But he’s like a parent to me.”
In 1990, after student activists from Rangoon high schools ripped down Ne Win’s image from their headmasters' offices, Ne Win put a personal announcement in state-run newspapers instructing that his picture should be removed from government buildings.
This fueled speculation that Ne Win was finally relinquishing power, but then in 1992 he gave the order to fire Saw Maung and install Than Shwe at the helm of SLORC when Saw Maung began giving eccentric speeches and behaving strangely in public.
Although not directly involved in the day-to-day workings of the regime, Ne Win continued to pull the strings of power throughout the 1990s, even instigating a mini-coup of corrupt second-tier generals in 1997 upon his return from a trip to visit his counterpart General Suharto in Indonesia.
Despite Ne Win’s advanced age, the ex-dictator still wielded enough power and influence that Than Shwe needed him and his family out of the way in order to consolidate his own grip on the regime. So in 2002, Than Shwe’s junta accused the aged Ne Win of conspiring to stage a coup and placed him under house arrest, while his son-in-law and grandsons were thrown in prison on charges of treason.
It is not difficult to find similarities between Ne Win’s supposed retirement in 1988 and Than Shwe’s supposed retirement in 2011, especially if one remembers that in 1989-1990 there was a campaign and a free and fair election that for a brief moment brought hope to the Burmese people, only to have that hope dashed when the junta refused to honor the election results.
Therefore, regardless of what senior officials in the Burmese government are now saying in public, and regardless of the fact that Than Shwe—who was always reclusive—has all but disappeared from public view, many Burmese people believe that the former junta chief is still well-informed, watching closely and willing to pull the levers of power when necessary.
Logic says they have a point, because it defies logic to believe that a demonstrably paranoid control-freak such as Than Shwe—who had personally put his predecessor and mentor under house arrest—would suddenly step completely away from power and put blind trust in his appointed successors to take good care of his personal safety, assets and legacy.
It should also be remembered that Than Shwe is a master political chess player who first manipulated himself into the position of dictator and then for years manipulated the international community through PR moves and promises of reform. He even managed to hide the fact that he was spending a large chunk of the nation’s cash resources to build the new capital Naypyidaw in the jungles of central Burma, not to mention the possibly hundreds of millions of dollars he and his cohorts in crime siphoned from the state coffers.
Because there remains no transparency or accountability in the Burmese government, regardless of whether or not Than Shwe is making day-to-day decisions for the state, he will have no qualms about influencing the current administration when it suits his desires, and to assume otherwise is both unnecessary and foolish.
There are several explanations as to why Than Shwe would step out of the spotlight and operate behind the scenes in this manner. One reason may be to cut off any momentum towards an “Arab Spring” type of uprising in Burma and avoid the fate of Mubarak or even worse, Gaddafi. But what may be the most convincing reason would also explain why government officials took such great pains to send the message, just before Clinton’s arrival, that the ex-strongman had officially retired.
The US government made it very clear before the 2010 election that it was unacceptable for Than Shwe to remain in power by donning civilian garb, and if Clinton picked up the scent that he was still running the show there would be no chance that the US would lift sanctions anytime soon. There is probably nobody who stands to economically benefit more from the removal of Western sanctions than Than Shwe and his family.
It therefore rings true when military insiders report that although the former junta general has “retired” from the front page of the newspapers, he still acting as if he is commander-in-chief of the armed forces and enjoys enormous power. These insiders say that Than Shwe is surrounded by the senior army officers who served him in the past, can summon current commander-in-chief Gen Min Aung Hlaing, President Thein Sein, Vice President Tin Aung Myint Oo and Lower House Speaker Shwe Mann whenever he wishes, and even his aides have direct access to top government officials.
Although Than Shwe is too clever to leave any fingerprints, circumstantial evidence of his involvement in major government decisions can still be found.
For example, before the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) summit, Burmese government officials sent out clear messages that another batch of political prisoners would soon be released.