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Washington remains the Burmese people’s best hope for reliable support in their struggle for democracy AS Barack Obama assumes the heavy duties of the US presidency, the oppressed Burmese people who have seen little political progress in their crisis-racked country are looking to him to see how his Burma policy differs from his predecessor’s.
Obama’s vice-president, Joseph R Biden, is no stranger to the Burma issue. While chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he played a prominent role in shaping US policy on Burma. Biden spearheaded the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (the Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act 2008, which was signed into law by President Bush on July 29, 2008. The bill renews an act of 2007 restricting the import of gems from Burma and tightening sanctions on mining projects. Biden said in presenting the bill that it was a “tribute to my dear friend Tom Lantos who worked tirelessly on behalf of human rights for the people of Burma.” Biden added: “We must continue Tom’s work. Working together with the international community, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the EU, India and China, I look forward to the day when a democratic, peaceful Burma will be fully integrated into the community of nations.” The Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act marks the outline of a strong US policy on Burma. The act has three aims: to impose new financial sanctions and travel restrictions on the leaders of the junta and their associates; to tighten the economic sanctions imposed in 2003 by outlawing the importation of Burmese gems to the US; and to create a new position of special representative and policy coordinator for Burma. Michael Green, who formerly served on the National Security Council and is currently an associate professor at Georgetown University, was nominated for the post, but the changeover at the White House has put his confirmation on hold. The proposed US special envoy would have the task of working with Burma’s neighbors and other interested countries, such as those within the EU and Asean. The envoy’s mission would also involve developing a comprehensive approach to the Burma crisis, including pressure, dialogue and support for nongovernmental organizations providing humanitarian relief to the Burmese people. While Burmese dissidents want Obama to maintain a tough Burma policy, they may want to see some tactical changes and a better strategy. The prominent Burmese opposition leader Win Tin, in congratulating Obama on his election victory, urged the US to adopt a multilateral approach toward Burma. “We want the US to work with the international community and the United Nations,” he said. Win Tin, who spent 19 years in a regime prison, warned the US not to compromise with the junta. More effective sanctions and proactive pressure from the international community were necessary for the advancement of the pro-democracy struggle within Burma, he said. Win Tin appears to have no cause for concern about the steadfastness of US policy on Burma. Ahead of the US presidential campaign, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think tank, said in its October analysis that Obama would continue to support sanctions against Burma. The analysis said: “While the dynamics of change ultimately must come from within the country, Obama will work toward achieving a coordinated international approach that includes the nations of Asean, China, India, Japan and European countries to help contribute to the process of reform and reconciliation in Burma.” Frank Jannuzi, a senior Asia adviser to the Obama campaign, said the Burma question should not prevent a deeper US engagement with Asean. “Rather, the United States should work with Asean to ensure that Burma lives up to its obligation as an Asean member,” he said. Burma scholar David Steinberg believes the Obama administration won’t change the US sanctions policy without some strong indication of conciliation from the regime. Nevertheless, he expects the new administration “will be more willing to have discussions with the junta.” There is no doubt that the generals want to forge a normal relationship with the world’s superpower. A decade ago, they even hired lobbying firms in Washington to approach State Department and White House officials in the hopes of improving ties. They abandoned these efforts after failing to make headway with the Clinton and Bush administrations. When Obama won the election, Burma’s state-run media formally congratulated Obama and Than Shwe sent a congratulatory message. According to some recent unconfirmed reports, a number of former Burmese ambassadors traveled to Western countries, including the US, on what are thought to have been missions to sound out the incoming administration’s Burma policy. It’s premature to imagine an informal dialogue between the Obama administration and the regime, but such a development can’t be ruled out.
The meeting came at the request of the military junta and was marked by what was described as a frank and free exchange of opinions on both sides. Burmese officials had wanted the meeting to be held in Burma, but US officials declined because they were told they could not talk to Suu Kyi. Although the substance of the talks between the US and Burmese sides was not disclosed, topics clearly included the continuing detention of Suu Kyi and other political prisoners, US sanctions and the political situation in Burma in general. US officials at the meeting recalled that as soon as they mentioned Suu Kyi’s name the faces of Burmese ministers suddenly changed as if they had seen a ghost. Further US-Burma talks are not ruled out, although it’s unlikely they would be held in Burma unless access is granted to Suu Kyi. According to Steinberg: “Unless there are changes, any direct talks would probably take place outside Burma, because it would seem doubtful that an American official would be allowed by the US administration to go to that country and not see Aung San Suu Kyi, which—assuming Gen Than Shwe is still in command—seems unlikely.” Steinberg did not expect any dramatic changes on Burma under Obama but added: “I think that in many circles in Washington there is an increased realization that the military will be part of the solution or amelioration of Burma’s problems, and that simply asking them to return to the barracks, which was once US policy, is no longer possible or feasible, if it ever were. “Overall, there seems to be less change and more of the same, to the continued suffering of the Burmese people.” Min Zin’s concern is whether the new administration’s policy on Burma will focus more on finding consensus than the “do-it-alone” policy adopted by Bush. The downside of departing from the Bush approach will be more compromise and accommodation with the other international players on the Burma issue, Min Zin said. In this sense, he thought that the goal of achieving a tangible result in Burma would be compromised. In an interview with the US TV network ABC in December, then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice—who famously identified Burma as one of the world’s “outposts of tyranny”—said she regretted that the international community had let the Burmese people down. Her honest confession is welcome—but the Burmese people don’t want to be let down again. |
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