The recent clashes between the Burma Army and the Kokang ethnic militia, known as the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), in the country's northeastern region expose a central flaw in the constitution that was approved in the so-called referendum held a few days after Cyclone Nargis struck Burma in May 2008. 

Although the Burmese junta announced on Sunday that the fighting is over and that the Kokang region—the autonomous First Special Region of the northern Shan State, recognized by Napyidaw—is again stable, there is growing suspicion and distrust of the  Burma Army within the Sino-Burmese border-based ethnic groups that have ceasefire agreements with the Naypyidaw regime.

Relations between those ethnic groups and the junta deteriorated when Naypyidaw in April ordered all ceasefire armed groups to transform their armies into a Border Guard Force, to operate under the Burmese army.

The junta’s recent move to transform the troops of the ceasefire groups into border guard forces before the upcoming 2010 election is believed to be in accordance with the constitutional provision.

Clause 338 in the new constitution’s chapter VII, entitled "Defense Services," states that all armed forces in the union shall be under the command of the defense services, known in Burmese as the "Tatmadaw," which is described as the main armed force for the defense of the union.

As the June 30 deadline approached for accepting the regime’s border guard proposal, Lt-Gen Ye Myint, chief of military affairs security and secretary of the transformation committee for the border guard force, visited the Wa, Kokang and Mongla regions to promote the plan. Burmese military officials also met with representatives from the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in Kachin State.

However, with the exception of the Burmese-Thai border-based Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, armed ceasefire groups have refused to accept the border guard proposal, effectively rejecting a central clause of the new constitution. Seventeen insurgent groups have signed ceasefire agreements with the ruling generals since 1989, according to official reports.

Despite signing ceasefire agreements, ethnic armed troops have recently been preparing for possible combat with the Burmese army by recruiting and training soldiers and producing small arms and ammunition. The United Wa State Army (UWSA), in particular, is manufacturing arms and ammunition for use by its own battalions but also to sell to other armed groups in the region.

According to a Jane’s security report, the UWSA facility marks the first time an insurgent group in the region has succeeded in setting up a small-arms production line. The UWSA is also known to be operating as traffickers and middlemen, buying from Chinese arms manufacturers, then reselling the weapons to Indian insurgent groups and the KIA.

Observers believe that the patience of Burmese military commanders is wearing thin and Naypyidaw seems have no option but to launch military action against ceasefire groups.

In a tactic aimed at achieving ethnic compliance with the junta’s border guard plan, the Burmese regime began its pressure on the Kokang group, citing its concern about Kokang  links to illegal arms production—charging that arms production facilities had been set up at the home of the MNDAA's chairman, Peng Jiasheng.

The area rocked by fighting between the Burma Army and Kokang forces is also renowned for illegal activities such as gambling, drug production and trafficking. The regime has no shortage of reasons, therefore, for using its armed forces to bring the ethnic groups into the "legal fold," neutralizing their threat and giving some extent of "legitimacy" to next year’s general election.

Meanwhile, the Burma Army is busy deploying its troops to consolidate control over several armed ethnic groups along its borders—both those with China and Thailand. There are serious concerns that the boom years that began with the signing of a ceasefire agreement with then-intelligence chief Gen Khin Nyunt are ending on the battlefield.

The current clashes on the Sino-Burmese border offer a clear picture of what the election will mean for Burma’s ethnic regions. It’s a familiar picture—of conflict, fleeing refugees and massive human rights violations.