The International Crisis Group (ICG), a Brussels-based think tank, has recently released a new report on next year’s elections in Burma. The report concludes that although the elections are not likely to be free or fair, they could set the stage for the current leadership of the ruling junta to step down, potentially creating the conditions for genuine change. Therefore, the report says, “all stakeholders should be alert to opportunities that may arise to push the new government toward reform and reconciliation.”

The Burmese generals have vowed to hold the election in 2010, and are now doing everything in their almost absolute power to ensure that it goes according to plan. It has just extended the house arrest of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi for a further 18 months, and continues to hold around 2,100 other political activists behind bars. It is also trying to tame restive ethnic armies, forcing thousands of civilians to flee to neighboring countries. None of this bodes well for the junta’s hopes of using the election as a means of winning international legitimacy.

Another problem for the generals is the deeply flawed constitution, which was loosely modeled on the Indonesian dwifungsi, or dual function, system that gives the military a key role in the political arena. Approved in a sham referendum last year, the constitution is widely seen as a means of continuing military rule in another guise. Although Snr-Gen Than Shwe, the regime’s reclusive leader, claimed in an Armed Forces Day speech last year that he had a “sincere aim of developing the country without any craving for power,” no one doubts that he will continue to wield considerable influence after the election.

But both the constitution and his advancing age mean that Than Shwe cannot remain in his current position forever. This is why the ICG reports suggests that both he and his second in command, Vice Snr-Gen Maung Aye, may soon step down or move to ceremonial roles, making way for a younger generation of military leaders. However, even such a move is fraught with risks. Although Than Shwe fears that a full transition to democracy could lead to war-crimes trials or even lynch mobs, he also knows that even a modest devolution of his powers could make him vulnerable.

The retribution Than Shwe fears most is from within the military. He is haunted by the memory of his predecessor, Ne Win, who ruled Burma for nearly three decades. Ne Win ran the country into the ground through a combination of brutal suppression, a crude socialist ideology and superstition, but continued to enjoy senior statesman status for more than a decade after stepping down from power. But this ended in 2002, when he was arrested and placed under house arrest after his son-in-law and three grandsons were found guilty of plotting to overthrow the regime with the aid of renegade officers and black magic.

“He knows very well about the tradition of the armed forces,” said a Burmese political analyst. “If he is not in uniform, he can’t control the armed forces anymore.”

This is why ICG rightly concludes that even assuming that the intention of the regime is to consolidate military rule rather than begin a transition away from it, such processes often lead in unexpected directions. Than Shwe might know that his policies are misguided and ineffective, but as Ne Win’s fate proved, “It was like having caught hold of a tiger’s tail… there was nothing else to do but hang on to it.”