Another Decision Day for Suu Kyi

If anything, it has turned out that the regime—now reconstituted as a quasi-civilian government—still desperately craves the legitimacy that only the NLD can give it.

Now, at the latest turning point in this seemingly endless political saga, the NLD must once again decide whether to participate in a process that is still far from ideal—and risk giving the now ex-generals what they want and getting nothing meaningful in return.

There is every indication that this time round, Suu Kyi will steer the party toward participating in upcoming by-elections when she meets with leading members of her party from across the country tomorrow. According to party spokesperson Nyan Win, the NLD will likely register under the recently amended Political Parties Registration Law.

At a press conference held on Nov 14, Suu Kyi told reporters that the amendment of the law, which will now allow her to run for a seat in Parliament after previously excluding her and other “ex-convicts,” was a result of meetings between her and the government.

If the NLD does decide to re-register and run in the by-elections, it will be a remarkable u-turn for a party that has long staunchly opposed any involvement in the government's effort to establish a “disciplined democracy” under military control.

Not surprisingly, some NLD members have expressed opposition to the expected move and have sent petition letters to party leaders urging them to reconsider. And again, as in 1990, the dissenters have good reason for thinking as they do.

The most obvious objection is that only 40 or so seats will be contested in the by-elections, meaning that even if the NLD were to win all of them, it would still be vastly outnumbered in Parliament by the ruling military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party and military appointees.

Another concern is that, despite the recent thaw between Suu Kyi and the government, on other fronts, little has changed. The authorities are still holding large numbers of political prisoners, and the army is still waging war against ethnic armed groups, forcing thousands of refugees to flee to neighboring countries.

Under these conditions, is this really the right time for the NLD to start cooperating with the government?

As in the past, the options are extremely limited. The party can either re-register or remain officially illegal, as it has been since last year. If it takes the latter course, it may retain its moral authority, but will have to face the prospect of further pressure with little room to maneuver.

Ultimately, the decision will be made based on whether the party believes that there has been a real change in the political climate. This is a difficult judgment call, since it is easy to interpret most of the developments of the past year—the government's overtures to Suu Kyi and the NLD, its release of some political prisoners, its relaxation of controls over the media and relative tolerance of small-scale protests, and even the suspension of the unpopular Myitsone dam project—as token gestures aimed at winning international recognition.

However, there is another, more intangible factor that appears to have had a decisive influence on the party's thinking: Suu Kyi's trust in President Thein Sein's desire for reform.

Only time will tell if this trust is really warranted, but it appears that Suu Kyi, who met with the ex-general and former junta prime minister for the first time on Aug 19, believes that Thein Sein is someone with whom real dialogue is possible.

From the very beginning, Suu Kyi has said that the way forward for Burma is through dialogue. She has consistently advocated non-violent struggle and avoided any course of action that could lead to demonstrators being gunned down in the streets.

Her approach to politics has won many admirers, but also many detractors, who say that by limiting her options—i.e., ruling out violence or the threat of violence as means of achieving political ends—she has weakened her position and played into the hands of Burma's oppressors.

But as she has proven in the past, Suu Kyi is able to make do with fewer options than most politicians and still survive with her influence intact. This is a remarkable achievement in itself, but now that she seems to have found a dialogue partner she can work with, she may be able to achieve even more.

When asked by The Economist last month whether she sees herself as a president in 2015 (after the next election), she answered, “anything is possible.” Yes, in the unpredictable world of politics, and in the life of this improbable politician, it seems that nothing is impossible.