The Burmese military regime claims that the Nov. 7 election is part of its road map to a peaceful, democratic union that reconciles the country’s disparate ethnic groups. But the junta’s recent purchase of about 50 Mi-24 helicopters and 12 Mi-2 armored transport helicopters from Russia indicates that it is instead preparing for war against armed ethnic cease-fire groups that control territories along Burma’s borders with China and Thailand. Tensions between the regime and the cease-fire groups have risen steadily concurrent with the approach of the election as the regime has attempted to use the impending polls to pressure the armed militias to join its border guard force (BGF). By doing so, the junta appears to have painted itself into a corner, as most of the groups have refused to join the BGF and now the junta must either back down or take action after the polls close.
Two armed ethnic groups to watch in the north are the United Wa State Army (UWSA) in Shan State and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in Kachin State. The junta has cancelled the election in four townships controlled by the UWSA and rejected the registration applications of three Kachin political parties, both moves in apparent retaliation for the refusal of the respective ethnic militias to join the BGF. In addition, tensions recently spiked in Kachin State when the junta’s state-run newspaper described the KIA as “insurgents” for the first time since signing a cease-fire agreement with the KIA’s political wing, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) in 1994. This action has led some analysts to wonder whether the regime’s newly appointed commanders in the northern region want to provoke a war against the KIA, and Kachin leaders are outraged that the regime’s attempt to intimidate them into joining the BGF could lead to the resumption of armed conflict. Responding to Naypyidaw’s use of the word “insurgents,” Wawhkyung Sinwa, a KIO spokesman, told The Irrawaddy that it is incorrect to describe a cease-fire group in this way while the cease-fire remains in operation. Observers in Rangoon were also surprised by the junta’s change in language. “After reading the report, I was shocked because ‘insurgent’ is a term the regime has only used for non-ceasefire groups such as the Karen National Union (KNU) in the last 20 years,” said an editor of a private Rangoon weekly speaking on condition of anonymity. “It also signals a potential new civil war in the country’s border areas.” Kachin and Wa leaders in the northern region are already bracing for war. They have acquired anti-aircraft weapons and additional ammunition and have deployed their troops along key hilltop positions. The UWSA has deployed three battalions —comprising some of the Wa army’s elite troops—from its headquarters in Panghsang to southern Shan State near the Thai border, sources close to the UWSA say. The UWSA and KIO do not, however, intend to simply sit back and defend their positions. If attacked, they have threatened to launch an urban warfare campaign intended to eliminate ethnic Burmans living in their regions. In addition, in order to defend against major junta offensives, the UWSA and KIO have formed an alliance with four other armed ethnic groups—the KNU, the New Mon State Party (NMSP), the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and the Chin National Front. If the Burmese junta attacks one armed ethnic group, the other armed ethnic groups will launch attacks in their areas of the country, according to alliance leaders. “We intend to set up different military front lines in the country when the Burmese military attack one of our members. That way they can’t reinforce their troops at only one position. They have to defend every corner from our attacks. This is how we will be better prepared to counter their offensives,” said Bee Htoo, the army chief of the KNPP. It remains to be seen, however, whether such an alliance between disparate ethnic groups can remain united and function as planned in the event of an attack by the regime. While rebel armies in the northern region are restless in fear that they will be targeted first, Karen, Mon and Shan armies are also quietly preparing to defend their territories in the south and in Shan State. The Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the military wing of the KNU, has been fighting the Burmese military for six decades and has never signed a cease-fire agreement with the regime. However, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), which broke away from the KNLA 15 years ago, is a proxy of the Burmese military that has often clashed with the KNLA, and a substantial number of DKBA troops have reportedly agreed to join the BGF.
In 1993-4, the regime used aircraft in an attack on KNLA Brigade 5 that caused many villagers to flee either to the jungle or the safety of Thai soil. Thai and Burmese military sources said that if fighting breaks out after the election, Burmese troops would likely once again use aircraft to attack Brigade 5 strongholds and KNLA bases on the banks of the Salween River. There has also been increased friction between Mon rebels and the regime. In a letter to the NMSP on Aug. 23, the junta warned the Mon cease-fire group that it will be outlawed if it does not disarm, and the militia responded with a threat similar to that made by its Kachin counterparts in the north. “If there is war in the future, we will not fight like we did in the past, and we will fight not only in the jungle. Our Mon people are everywhere, and we will take a clandestine guerrilla war to the enemy,” said Nai Hang Thar, the secretary of the NMSP. “We have traveled through the country for years now, and we now know where their important sites are.” The Shan State Army (South) and Karenni militias have also positioned their troops for a junta offensive, but they are weaker and smaller. Their best chance to avoid being steamrollered by the regime is to hope that Thailand wants to maintain a buffer zone in the north and persuade the Thais to provide a safe haven that allows the ethnic militias to regroup and launch a counter-offensive. But these smaller groups also have voiced a willingness to fight back with unconventional warfare. “We have formed special forces to prepare for guerrilla war when they [regime troops] come,” said Bee Htoo. “It is not good to kill each other. But, the military will still rule the country after the election.” In addition, a Shan State Army (South) officer recently told The Irrawaddy his troops will drive the “colonialists” from Shan State. He added that the Burmese army was reinforcing its troops in southern Shan State. With all of these potential post-election conflicts looming, Thailand and China are understandably concerned about instability along their borders with Burma. Thailand has increased border security because it fears any ethnic conflict before or after the election could lead to an increase in refugees seeking safety in Thailand, army officers told Agence France-Presse (AFP). “We have stepped up security checks along the border to prevent any forces or people fleeing from the other side and also to prevent people and weapons crossing the border from our side,” Col. Padung Yingpaiboonsuk, a task force commander in the border province of Tak, told the AFP. He said the army would increase patrols along the border opposite Burma’s Karen State, where ethnic rebels continue to fight the government. Nai Kao Rot, the former deputy army chief of the NMSP, told The Irrawaddy: “High-ranking officers in the Thai army came and asked me last month whether we will fight the Burmese regime because they have to secure the border.” China may have even more reason to be concerned after a surprise Burmese military offensive against the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in the Kokang region in August 2009 shattered a 20-year cease-fire and sent an estimated 37,000 refugees into China’s Yunnan Province. “For a risk-averse Beijing, it all makes for a volatile mix in an election year. At a time when China is pushing border stability in Myanmar [Burma], elections lacking participation from major border ethnic groups—the Wa, Kachin and others—may set the stage for potential conflict,” said Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, the International Crisis Group’s (ICG) North East Asia Project Director in Beijing in a recent article. When Snr-Gen Than Shwe traveled to Beijing on a five-day state visit in September, he sought to reassure Chinese leaders that the Nov. 7 election would not produce any negative fallout along the 2,192-kilometer Sino-Burmese border. In return, Chinese President Hu Jintao praised peace and stability in Burma’s ethnic areas along the border. Behind the scenes, however, Beijing was reportedly not convinced. The Burmese regime has proved time and time again that it is not capable of finding a peaceful political solution to the conflicts with ethnic groups. And while Than Shwe was in China, the Burmese military mobilized hundreds of soldiers into areas near the Sino-Burmese border controlled by armed ethnic groups, including the UWSA, KIO, MDAA and the Shan State Army. Chinese officials in Beijing said that when the Chinese leaders raised the border stability issue with Than Shwe, who in the 1980s was the regional commander in the northern region, he was taken aback and became agitated. Burmese reports of Than Shwe’s visit, however, were slanted in the regime’s state-controlled press, which said that China promised not to support any armed ethnic groups that carried out anti-Burmese government operations along the border and damaged bilateral relations. Afterward, Chinese officials told Wa and Kachin leaders that these reports were not true. The Burmese don’t trust the Chinese when it comes to ethnic issues. Beijing previously backed the Communist Party of Burma in its armed struggle against the Burmese military, and despite the fact that Beijing is currently the closest ally of the regime because it provides much needed political and military support, it is well-known that Beijing is directly engaged with ethnic groups along the border, even helping mediate between the regime and the armed border groups to prevent conflict. The ICG recently said in its report that the KIO has had “basic discussions” with Beijing over the contours of a “genuine union” within Burma in which the ethnic groups would have autonomy, possibly similar to the Special Administrative Regions in China—Hong Kong and Macao. The ICG’s 20-page report titled “China’s Myanmar Strategy: Elections, Ethnic Politics and Economics” said: “The Kachin are working on a common peace proposal for which they plan to seek Beijing’s backing.” However, Beijing has also lost the trust and confidence of the cease-fire groups due to its large-scale investments in Burma and its political backing of the pariah regime. Leaders of the cease-fire groups say there is also no trust between their militias and Naypyidaw, and the lines of communication have been strained since the regime began pressuring them to join the BGF. The regime’s former spy-master, Gen Khin Nyunt, who previously won the trust of the ethnic militias, has been under house arrest since 2004 and ethnic leaders say there is no one else they can speak with in Naypyidaw. In this environment, and given the regime’s belligerent demands that all cease-fire groups join the BGF before the election or face possible military consequences after, it is hard to imagine a scenario in which the regime does not at least attempt to send a message by attacking one or more cease-fire groups, not to mention the potential of an all out assault intended to clear the country of armed militias. If this happens, the days of armed conflict on multiple fronts in Burma may return and any hopes for national reconciliation may be destroyed. As always, it will be the people of Burma who suffer, and ethnic leaders who have been fighting to achieve fundamental human rights, self determination and an autonomous region will see their dreams disappear over the horizon as rapidly as a Russian helicopter. Irrawaddy reporters Wai Moe, Saw Yan Naing and Lawi Wang contributed to this article. |
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