How will Snr-Gen Than Shwe safeguard himself and his family after the election?

In an interview with a US television journalist on April 14, Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong predicted that Burma’s ruling generals will not easily give up power, saying it is an “existential thing” for the few key people who make the decisions.

“If they are out, it’s not just that the country and the government have changed, but ‘Where do I go and which jail would I be in and [what about] my children and my jewels and my billions?’” he said. “ They are not likely to be persuaded by lectures.”

Snr-Gen Than Shwe during a state visit to Sri Lanka in November 2009-a rare overseas trip for a leader who has dedicated much of the past few years to making sure his house in order before stepping into the background.

Ne Win secured his future by appointing trusted men like Gen Tin Oo (who later became vice chairman of the main opposition party, the National League for Democracy), Gen San Yu (who later became president) and Gen Kyaw Htin as commanders in chief of the armed forces in the 1970s and 80s. Ne Win remained at the top as party chairman of the Burmese Socialist Programme Party, but he rarely came back to meddle in politics. Having left his trusted men in the army and in the intelligence wing in 1988, however, he was seen as a father figure in the armed forces until his influence began to wane in the late 1990s.

Like Ne Win, Than Shwe has purged potential rivals and promoted his own men. Guests who attended the Armed Forces Day reception on March 27 at the palatial new reception center in Naypyidaw said Than Shwe looked confident. Senior army leaders reportedly told guests that the military supremo was readying to take a back seat.

A few hours previously, Than Shwe had delivered a short speech at a military parade. Although he did not say he was planning to retire, listeners said the message could be read between the lines.

“Our armed forces were originally formed by patriotic heroes to fight for independence,” Than Shwe said. “The leaders of the armed forces turned from politicians into patriotic Tatmadaw [Burmese army] men when the armed struggle for independence was necessary, and they turned back into politicians engaged in national politics when the time came for political struggle. In this way, our armed forces have had a brilliant history of achievement both in political and in military affairs.”

In what is considered a clear indication that the military does not intend to simply go “back to the barracks,” Than Shwe reportedly said the Tatmadaw should have three capabilities: military, organizational and administrative. The army had a duty to assist the “gentle transition,” he said.

Than Shwe must ensure that his most trusted lieutenants take over the reins of both the new government and the armed forces so that his family and fortune will be protected. For just as Than Shwe purged feared spy-chief Gen Khin Nyunt and betrayed his mentor, Ne Win, placing him under house arrest for allegedly plotting a coup shortly before the latter’s death in 2002, enemies in the military may be plotting against Than Shwe.

Khin Nyunt, who is now under house arrest on charges of corruption and insubordination, is just one of several powerful and influential people who would enjoy seeing Than Shwe overthrown and humiliated. He and his former intelligence officers bitterly opposed Than Shwe’s increasing grip on power, and since the purge, some who served long prison sentences for their association with Khin Nyunt have even cooperated with the opposition inside and outside the country to shed light on the regime.

Than Shwe knows that several retired army officers who are loyal to different factions within the armed forces could become potential enemies. To protect against such enemies gaining too much power, he has handpicked former aides and staff officers to serve in key positions, and will only hand power over to his most trusted allies.

A key loyal subordinate is Prime Minister Gen Thein Sein, who Than Shwe asked to lead the Union Solidarity and Development Party to contest in the election after learning that Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy had decided not to participate. Others include Lt-Gen Myint Swe, the head of the Bureau of Special Operations (5), Gen “Thura” Shwe Mann, the coordinator of Special Operations (army, navy and air force) and Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation Maj-Gen Htay Oo, who is also secretary-general of the Union Solidarity and Development Association.

Than Shwe has promoted young officers who were his subordinates when he commanded Light Infantry Divison 88 in Magwe, including Gen Myint Swe and Maj-Gen Tin Ngwe, who are both being groomed to take the position of commander in chief. Other subordinates include Lt-Gen Hla Htay Win, Maj-Gen Kyaw Swe and Maj-Gen Wai Lwin, who is now commander of the Naypyidaw region. They are, in effect, Team Than Shwe.

Last year, it was rumored that Than Shwe had endorsed the junta’s No 3, Shwe Mann, who is also joint chief-of-staff of the armed forces, to become president of post-election Burma. But having proclaimed himself as the inspiration behind the modernization drive of the Burmese armed forces, Than Shwe may be reluctant to let another strong leader take over, knowing he may not be able to control future power struggles among his top commanders. 

Some analysts predict that Than Shwe will be president in the new government after the general election. There will be three nominees for the top political slot—one from the Amyotha Hluttaw (the House of Nationalities, or upper house), one from the Pyithu Hluttaw (the People’s Assembly, or lower house) and one from the 25 percent military contingent of the two Hluttaws, according to the 2008 Constitution—and it will be up to the two houses of parliament to choose the president.

According to the Constitution, one of the duties of the new president will be to head the National Defense and Security Council, which will have the power to declare a state of emergency, allowing it to suspend parliament and assume state control.

Some believe, however, that Than Shwe may chose to head a military council that will supercede the National Defense and Security Council—in effect, maintaining the current regime, albeit from behind a veil of civilian rule.

As things stand, Than Shwe’s real concern is likely to be the loyalty of young army officers and Cabinet ministers who have become increasingly powerful and wealthy in the last decade. Some of these officers may come to the fore in reshaping Burma as their roles change between being members of the armed forces or parliament.

An almost universally despised leader, Than Shwe will have to live with the resentment of those he has had arrested and imprisoned. He knows how the mighty can fall, and as he contends with sleepless nights wracked by visions of ghosts from his past seeking revenge, his safety and that of his family must be uppermost in his mind as he handpicks his successors.

Than Shwe’s Armed Forces Day message that his officers will play key roles in politics “whenever the need arises” could therefore be construed as a warning to potential challengers.