Burma’s military leaders are masters of psychological warfare. And you can tell they’re pretty proud of their accomplishments in this area. How many other countries do you know that boast a “Directorate of Public Relations and Psychological Warfare”?

But there is something about the regime’s latest effort to manipulate domestic and international public opinion which smacks more of slick modern marketing than good old colonial-style “divide and rule.”

By announcing plans to hold a referendum on a draft constitution in May, the regime has given Burma and the world a classic non-choice.

On the face of it, the choice is simple and clear: Do you support the constitution, yes or no? But the real choice is not so straightforward. Basically, the generals are asking a weary Burmese populace (and an increasingly jaded community of concerned world citizens, who don’t know whether to root for the monks or Rambo) which of the following two scenarios they find easier to live with:

A situation whereby military rule is permanently enshrined, with a shaky guarantee of some civic involvement from pliable non-military organizations (in the event of a “yes” vote); or,

An indefinite period of military rule with only a remote hope that the opposition will someday emerge strong enough to challenge the army’s stranglehold on Burmese public life (in the event of a “no” vote).

Do these choices seem suspiciously similar? They should. Essentially, the regime is offering an illusion of choice. Ask any expert in marketing, and they’ll probably admit, somewhat cynically, that nothing gives the public more satisfaction than a choice that is not really a choice at all.

Think Coke and Pepsi. The only thing that makes either option seem palatable is the existence of the other. And one way or the other, you’re getting something that isn’t very good for you.

Let’s look at what the regime has to offer, and consider the likely outcome of each of the choices before us.

If the people vote “yes” to the referendum, this is what they can expect:

* A leading political role for the military. According to the draft constitution, the commander in chief of the armed forces is entitled to fill 110 seats in the 440-seat parliament with appointees from the ranks of the armed forces. Moreover, the commander in chief will occupy a position on the same level as that of the two vice presidents. And in the event of a “state of emergency,” which the military can declare at any time, the commander in chief will assume full legislative, executive and judicial powers.

* A limited role for ethnic organizations. But if the 17 ethnic groups which currently have ceasefire agreements with the regime want to participate in the election planned for 2010, they will probably be required to lay down their arms once and for all. Faced with this prospect, many may end their ceasefires in the event that the constitution is approved.

* An even more limited role for opposition groups. The constitution will impose stringent restrictions on any activities deemed inimical to national unity, which would include any of the normal functions of a parliamentary opposition party. Civilians will be permitted to enter parliament, but only if they show that they know their place.

* No role for Aung San Suu Kyi. The charismatic leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD) has been explicitly denied any future leadership role:

“The President of the Union shall be a person who has been residing continuously in the country for at least 20 years up to the time of the election and the President of the Union himself, parents, spouse, children and their spouses shall not owe allegiance to a foreign power, shall not be a subject of a foreign power or citizen of a foreign country. They shall not be persons entitled to the rights and privileges of a subject or citizen of a foreign country.”

As the widow of British scholar Michael Aris and mother of two sons who are not Burmese citizens, Suu Kyi has no right to lead Burma, according to the draft constitution. Incidentally, this same clause also rules out the involvement of most political exiles, many of whom have lived and engaged in political activities outside of Burma since 1988.

If she’s lucky—that is, if she learns to hold her tongue—Suu Kyi may be released as part of a partial amnesty for political prisoners, once the constitution gets the go-ahead. But all the talk about “talks” between Suu Kyi and the regime will be moot. There will be no further need to respond to demands from the international community for an inclusive political dialogue.

* A constitution as immovable as the military itself. Just in case anybody was thinking of making changes once the constitution is in place, Section 4 (a) of the chapter “Amendment of the Constitution” effectively rules out that possibility. Even if a democratic opposition party, such as the NLD, were to win every single seat not filled by military appointees, it would be unable to make any amendments, which under this clause would require the approval of more than 75 percent of all members of parliament.
 
And here’s what’s in store for Burma if the people vote “no”:

* A constitution that just won’t go away. If they fail this time, the generals will just try and try again. Expect another referendum, and another, and another, until they get their way. Each proposed constitution will be modified slightly, but only to make it a more effective weapon in the war of attrition that is Burmese politics.

* A regime that just won’t go away. After twenty years in power, the junta sees no reason why it shouldn’t hang in there for another generation or two.

* An international community that wishes all of this would just go away. But the United Nations and several Western countries have already staked a great deal of their diplomatic credibility on their ability to make things happen in Burma. So expect more pressure on the regime, which has so far withstood all the sanctions and tough words that have been lobbed at it.

* More protests and more political prisoners. Frustration will come to a head again, and the regime will respond as it always does—by coming down hard on protestors and putting “troublemakers” behind bars.

Whatever the outcome of the upcoming referendum, it is going to leave a nasty aftertaste. What the Burmese people want—and what the regime doesn’t want to give them—is freedom from the cycle of poverty and violence that has marked the past 45 years of military misrule. What they need to quench their thirst is the water of democracy; what they are getting is an empty choice that is guaranteed not to satisfy.