If the Thai prime minister adopted a more principled stance on Burma, it would improve Thailand’s image
His critics and detractors notwithstanding, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra can not be accused of passivity. He is famously bold and pro-active in his domestic dealings, having monopolized Thailand’s political space with virtual authoritarian rule, and implemented a raft of populist policies that have earned him an unprecedented second term for an elected leader. What Thaksin has done at home has been mirrored by his foreign policy activism. The Thai leader has devised a foreign policy platform that revolves around a clutch of regional initiatives, underpinned by the Asia Cooperation Dialogue, the Ayeyarwady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy and a series of strategic bilateral free-trade agreements. His audacity in past foreign relations included his swift military response to the arson and looting of the Thai embassy in Phnom Penh in January 2003. Thaksin’s assertive-ness can also be seen in his defiance of past human rights criticisms by the UN and the US State Department. “The UN,” he once blustered, “is not my father.”
Yet when it comes to Thailand’s relations with Burma—an issue on which Thaksin’s centralized and personalized foreign policy platform pivots—the self-styled “CEO Prime Minister” has been conspicuously timid. Thailand’s Burma policy under Thaksin has been characterized by accommodation and appeasement, at times bordering on flattery. It has rendered “constructive engagement” completely elastic in accordance with the preferences of the State Peace and Development Council, Burma’s ruling military regime. Whatever the SPDC wants, the Thaksin government seems willing to comply. For a nationalist leader who has told off the UN and the US, Thaksin has uncharacteristically kowtowed to the SPDC’s whims, letting Bangkok play second fiddle to Rangoon.
When the SPDC snubbed Thailand’s roadmap for domestic political reconciliation and reform early last year and came up with its own seven-point roadmap, the Thaksin government’s lame excuse was that its initiative was set up to “show a way forward” for the junta. When Gen Khin Nyunt, the former Burmese prime minister, was purged from the SPDC’s hierarchy in October 2004, the Thaksin government readily accepted its counterpart’s official explanation of corruption and graft. Gen Khin Nyunt’s downfall, in fact, bankrupted Thaksin’s hitherto bilateral relationship with Burma, which centered on cordial ties between the respective leaders of both countries. As Thaksin had invested substantial diplomatic energy and resources in cultivating ties with Khin Nyunt, the latter’s demise was disastrous for Thailand’s Burma policy. It also exposed the myopia and fundamental flaws of Thaksin’s personalized diplomacy. More recently, when the dumbfounded SPDC implicitly blamed Thailand as a sanctuary for the unknown perpetrators of the bomb blasts that convulsed Rangoon last May, Thaksin’s wimpish reply was that Thailand “does not harbor terrorism.” His government failed to launch an official protest against the SPDC’s blatant accusation.
In effect, Thaksin’s Burma policy is a manifest failure. The overstretched constructive engagement with Rangoon has cost Thailand considerable political capital in its international standing. It has also hindered Thailand’s role in Asean, whose principal members have recently called for political dialogue in Burma between the military government and the civilian-led opposition, the National League for Democracy. Indeed, despite being the regional organization’s frontline state, Thailand missed the boat on Asean’s strengthened position vis-a-vis Rangoon. The SPDC’s recent decision to forgo the rotating chairmanship of Asean was much more a result of the collective pressure from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore than from Thailand.
In an era when Thailand’s national interest is entwined with the vested interests of its prime minister’s family-owned businesses, Thaksin’s spongy Burma policy is not surprising. The Shin telecommunications conglomerate currently has a stake in Burma’s sole internet service provider, with wide-ranging satellite interests in the pipeline. Thus when Thaksin deals with the SPDC, it is difficult to demarcate where his family’s telecom interests end and where Thailand’s national interest begins.
The SPDC’s recent diplomatic retreat on the Asean chairmanship is likely to affect the fluctuating geopolitical dynamics of South and Southeast Asia. Although Burma may now be nudged closer to China’s embrace, with India as a rival suitor, Asean has staked its position. For Thailand to play a leading role befitting its frontline status, akin to its efforts vis-a-vis Cambodia throughout the 1980s, it needs to firm up its Burma policy. If Thailand’s firmer posture elicits constructive changes in Rangoon, Bangkok will earn international credibility. If nothing changes in Rangoon, the international community will still respect Thailand. A more principled stance on Burma would also allow Thaksin to keep the domestic criticisms of his conflicts of interest at bay. This is a win-win-win proposition that would enhance Deputy Prime Minister Surakiart Sathirathai’s bid to be the next UN secretary general. It would also elevate Thaksin’s statesmanship and international stature in his stumbling but ongoing quest for regional leadership.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak is assistant professor of international political economy, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok.
