The Myitsone Dam: A Cause for Unity or an Uprising in the Making?

The growing consensus among Burmese experts, including some senior advisers to the president, and general public was now clear: the project must be stopped—period.

The watershed moment came when Minister of Electric Power (1) Zaw Min, who claimed that “no one in Myanmar knows and possesses more experience than me concerning hydro-power,” told local media on Sept 11: “Regardless of objections from any sources, the construction of the Myitsone Hydropower Project will not be abolished. … We will never rescind it.”

Zaw Min's remarks triggered public outrage. The influential Eleven Media immediately responded by collecting the views of various leading journalists, public intellectuals and even members of the regime’s Parliament. Highly respected veteran journalist Ludu Sein Win defiantly warned that people would take to the streets to defend the Irrawaddy River if civil and non-confrontational means didn't work. The Internet posting of the report drew hundreds of angry comments from readers within days, and social media and various public actions have further invigorated the momentum of the “Save the Irrawaddy” campaign.

If history is any guide, the “Save the Irrawaddy” discourse will gradually grow into the “Irrawaddy Uprising” because the emergence of this issue coincides with worsening poverty among the majority of the general public, caused by a struggling export sector hit by fluctuating currency exchange rates. In the past, whenever the severe economic deprivation of the general public was compounded by unjust events that violated the dignity of the people—for example, in 1987, when the demonetization of the Burmese currency was coupled with police brutality against students, and again in 2007, when fuel prices were hiked by 500 percent fuel price hike and police assaulted Buddhist monks in Pakokku—the people have revolted against incumbent regimes.

Of course, the uprising in itself will not yield a positive policy outcome. The effective societal pressures could force the policymakers (rarely as a unified entity but mostly likely a winning faction of them) to intervene in the situation and accommodate a mediated outcome.
In the meantime, public pressure is growing, presenting a serious challenge to the Thein Sein administration, as well as to its chief domestic interlocutor, Aung San Suu Kyi, and its key international ally, China.

Over the past few months, Thein Sein has captured the imagination of politically active members of Burmese society, both inside the country and abroad, with his various initiatives, including his meeting with Suu Kyi, efforts to convene poverty alleviation workshops, and an invitation to exiles to return home. However, if he fails to mitigate the rising tide of public anger over the Irrawaddy crisis, this could trump any credit he might receive for his otherwise laudable efforts.

However, there are a number of steps that Thein Sein could take to address the Irrawaddy issue, such as getting the Parliament to enact a much-needed environmental law, suspending the dam project to conduct more independent assessments with the assistance of Mekong River Commission, or choosing the EIA-proposed alternative plan of building two small dams north of Myitsone.

Of course, these measures are not without risk for the Thein Sein regime, which is rife with internal rivalries. However, there is reason to believe that they would enjoy support among at least some in the regime. Minister of Industry (2) Soe Thein, for instance, recently called for a review of the project and suggested exploring the option of building two small dams north of Myitsone, as proposed in the EIA report. However, this would likely anger China, the indispensable patron of the regime for international protection and financial assistance, which has already invested heavily in the project.

In fact, this is where Suu Kyi could play a role. As the democracy darling of the West, Suu Kyi could bring what the regime needs from the international community and ease Thein Sein’s disproportionate reliance on Beijing. By cooperating with Suu Kyi, Thein Sein could win international support and thus gain more leverage in dealing with Beijing, which could be persuaded to accept the need for a transitional Burma to balance between political stability and honoring business contracts of previous regimes, at least in the short term.

However, the Lady herself is in a political dilemma: should she lead the public in calling for a halt to the Myitsone project, or simply follow the people's lead? In August, she weighed in with a letter appealing to both the Burmese and Chinese governments to “reassess the scheme and cooperate to find solutions that would prevent undesirable consequences and thus allay the fears of all who are anxious to protect the Irrawaddy.” But since then, she has not followed up with any concrete program. Perhaps she is facing the same dilemma that her aging party leadership encountered during the Buddhist monk-led Saffron Revolution in 2007: not leading, but just belatedly following after the crowds.