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CONTRIBUTOR
(Page 4 of 5) In addition, unless the military concedes the ceasefire status quo in ethnic areas, or makes some accommodations in its forced disarmament strategy, after the election the prospect of negotiated political resolution with major ethnic ceasefire groups will remain bleak, and therefore the risk of renewed civil war, or widespread guerrilla warfare, cannot be ruled out. So what exactly is the “something” that is better than nothing that the election cheerleaders envision resulting from the election? It seems obvious that these advocates (especially foreign observers) apply the O’Donnell/Schmitter textbook approach to Burma without understanding or considering Burmese history and political culture. They claim that it is pragmatic to promote the theory that elections—no matter how flawed—have a slippery slope tendency toward democratization and therefore could be a path to change and liberalization. Then they mock the committed activists inside Burma as an irrelevant force. But the cheerleaders’ overstatement of the election’s significance in the Burmese context, and their optimistic, linear view of liberalization and follow-up democratization, is theoretically simplistic and does not conform to Burmese history. The pro-election advocates who believe that just getting a foot in the door is an important step should pay heed to Aleksandr Gelman’s warning that: “Liberalization is an unclenched fist, but the hand is the same and at any moment it could be clenched again into a fist.” NLD members are not the only democrats in Burma This is True. Not every democrat in Burma is or was an NLD member. And the emergence of political parties, no matter how limited the political space they have to operate, is something to encourage because it may lead to political competition. But it does not necessarily follow that every new party that is not directly aligned with the regime represents the public interest and will positively influence the direction and power structure of the country. In fact, advocating this position is tricky, because it is basically an extension of the “third force” argument. The “third force” refers to an array of groups who claim to steer a neutral path between the NLD and the regime. Most of these groups, however, lean more toward the positions of the junta in their outspoken anti-sanction views and open support for the 2010 elections. When the election laws were published, many old faces resurfaced and resumed their political activities. Excluding the junta-backed USDP party and its cronies-turned-candidates, most of the newly formed political parties under regime’s election laws are being founded by former activists, NLD splinters and small ethnic groups. Any attempt at lumping them together and promoting them as the new opposition, however, is at best premature optimism and at worst an ill-conceived attempt to undermine the role of committed activists from the NLD, the Shan National League for Democracy, the 88 Generation Students and the monks. Unlike these groups, who have long struggled for democracy and human rights in Burma, the so-called “new players” do not speak out against injustices suffered by the citizens at the hands of junta, let alone represent and fight for the rights of the general public. It is not the “emerging new players” who are struggling to combat forced relocation, forced labor, child soldiers or HIV/AIDS on the ground level. And it is not the third force parties who are calling for national reconciliation as a necessary goal for the country’s future direction. It is still the NLD and their supporters who are at the forefront in representing and fighting for the public. In fact, third force advocates, both domestic and abroad, snipe at the NLD's grassroots struggles, claiming they are confrontational, failed stances. This is nothing more than elitist arrogance. Moreover, the emergence of civilian players will not necessarily promote a liberal environment and values such as tolerance under the new hybrid system. The most intimate example from Burmese history is that of the pre-war politicians, with whom the British shared power from the 1920s through the 1930s. It was U Saw, the native Burmese civilian premier, who called upon the British Governor in the early 1940s to take repressive actions against “extreme politicians” in order to avoid disorder, and later ended up assassinating Aung San and his cabinet members in 1947. Paul Collier was dead right when he claimed that democratic politics as often practiced in the countries of “the bottom billion” (i.e. hybrid systems that allow elections with repression) tends to attract candidates with criminal records. And those who promote the option of emerging third force players without stating clearly what it means to be a democrat confuse the moral clarity of people’s struggle against dictatorship. COMMENTS (14)
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