After 20 years, it’s still alive but just barely—Burma’s 20-year democracy movement. Its goal is democracy, but the country is still under the military boot. And there’s little possibility of achieving the goal in the near future unless a miracle happens.

On August 8, some young people wore black clothing to mark the 20th anniversary of the Burma’s most significant uprising, known as 8.8.88 or the four eights.

Some Burmese university students in Rangoon are still wearing black to mark the bloody anniversary of the military coup, which occurred on September 18 when an estimated 3,000 demonstrators were killed by the current regime’s troops. But nothing beyond wearing black clothing will happen on the 18th.

No one can deny that the ’88 uprising was powerful, managing within two months, from July to September, to topple three successive authoritarian governments, led by late dictator Ne Win and followed by his loyal successors, former Brig-Gen Sein Lwin and the academic Dr Maung Maung.  
 
The uprising produced exciting political theater: new political parties made up of both young and seasoned political leaders, and the 1990 “free and fair” election, the first in 26 years. Of course, it all failed, but at least democracy became the country’s goal.

The question is: What substantive gains has the democracy movement achieved in the past 20 years?

The leadership of the democracy movement has shown courage in confronting the oppressive regime, but it has yet to mature enough to achieve the political goals it seeks.

Some politicians, strategists and businessmen still see The Prince by Niccolo Machiavelli, written in the early 16th century, as an authoritative guide to political movements, although it’s considered extreme by some.

One its major rules: A policy shouldn’t be defined by its excellence or purity, but by its outcome. The policy must be effective.

Obviously, Burma has had no democratic policy changes. Instead, it has political prisoners, public turmoil, fear and political and economic refugees.

Actually, it’s something of a miracle to see the movement still struggling along under such overwhelming odds. The military regime has never given any breathing space to the democratic opposition, preferring to smother it to death.

All pro-active, capable political activists are destined for prison—like the prominent former student leader Min Ko Naing—or house arrest—like opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

In fact, Suu Kyi once described Burma itself as a larger prison. Its people are virtually prisoners who live under harsh conditions.

Unfortunately, no one has figured out how to break out of the prison, including Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy, the main opposition party and the winner of the 1990 elections.

The NLD and other democracy groups have had some great policy ideas: hold an assembly of elected representatives in 1990; open up a dialogue between the opposition groups and the military; hold tripartite talks with the military, including opposition groups, ethnic parties and so on.

Each, at the time, may have been an excellent or pure policy, but each lacked effectiveness.
    
The NLD headquarters in Rangoon today is little more than an office with a sign in front announcing its presence. Officials release statements marking anniversaries, call for the release of Suu Kyi and the party’s deputy leader Tin Oo and come up with other routine announcements and statements. However, the authorities constantly monitor the office and just visiting it can be dangerous.

The NLD’s failure is just one of the many failures of all Burmese opposition groups, inside and outside the country, that are trying to achieve democratic reform.

On the other hand, the military regime has always exercised a clear, effective policy designed to retain military power now and into the future. It unwaveringly adheres to its “seven-step road map” to “disciplined-democracy,” code words for more military repression and control.

Burmese opposition groups must rethink the past to come up with pro-active, effective policies that can move the country closer to a democratic system. It doesn’t have to be 100 percent overnight. But the opposition must have a strategy that produces effective gains, even if only one small step at a time.

The past 20 years would make a poor political science textbook for Burma’s future generations of activists and political leaders. However, out of the rubble of these failed policies the movement must learn to create new policies not based on excellence or purity but on effectiveness.