| By WILLIAM ASHTON | MAY, 2004 - VOLUME 12 NO.5 |
Over the past 15 years, Burma’s armed forces have demonstrated a remarkable ability to justify arms acquisitions that, to most observers, seem to be without any credible strategic or economic rationale. The ruling State Peace and Development Council, or SPDC, appears determined to persist with its military modernization and expansion program in the face of such stark realities as Burma’s struggling economy, the collapse of its social infrastructure, the poverty of its people and the concerns of its neighbors. Perhaps the best example of the military junta’s questionable priorities is its determination to build a nuclear reactor. This project has caused considerable unease in the region, and in centers like Vienna and Washington. Over the past few months, this concern has begun to turn to alarm, as reports have emerged suggesting that the reactor may be built with the assistance of North Korea. This has raised the specter of a future nuclear weapons program that could intimidate Burma’s neighbors and be used as a bargaining chip against the US and its allies. Burma’s nuclear ambitions date back at least to December 2000, when the SPDC’s Minister for Science and Technology, U Thaung, visited Moscow and met with the Russian Minister of Atomic Energy. There were reports at the time that Burma had also approached China, and made its interest in a nuclear reactor known to potential vendors there. Pakistan too may have been contacted for assistance. The Department of Atomic Energy was created in U Thaung’s ministry, which was made responsible for pursuing this project, including contacts with the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA. In September 2001 Rangoon formally approached the IAEA for assistance in obtaining a nuclear research reactor. The agency initially decided to ignore the request, on the grounds that Burma neither needed a reactor nor had the infrastructure and funding to support such a project. It was also concerned about the collapse of Burma’s education system since 1988 and its low technical skills base. Despite these reservations, an IAEA inspection team was sent to Burma that November. The team’s assessment, however, simply confirmed the agency’s original views. There were rumors in early 2002 that, without the IAEA’s help, the junta could not meet the cost of the nuclear project. But in May it was announced that Russia’s Atomic Energy Ministry, known as Minatom, had agreed to “cooperate in designing and building a nuclear studies center that will include a research nuclear reactor with a thermal capacity of 10 megawatts and two laboratories.” Minatom undertook to design the center, help choose the site, deliver the nuclear fuel, and supply all essential equipment and materials. Russian experts would assemble, install and help operate the center’s “main technical equipment.” The agreement included structures for the disposal of nuclear waste and a waste burial site. Russia would also train Burmese technicians to help build and operate the reactor. The deal was signed in Moscow in July 2002. There was initial speculation that the nuclear facility would be built in Rangoon, followed by some unlikely reports that it was going to be built on an offshore island near Ye. However, it was later revealed that a groundbreaking ceremony for the facility was scheduled to take place at a secret location near Magwe, in central Burma, in January 2003. The reactor and associated equipment were to be delivered later that year. The Rangoon regime said that it expected the reactor to be built “within a few years.” In anticipation of these events, hundreds of Burmese officials were sent to Russia for training. The reasons behind the junta’s interest in a nuclear reactor have never been clear. There were several statements during 2002 that the reactor was to be used for peaceful medical purposes. The Foreign Minister was reported as saying too that the reactor could be used “possibly to generate nuclear power.” Yet the construction of such an expensive and highly specialized facility for electricity generation is irrational. Burma could barely maintain its basic civil infrastructure, and its level of technological development was very low. The production of medical isotopes could be achieved more economically elsewhere. While it suffers from electricity shortages, Burma has ample natural gas and is constructing several new hydroelectric power stations. The main impetus behind the nuclear reactor project appears to be status and prestige. The international reaction to the announcement of the nuclear project was predictable. A number of serious concerns were expressed, relating largely to the safety and security of any reactor built in Burma. With the example of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster clearly in mind, the Thais in particular were worried about Russia’s involvement in the construction project, and the nature of the facility that was to be built. Also, Thailand and other neighboring countries feared that Burma would be unable to operate and maintain the reactor. The IAEA team that visited in 2001, to assess the country’s preparedness to use and maintain a nuclear reactor safely, was highly critical of Rangoon’s standards, which were well below the accepted minimum, even for conventional power plants. Burma’s record of earthquakes was also raised. There were security concerns too. Despite ceasefire agreements with most of Burma’s armed insurgent groups, some were still fighting the junta, and posed a potential risk to any nuclear reactor. While doubtless heavily guarded, the facility would still be an attractive insurgent target. Despite the imposition of tight controls over popular protest since the 1988 democratic uprising, there was also a danger of civil unrest, arising from decades of repression by the military government and its inept handling of the economy. A nuclear reactor would represent a potent symbol of the regime’s penchant for costly high-status projects, pursued at the expense of basic services like health and education. With the international terrorist threat in mind, the US State Department has already demanded assurances from the junta that it could safely secure such sensitive facilities and materials. After the initial announcement of the nuclear project, little additional information has been made available about the reactor, its location, or the safeguards being put in place to ensure that it is built and operated according to international standards. This has led to considerable speculation and a number of additional concerns. In particular, fears have been expressed that Burma might become a rogue state, and try to develop a nuclear weapon. Even if a nuclear weapons option was not available, it was argued, the presence of a nuclear reactor would at least give the Rangoon regime the capability to develop a “dirty bomb,” which could spread radioactive material through a conventional explosion. Few objective observers question the ruthlessness of the military junta in Rangoon or its determination to cling to power. But an attempt to acquire a nuclear weapon would be completely out of character for a government that, ever since its independence in 1948, has had a history of active participation in global disarmament initiatives. There was no sign before 2000 that Burma had ever considered the acquisition of a nuclear reactor, let alone nuclear weapons. Indeed, successive governments in Rangoon have consistently sought to counter nuclear threats and enhance the country’s security by opposing the manufacture, deployment and use of nuclear weapons. Burma has an impressive record of supporting international legal instruments designed to limit nuclear weapons proliferation and use. Since 1988, this policy has been confirmed by the junta. For example, in December 1995 it signed the Bangkok Treaty, which included a reaffirmation by the ten signatory states of the obligations assumed under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and contained a ban on the development, manufacture, possession, control, stationing or transport, testing or use of nuclear weapons. Notwithstanding this record, the possibility of Burma acquiring a nuclear weapons capability is now being accorded greater attention. In late 2003, it was revealed that the nuclear reactor deal with Russia had been shelved, apparently because the junta had been unable to reach final agreement with Moscow regarding payment. While no firm evidence is yet available, there have been suggestions in the international news media that Rangoon may have turned instead to North Korea to help build its nuclear facilities. This, in turn, has raised the specter of a Burmese nuclear weapons program. In November 2003 the Far Eastern Economic Review reported that North Korean technicians had been seen unloading large crates and heavy construction equipment from trains in central Burma, near the reported site of the future nuclear research reactor. In addition, aircraft from North Korea’s national airline have reportedly been seen landing at military airfields nearby. These developments apparently coincided with the arrival in Rangoon of representatives of the Daesong Economic Group, which has a record of secretly proliferating nuclear technologies to Pakistan. The clear implication of the article was that Pyongyang was providing equipment and materials to help build a nuclear reactor. The small research reactor Burma was getting from Russia was said to be unsuited for the manufacture of fissile material, but Pyongyang has the expertise to provide Rangoon with other options. These fears were encouraged by an unconfirmed news report in November 2003 that 80 members of the Burmese armed forces had recently departed for North Korea to study nuclear technology. The junta has denied that it has any plans to acquire weapons of mass destruction. SPDC spokesmen have stated that Burma was putting its energy and resources into the pursuit of a peaceful, stable and smooth transition to a multi-party democracy and an open market economy. The nuclear reactor, which was apparently still on the junta’s list of priority development projects, was said to be for peaceful research purposes only. The junta has further claimed that Burma was “everyone’s friend and nobody’s ally or enemy.” It said that it had no ambition to arm itself with nuclear weapons and firmly rejected the idea that Burma would ever threaten any of its neighbors. There is still considerable confusion about Burma’s plans for a nuclear reactor. A number of key questions remain unanswered. It is likely to be several years before the facility is built and comes on line. A number of major obstacles will need to be overcome. But even if a Burmese nuclear weapon is simply a bad dream, the construction of a nuclear reactor will severely stretch Rangoon’s budget and technical capabilities. It may test Burma’s relations with its neighbors and the wider international community even more. The full version of this article appeared in the February issue of the Asia Pacific Defence Reporter. William Ashton writes regularly about security issues in Asia.