In early November 2010, Burma held a sham general election while Aung San Suu Kyi was still under house arrest, and even if she had been free the country’s Political Parties Registration Law would have prohibited her from running for a seat in the military- and ex-military-dominated Parliament.

In contrast, last week Burma’s Parliament passed amendments to the Political Parties Registration Law that would allow both Suu Kyi and her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), to legally participate in the political process. Moreover, President Thein Sein appears to be seeking what may be the ultimate stamp of legitimacy for his new government by actively attempting to persuade Suu Kyi to register the NLD and run for office.

Aung Zaw is founder and editor of the Irrawaddy magazine. He can be reached at [email protected].

Following the meeting, the pro-democracy leader was upbeat and said that in the coming days she will hold a series of meetings with NLD leaders, ethnic leaders and other opposition allies. When asked if the NLD would register, however, Suu Kyi kept her cards close to her vest. "Once we see the law, then we will hold a party meeting and decide whether or not we will register," she said.

Reading between the lines, Suu Kyi was saying that if the negotiations taking place over the details of the Political Parties Registration Law and the other major issues being discussed result in terms acceptable to her and the NLD, then the party will re-register and contest in future elections, including the upcoming by-election for seats vacated—mostly by MPs joining Thein Sein’s administration—since the November 2010 election.

To the dismay of critics and observers who just a few months earlier dismissed her relevance and ability to lead, Suu Kyi is now more influential and popular than ever, and both Thein Sein and major international players such as the US have clearly acknowledged her as the main opposition leader. This was confirmed in spades by her one-on-one meeting with Thein Sein in August, and reconfirmed by her latest meeting with his liaison, as well as the government’s not so subtle attempt to court her into the formal political process.

Suu Kyi is well aware of the factions and rivalries within the Burmese government and clearly sees Thein Sein as the horse to place her bet on. This was reflected in an article in the Wall Street Journal, where she said she believes the president is honest and straightforward.

This perception did not happen immediately after the new government was formed; it took time to emerge over a period of mutual confidence building. Suu Kyi was first allowed a minor personal excursion to Bagan, during which she took pains to not be too overtly political or do anything to unleash a backlash from government hard-liners.

On July 19, Thein Sein’s government allowed Suu Kyi even more leeway when it permitted her and some 2,000 people to march from NLD headquarters to the Martyr’s Day ceremony, where police officials did not intervene and actually helped facilitate the biggest public opposition gathering since the 2007 crackdown on pro-democracy protesters. Then on August 14, Suu Kyi was allowed to travel to Pegu and meet with supporters. In both instances, Suu Kyi kept things low-key and did not take advantage of the situation by stirring the crowd into any kind of anti-government frenzy, although she clearly could have done so if she had wanted to.

After Martyr’s Day, the meetings between Suu Kyi and government minister Aung Kyi resumed, and Suu Kyi saw a perceptible difference in her interactions with the new government versus the old military junta. Under the previous regime, Aung Kyi was merely a messenger of the senior generals. But to Suu Kyi’s delight, this time he was given more authority to speak on behalf of the government and brought decent proposals on the key issues to be discussed, including the release of political prisoners.

Suu Kyi was even more pleasantly surprised when Thein Sein invited her to visit to Naypyidaw to meet with him and attend a government-sponsored economic forum.

A key player who deserves at least some credit for the meeting and the improved relations is respected economist U Myint, who despite having played guitar along with Suu Kyi’s son at NLD headquarters after Suu Kyi was released, was appointed to be the chief economic advisor to the president.

The irony is that no foreign envoy played a major role in breaking the ice between the two camps—it was a homegrown initiative that came from the mutual desire of both sides wanting to sit down and talk.

Suu Kyi was probably, and rightfully, skeptical at first. After all, she had been invited several times in the past to meet with key regime leaders, including the former junta chief, Snr-Gen Than Shwe, and each time she had later ended up back under house arrest. But despite being known as a vague politician beholden to Than Shwe, the more personal style of Thein Sein undoubtedly helped set Suu Kyi more at ease.

During her visit to Naypyidaw, Thein Sein’s wife, Khin Khin Win, even held a non-pretentious family dinner for Suu Kyi that included good-natured and candid conversation, according to informed government sources. This was quite a contrast from Suu Kyi’s previous experience with the wives of Burmese generals, many of whom were notoriously corrupt and haughty and held open animosity towards the pro-democracy leader.

In Burma, personal relationships play a big part in discussions between opposing parties, and Suu Kyi has been extremely positive since her cordial visit with Thein Sein in Naypyidaw. She seems convinced that changes are coming to Burma and it is time to take a chance—and that the best way she can contribute to the peace and prosperity of the nation is to participate in the process of political transition.

The Burmese government’s embrace of Suu Kyi—along with steps such as releasing a number of political prisoners, relaxing restrictions on the press and suspending the Myitsone Dam project—has turned the recently isolated country that was known as a pariah state into a diplomatic hotspot.

Indonesia currently holds the chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), a chair which Burma would like to assume in 2014, and Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa just visited Burma on a fact-finding mission. After the foreign minister’s three-day visit, he said that Naypyidaw's political reforms look “irreversible” and added that he believed the process would continue, but said more changes need to take place before Burma assumes the Asean chair.

The Burmese government is also keen to improve relations with the US in order to counterbalance China’s influence, and to get US sanctions lifted or significantly reduced. The US assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights and labor, Michael Posner, and the US coordinator for policy on Burma, Derek Mitchell, will arrive in Naypyidaw today. It will be Mitchell’s third visit in two months, and he has previously said that if Burma takes concrete actions towards real reform, the US will reciprocate in kind.

European support, particularly from certain EU members, has been actively solicited by the new Burmese government as well. Norway’s deputy foreign minister concluded a visit to Burma a few weeks ago and now the Norwegian international development minister is in town. In addition, Harn Yawnghwe, the director of the Brussels-based Euro-Burma Office, just concluded a trip to Burma that included a flurry of meetings with government and opposition leaders.

The UN—whose special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Burma has recommended a Commission of Inquiry into crimes against humanity in Burma—also has its special envoy in country, with Vijay Nambiar currently in Rangoon for his second visit this year.

So with Asean, the US, Europe and the UN all represented in Burma at virtually the same time—a time when Suu Kyi is actively engaged in discussions with the government regarding her potentially joining the formal political process—what does the revolving door of diplomats denote?

Are they all in Burma just to keep tabs on the situation? Or are they there to both encourage the “reform” process and push the Burmese leaders to quickly make it more concrete and irreversible?

With Burma’s by-elections and an Asean meeting upcoming, and with the US about to turn the corner into an election year, it seems that now may be the time that the preliminary small-talk has stopped and the major players have sat down for serious negotiations over the top issues of concern to all sides. If so, then this may be the best chance that Suu Kyi has to force Thein Sein and his new government allies to put their cards on the table and show how serious they are about meaningful and irreversible reform.

Given the internal rivalries and the possibility that the balance of power could tip back towards the hard-liners if Thein Sein and his reformist group falters, some political analysts have argued that Thein Sein should receive sufficient support from inside and outside of Burma to strengthen both his reform agenda and his internal power without expecting him to give too much in return at this point.

Others disagree, however, suspecting that the government is attempting to increase its legitimacy and obtain international concessions while making only small changes around the edge while maintaining firm control at the center.

Suu Kyi is aware of the arguments on both sides and of the pitfalls of taking one position or the other. But despite her improved relations with the government and their open attempts to woo her, she must maintain her role as the main opposition figure and maximize this opportunity for the benefit of all the people of Burma, including the country’s diverse ethnic groups.

Suu Kyi has received significant support from ethnic groups since her release from house arrest in November and, like her father, she will not betray her ethnic allies. Their issues, including the ongoing armed conflicts, have been one of her top agenda items when meeting with government officials, and she seems committed to following through on her offer to act as a peace broker between the government and ethnic groups.

Since Suu Kyi’s release from house arrest, there has been an ongoing debate about whether she should remain as head of the NLD or leave the party and become a national figure without allegiance to one particular organization, allowing her to lead the effort towards national reconciliation by being an independent player in a position to bridge the gaps between all stakeholders. Suu Kyi is also aware of shortcomings in the NLD and the need for reform, so it won’t be surprising if in the future she delegates more authority and power to a younger generation of respected leaders, some of whom may currently be outside the NLD fold. There has even been a rumor that she has been offered a government position, but has turned it down.

However, regardless of what Suu Kyi chooses to do about her NLD affiliation in the future, or whether she decides to run for office or stay outside the day-to-day political fray, what is now necessary is that the positive energy between the government and opposition camps be used to bring about real change that will have a significant impact on the lives of the people of Burma.

The many political dissidents still in prison, the ethnic soldiers fighting in the jungle, those suffering from human rights abuses such as rape and forced labor, refugees and displaced people along the border and all the people struggling just to survive in Burma deserve a better future, and they have already placed their faith in Suu Kyi as their leader and the chief negotiator on their behalf.

What will be required is a combination of goodwill and pragmatism together with tough resolve and an unflinching negotiating strategy regarding key issues. In order to obtain the best results, both the Burmese people and the international community need to speak with one voice. Suu Kyi is that voice, and she should be given both our full support and a blank check to cut the best deal possible under the current circumstances—which all signs indicate could, if the negotiations are handled properly, be a good one for the people of Burma.

Related article: Suu Kyi's Long Road to Naypyidaw