, following an historic January 12 meeting with government representatives in the Karen State capital of Pa’an, where a preliminary ceasefire was agreed. Others in the KNU leadership have proposed introducing new conditions, before engaging in further talks with the government. Questions remain whether the KNU will be able to maintain a coherent and consistent position.

The situation in Kachin State is particularly dangerous. The resumption of armed conflict after a 17-year ceasefire must be understood in the context of the perceived failures of the 1994 KIO truce, and pressures on ceasefire groups to become Burmese Army-controlled Border Guard Forces—plus the government’s refusal to allow a Kachin political party to contest the 2010 elections (after promising to do so). Fighting in Kachin areas has forced some 60,000 civilians to flee. Although the KIO and government have had several rounds of talks, these have yet to result in a peace deal.

What Next?

There is a need for consistency of approach and representatives on the government side. It is important to build on political momentum, but at the same time, undue haste may lead to ceasefire agreements which cannot be sustained.

Without a clear “roadmap” leading to political negotiations, the current round of ceasefires may stall. The president’s initiative calls for the completion of initial ceasefire agreements, followed by Union level political talks, and discussion of key issues in Parliament.

The third stage of his plan envisions a grand Hlutaw, along the lines of a “New Panglong Agreement” which many ethnic nationality politicians have been calling for. It is important that participation in national level political talks includes civil society and political stakeholders, as well as armed groups.

Re-negotiating the relationship between state and society in Burma risks provoking a backlash from Burmese military hardliners. A pretext for the 1962 coup was that (then Prime Minister) U Nu was on the point of selling-out to secessionists. Might “hardliners” use the prospect of a new Panglong-type conference to precipitate a crackdown?

Another historical precedent is the ceasefires of the 1990s, when some two dozen armed ethnic groups agreed truces with the military government. It is important to avoid the missed opportunities of this period.