Can free elections lead to democratic reform?

While future elections in Burma remain a part of the ruling junta’s seven-point “road map” for democratic reform, the significance of such elections—and their likelihood of leading to democratic reform—remains unclear.

“The government has established a seven-point road map for democracy, and that map is the chief political focus of the state,” says Snr-Gen Than Shwe, the leader of Burma’s military junta. Ousted Prime Minister Gen Khin Nyunt first introduced the so-called road map two years ago.

As long as the soldiers hold their arms at the ready, [a constitutional draft] will become the law

The announcement of the seven-point plan, which includes a revival of the twelve-year old National Convention, came shortly after Thai officials in Bangkok made a similar suggestion to the military regime. The convention bears the daunting responsibility of drafting a new constitution that must then get approval by a referendum and ultimately lead to free elections.

Fifteen years have passed since Burma’s last election, in which the National League for Democracy won a landslide victory but was prevented from assuming their rightful control of the government. Since that time, many opposition leaders have died or have retired from public life. Still more languish in Burma’s prisons.

Will the outcome be any different for future elections in Burma?

“It makes no difference that those elected in 1990 have either died, are still living in prisons or are too intimidated to speak out. The constitutional draft will be adopted,” said Josef Silverstein, a long time US-based researcher on Burma. “As long as the soldiers hold their arms at the ready, it will become the law,” he added.

A veteran politician based in Rangoon calculates that the junta can force the adoption of a constitution and sway the outcome of a referendum with little difficulty. The regime has held occasional mass rallies—backed by the government’s Union Solidarity and Development Association—throughout the country to increase popular support.

Since 1990, opposition groups in Burma have suffered setbacks. The NLD and the Shan National League for Democracy—winner of the second largest share of votes in the 1990 election—have been crippled by the junta’s suppression of their political activities. Leaders from both parties are currently detained or in prison, and the NLD continues to wrestle with political divisions among its members.

Prominent student leaders—some of whom have recently been released from prison—may represent a potentially viable political force in Burma. Two such leaders, Min Ko Naing and Ko Ko Gyi, have expressed their strong desire to help solve the political crisis in Burma.

Several ethnic ceasefire groups could also wield some power in future elections and play a vital role in the National Convention, where the views of Burma’s ethnic minorities rarely get much attention.

However, their right to participate in the National Convention and the drafting of a new constitution has been questioned by some because the ceasefire groups’ delegates are not elected and therefore have no right to represent their respective ethnic groups.

“We will not accept this constitution,” said Fu Cin Sian Thang, chairman of the Zomi National Congress and an ethnic member of the Committee Representing the People’s Parliament. Indeed, many principal opposition parties in Burma—including the NLD and SNLD—have boycotted the National Convention, the nominal first step toward future elections.

Opposition groups in Burma may not accept the results of a new election—or even participate in such an election—initiated by a boycotted assembly, says Fu Cin Sian Thang.

The USDA—under the patronage of Than Shwe—is expected to refashion itself as a major political force. The association now claims to have 24 million members, though many were compelled to join the group or were enlisted without their knowledge. The activities of the USDA get heavy coverage in government-controlled news outlets.

Neighboring countries—particularly Thailand and China—approve the regime’s efforts toward implementing the road map, and international organizations such as the United Nations and Asean have rarely been critical, though they often encourage the regime to speed up the progress of reforms.

It is an open secret that the regime lacks popular support at home and abroad. However, Silverstein believes that the junta will make sure to “devise the stages so that the people will have no alternative but to follow the commands” of the military.

Silverstein adds that the USDA’s media blitz is reminiscent of moves made by other dictators from the region, such as the former Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos, who managed to earn widespread support through mass assemblies.

Htay Aung, a Burmese researcher with the exiled Network for Democracy and Development, shares Silverstein’s view, saying that the junta will not make the same mistakes that they did in 1990. He also doubts that the NLD could repeat their landslide victory of 1990.