Suu Kyi steps into the fray at a time when the NLD desperately requires fresh ideas and strong leadership

After keeping Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest for more than seven continuous years, on Nov. 13, less than one week after holding a highly controversial general election, the Burmese military regime finally freed her.

The international community joined Burmese at home and abroad in welcoming Suu Kyi back from political and social isolation. The junta leaders, on the other hand, treated the release as if they had just pardoned a convicted criminal. Nothing more, nothing less.

While the release was labeled “unconditional,” many skeptics asked the question: how long can the pro-democracy figurehead enjoy her freedom before being locked up again? If Suu Kyi tests the limits of how far she can push forward in her quest for justice, freedom and democracy, sooner or later she will cross an invisible line that marks the threshold of Snr-Gen Than Shwe’s patience.

Nobel Peace Prize laureate Suu Kyi has been arrested, convicted and detained so many times by now that even Burma’s military-run courts may have run out of excuses for imprisoning her one more time.

There is a very real fear throughout the country that Suu Kyi may be assassinated.

New Parliament, Same Old Government

Suu Kyi is entering into a new political arena, and faces a mountain of challenges. Naypyidaw will soon open the doors of its newly constructed parliament building and host a freshly appointed government and president, all convened under the terms of a new constitution.

Despite all the benchmarks for a fresh start, few observers doubt that the opposition, and Suu Kyi in particular, will continue to be ignored by the junta.

The pro-democracy voices among the international community are also impatient—they urgently require an end to the ongoing political stalemate, and if that means shifting policy toward engagement with the incoming “civilian” government, then that’s just what they’ll do.

Washington, the most consistently vocal critic of the Burmese regime, has suddenly done a 180-degree turn on its policy of isolating the generals, and has instead adopted a new approach based on “direct engagement.” This approach is similar to that of several (but not all) European governments that have long advocated engaging the regime and providing more aid inside Burma, while at the same time maintaining sanctions on the ruthless military elite and their cronies.

Changing NLD’s Old Guard

Suu Kyi’s first task is to put her own house in order.

It was recently revealed by WikiLeaks that US diplomatic dispatches attributed the scathing internal criticism of the National League for Democracy’s (NLD’s) senior leadership to their failure to work with 88 Generation Students leaders in 2007 while Buddhist monks were leading nationwide anti-government protests.

“Repeated overtures from and ‘summits’ with the leaders of the 88 Generation in 2007 failed to result in any significant cooperation between the factions,” the cable said, adding that although Suu Kyi remained a popular and beloved figure among most Burmese, this status is not enjoyed by her party.

“Already frustrated with the sclerotic leadership of the elderly NLD ‘Uncles,’ the party lost even more credibility within the pro-democracy movement when its leaders refused to support the demonstrators last September, and even publicly criticized them,” wrote Leslie Hayden, the political and economic affairs chief of the US embassy in Rangoon, in a report in July 2008.

The WikiLeaks cables helped underline what many disenfranchised NLD members have been saying for a long time, which is that, during the 2007 Saffron Revolution, the party leadership under the control of controversial Chairman Aung Shwe remained aloof and distant from the protesters. Aung Shwe and his advisers were known for an extremely cautious approach toward the regime. His move to register the NLD for the election was thwarted and he has since turned his back on the party.

Instead of reaching out to technically sophisticated bloggers and young, Internet-savvy activists, “the Uncles spend endless hours discussing their entitlements from the 1990 elections and abstract policy which they are in no position to enact,” the cable said.

“Additionally, most MPs-elect show little concern for the social and economic plight of most Burmese, and therefore, most Burmese regard them as irrelevant,” it added.

Party sources have told The Irrawaddy that the release in late 2008 of Win Tin, a founding member of the NLD and an outspoken critic of the regime, reinvigorated the party. They also said that since the party decided in March to boycott the election, the party’s “Uncles” have stopped attending party meetings.

Suu Kyi steps into the fray at a time when the NLD desperately requires fresh ideas and strong leadership.

Engaging with the USDP

Perhaps a clear and prudent first move would be if Suu Kyi could convince the new government to release political prisoners as a goodwill gesture. The new parliament will include politicians that Suu Kyi will have to work with in the future. At the same time, Naypyidaw will be looking for options to legitimize its rule and “The Lady” could help pave the way.

To Suu Kyi, the enemy is within. She needs to reform the NLD—it is no longer the party that faced down the military in 1988 and won the election in 1990.

Second, she needs to reach out to the military leaders—more so to the new generation of military cadres who will take over the reigns of power when Than Shwe and his aging clique have left the stage.

Daughter of Burma’s independence hero, the charismatic 65-year-old Oxford University graduate is now standing at a historic juncture. To progress, she must surround herself with good, wise, dedicated people who are not self-serving—heroes like herself.

Together they must agree on a long-term game plan and be prepared to negotiate and work with Than Shwe’s successors. Suu Kyi must personally send a clear and genuine message to the army rank and file that she accepts and respects the military as a major stakeholder in Burma’s future.

Suu Kyi’s call for a Second Panglong Conference is fine; but she needs to establish solid backing from the ethnic groups, including the major ethnic armies that have been disenfranchized from the political process for so long.

Currying Favor Abroad

Third, Suu Kyi must also make herself and her party available to Burma’s neighbors and trading partners, most notably China. In another cable published by WikiLeaks, a senior Chinese official who met with a top US diplomat in 2008 is reported to have indicated that Beijing was “fed up” with the Burmese junta for “foot-dragging” on reforms.

In another dispatch, US officials described a luncheon between the then chargé d’affaires in Rangoon, Shari Villarosa, and former Chinese Ambassador Guan Mu, who reportedly acknowledged to her that the regime “has done nothing to improve the lives” of the people in Burma.

The Chinese ambassador went on to say that Beijing had repeatedly pressed Burmese officials to “speed up the political dialogue and warned them that the international community would not accept any backtracking,” the dispatch said.

Another 2008 cable boosted the sense that Washington and Beijing somehow shared a common policy toward Burma—to improve its economy and, in turn, its people’s livelihoods. This international situation is an advantage to Suu Kyi and one she can exploit now that she has re-emerged as a national figure.

As Buddhists say: “Nothing is permanent”— the regime and Than Shwe will not last forever. It means there must always be a leader-in-waiting, someone the people trust who is able to ride the current waves of uncertainty.

Suu Kyi’s destiny is to be that leader. She has already won the hearts of the people; now she must win the minds of everyone else.