The Price of Disunity

Aung Gyi, for instance, broke ranks and formed his own party.

Divisions within the anti-authoritarian forces existed long before the events of 1988, noted Tin Aye, a leader of the All Burma Federation of Student Unions during the uprising. “We were divided since we resisted British rule in the early 20th century,” he said.

Tin Aye recalled one meeting in 1988 where an initiative for cooperation again failed because of lack of unity. “People say it’s because of the divide-and-rule policy practiced by the British colonizers. But if you’re strong and united enough, no one can divide you.”

Standing for truth and justice isn’t enough, according to Tun Myint Aung, a leader of the influential 88 Generation Students group, all of whose leaders are now in prison. “We firmly hold to truth and justice. But I saw that just holding those virtues in our hands didn’t work.

“No one can deny that we are on the side of truth and the people. And we continue to think that that’s why we have to win this struggle one day. But the question is: when will that day come? In the days of our great-grandchildren?”

The opposition movement was prepared to make more sacrifices, he said. “But what we have to consider seriously is whether our sacrifices alone will actually bring victory.”

Since 1988, thousands of political activists were thrown into the junta’s notorious prisons and jails and at least 137 political prisoners have died behind bars, according to the Thailand-based Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma). Following the harsh crackdown on the 1988 uprising, hundreds of thousands of activists were forced into exile.

Tun Myint Aung said that apart from being prepared for personal sacrifice, political leaders should focus more on practical strategy, clear leadership and unity.

One of the policies almost all political leaders stuck to in the 1988 uprising and in later years, particularly after the 1990 election, was to push the military back into the barracks, its natural home. Suu Kyi was among those who pressed this policy, recalling that when her father founded the Burmese army he had said its role was not to oppress the people.

Nyo Ohn Myint, now head of the foreign affairs committee of the exiled National League for Democracy (Liberated Area), said: “I think that approach was extreme. One of our weak policies was to say: ‘you are with us or against us.’

“There was no middle position. You couldn’t become a political leader unless you used ruder, harsher, more insulting words against the military regime.”

Consequently, both sides always approached each other with annihilation rather than compromise in mind, he said.

“The NLD was proud of itself after winning a landslide in the 1990 elections,” Nyo Ohn Myint said.

“The result of the election made the party members ambitious beyond reality. They wanted the political upper-hand.” Viewing the result of the 1990 election as an “end game” was totally wrong, he said.

Most NLD politicians wanted the regime to hand over the power to the party, but this only resulted in the military leaders moving still further away from national reconciliation, according to Nyo Ohn Myint.

Burma in 1988 and the early 1990s was a “battlefield,” he said. “Daw Suu resembled a commander and our soldiers were the people. We appeared to be waging war against a real, strong army. When our ‘troops’ were destroyed by the military, we couldn’t rebuild our forces.

“At that time, most of us [activists as well as politicians] just had three or four months experience in politics, but we became policy makers in the NLD,” said Nyo Ohn Myint. “Wrongly, we injected our emotions into NLD policy. In fact, it was just a bull fight.”

The majority of the Burmese people approved of such a strong stance and were against compromise, Nyo Ohn Nyint said. “All of us thought the perfect victory would come soon after seeing the huge uprising of 1988.”

Aung Naing Oo said: “Bogyoke [independence hero Aung San] liked a line from the poem ‘Invictus’ by the British poet William Earnest Henley: ‘My head is bloody, but unbowed.’ We’ve also grown up with such courage.” Then he added: “On the other hand, we need engagement.”

Aung Naing Oo said it was hardly surprising that opposition political leaders were against compromise with the military regime since they couldn’t achieve it among themselves.

His appeal was: “Don’t isolate the army and don’t put them in the dark. We need to try to get them out into the light. Otherwise, change won’t happen.”

No one knew how to persuade the military leaders to move into the light, however. History has shown that the junta has never had the political will.

Aung Naing Oo believed the NLD should announce a clear power-sharing proposal to the junta rather than call for unconditional dialogue for national reconciliation.

“Burmese politics is polarized,” he said. “Perhaps we might need to find extreme solutions.