Burma’s generals have a history of juggling relations with Washington and Beijing

If ever the Burmese regime made it clear it preferred “Made in America” to “Made in China,” it would be no surprise to see relations between China and Burma suffer a severe hiccup.

China is now keenly observing Washington’s new policy toward the Burmese regime and Burma’s opposition movement. At the same time, Beijing is observing the unpredictable Naypyidaw regime’s paukphaw (kinship) commitment to China.

Burma’s former dictator, Ne Win, (left) met then US President Lyndon Johnson in 1966.

Burmese military officers used Western weapons to counter Chinese-backed insurgents in the past. They have long memories of Chinese chauvinism and Beijing’s efforts to export communism to Burma and install a government sympathetic to Mao Zedong’s communist ideology.

Those days are long gone. China became Burma’s staunchest ally after the regime brutally crushed the pro-democracy uprising in 1988. For the past 21 years, China has adopted its paukphaw policy toward Burma and played an influential role there.

Burma has always firmly supported a “One China” policy and expressed its sympathy to Beijing at the time of the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. Burma hastily issued a statement condemning the West when the Chinese embassy in the Serbian capital, Belgrade, was hit in a NATO air strike in 1999.

Perhaps Burmese leaders have had little choice but to embrace Beijing since 1988, in view of worsening relations with the West. However, it can be argued that the strength of ties between Burma and China is grossly overstated and may be an anomaly.

Former dictator Gen Ne Win, who fought British and Japanese occupiers, was always fearful of imperialists. During his reign from 1962 to 1988 and throughout the Cold War, he kept world powers at arm’s length.

Ne Win and his top commanders were well aware of their country’s geopolitical importance, strategically located between China and India.

Ne Win’s neutralist balancing act didn’t prevent him, however, from seeking military aid from the US and Europe when Burma faced a serious threat from Communist China in the late 1960s.

Four years after coming to power in the 1962 military coup, Ne Win visited the US and had lunch at the White House in Washington with then President Lyndon Johnson.

A few months earlier, Ne Win had received US Sen. Mike Mansfield, the first high-ranking US official or legislator to visit Burma since the coup.

Ne Win’s visit to Washington created some apprehension in Beijing, although the Burmese dictator never gave cause for real concern. He was clever enough to appease and exploit Beijing.

One year after the US visit, anti-Chinese riots broke out in Burma, causing Ne Win to placate Beijing and steadily repair strained relations, while still adhering to his country’s neutralist foreign policy.

At a Chinese National Day reception in Beijing, Ba Thein Tin, the leader of the Communist Party of Burma, was mentioned second only to Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot among distinguished guests at the main table in Beijing.

In December 1977, Ne Win made a surprise visit to Phnom Penh to meet Pol Pot, the first foreign leader welcomed to Cambodia since the Khmer Rouge takeover two years previously.

The visit was intended to break the Khmer Rouge’s international isolation. It certainly paid off, as Beijing increased its economic assistance to Burma and also ordered Burmese Communists to relocate their clandestine radio station to Burmese territory.

Burma’s current military strongman, junta chief Snr-Gen Than Shwe, was then an army captain temporarily serving with Light Infantry Division 101. He was undoubtedly an interested observer of how Ne Win was handling internal and external challenges.

Than Shwe was later assigned to lead Light Infantry Division 88 in northern Burma in countering a communist threat there in the 1980s.

Like many infantry commanders, Than Shwe and his No 2, Dep Snr-Gen Maung Aye, are known to harbor no great love for China.

Beijing somehow miscalculated the eccentric, nationalistic, independent-minded and battle-hardened Burmese army leaders. China had backed the wrong horse by wooing intelligence chief Gen Khin Nyunt, only to see him abruptly removed in 2004, thus losing one of Beijing’s most valuable friends.

Than Shwe, like many Burmese nationalists, was reluctant to see Burma become too dependent on China, even for the armaments his regime so badly needed. When Chinese-made jet fighters began to malfunction and crash at an alarming rate, the Burmese regime went looking for reliable arms manufacturers in Russia and Eastern Europe.

The Chinese have always found the Burmese difficult to deal with. When Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited Burma in December 2001 on a mission to strengthen economic and strategic ties, Than Shwe reportedly upset the Chinese leader by not signing an agreement allowing Chinese vessels to travel to the Bay of Bengal along the Bhamo and Irrawaddy rivers.

Kurt Campbell, the US assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacifc affairs

The Burmese regime knows full well the extent of China’s economic and strategic interest in the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal.

Two years before Jiang Zemin’s visit, Than Shwe had reinforced ties with Russia, India and Pakistan, demonstrating to uneasy senior military officers that his regime was no puppet of China.

Despite Burma’s cautionary stand, China remains a staunch ally, ready to defend the regime whenever it finds itself in a corner—including at the UN Security Council. In return, the regime has agreed to sell gas to China and build oil and gas pipelines.

Depending solely on China is not an option for the regime, however—and for that reason alone the junta may find the new US policy appealing at some level, as it could counterbalance China’s growing influence.

It is safe to say that the regime will cooperate with the US in the areas of drug control, health, environmental protection and the continuing search for the remains of US servicemen registered as missing in action in World War II.

This could provide an entry point for the US to further engage with the regime if pro-US engagement officers in the armed forces became powerful in the future.

However, it is doubtful that the current regime will deliver any substance in the political arena. It is highly unlikely that the regime will agree to Washington’s request for inclusive, free and fair elections and the release of all political prisoners including Aung San Suu Kyi.

In any case, although the new US-Burma policy outlined in Washington definitely creates a space for the repressive regime in Burma to engage more with its most vocal critic, it is still uncertain whether direct engagement would yield any positive outcome.

It is interesting to note that Washington’s new Burma policy received a cautious welcome from dissidents inside and outside the country.

The US policy is undoubtedly a smart one. However, Than Shwe and his junta are not only smart—like North Korea’s leaders, they are also manipulative and often skillfully employ pressure and dialogue to deceive the domestic and international communities.

Washington is well aware of Burmese deception, and Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell has made it clear that the US administration will not lift sanctions unless the regime makes concrete changes.

Campbell told a Senate sub-committee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs that the US will maintain existing sanctions until it sees concrete progress in Burma and will continue to work with the international community to ensure that those sanctions are effectively coordinated.

This means that Than Shwe will not see any lifting of sanctions any time soon. The regime doesn’t share US human rights and democracy values—and, as a result, the new US policy may not reach any meaningful stage in coming years because of the regime’s resistance to change.

However, the US gesture to the Burmese has set alarm bells ringing in Beijing. As in the past, Burmese leaders will have more room to play one superpower against the other.