As a result, just like the West gave China an opportunity to get cozy with Burma following the 1988 military coup, China’s unbridled influence in Burma may now have provided the US and other Western countries the chance to turn the table.
The groundwork for this opportunity was laid in 2009, when the Obama Administration adopted its policy of constructively engaging Naypyidaw while maintaining sanctions on the regime and its cronies.
At first the new US policy appeared to pay little dividends, as former junta chief Snr-Gen Than Shwe thumbed his nose at Washington’s overtures by conducting a clearly rigged election in 2010 that guaranteed the generals and ex-generals would remain firmly in power. But when new President Thein Sein took office and sent a clear signal that he sought international legitimacy and the lifting of sanctions, Obama’s diplomatic moves began to bear fruit as evidence of change appeared in Burma.
Most significantly, Thein Sein and his government invited Suu Kyi to a meeting in Naypyidaw, lifted many media restrictions, released some political prisoners, cancelled a Chinese-backed dam project, began local ceasefire discussions with some ethnic armed groups, passed a new labor law and amended the Political Parties Registration law to allow Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy to register and compete in future elections. In addition, Thein Sein sent his foreign minister to Washington D.C. and welcomed visits by US special envoy Derek Mitchell, who received a warm welcome in Naypyidaw.
Recently, Thein Sein was rewarded for these efforts with several trophies to place on his mantle of legitimacy: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations agreed to give Burma its chair in 2014, Suu Kyi and the NLD agreed to register and take part in the upcoming by-election, Obama agreed to send Clinton to Burma, and the US Secretary of State delivered some carrots in the form of relaxed restrictions on both foreign aid and international banking advice.
While all of this was happening, Thein Sein’s signals to China were decidedly mixed. He dropped his first—and biggest—bombshell by announcing the suspension of the China-funded Myitsone Dam project in Kachin State. Then he sent the commander-in-chief of Burma’s armed forces, Gen Min Aung Hlaing, to visit China’s historical adversary Vietnam before ever sending him to Beijing, and to sign a defense pact to boot.
Given these actions, together with the Obama Administration’s stated desire to strengthen its presence in the Asia-Pacific region and its clear intention of making Burma one of the focal points of that effort, China has clear cause for alarm that its influence in Burma is beginning to wane.
But Burma’s generals are well-versed in the art of playing international powers off against one another, and just before Clinton arrived in Naypyidaw, Burma sent a counterbalancing message to the US when Min Aung Hlaing flew to China to meet with Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping, the man who is expected to become president in 2012.
In addition, Thein Sein delivered the message to Clinton that Burma would continue its relationship with China while strengthening friendly ties with all countries as part of its independent and active foreign policy conducted in accordance with the five principles of peaceful co-existence. He pointedly called Beijing a strong and geopolitically important partner who had encouraged Burma to improve its relationship with Western countries and even helped it to do so.
In fact, China had previously expressed deep frustration to its allies over the behavior of Burma’s past regime and the intransigence of its generals, who for two decades China could not convince to make changes.
China’s leaders recognize that a peaceful and stable Burma will definitely benefit all countries in the neighborhood, particularly China, and now that Burma has made changes, China will have a more stable partner on its border and will not have to stick its neck out as far, or as often, to defend a rogue ally.
But on the flip side, as Burma improves its human rights record it will not have to rely on China to act as a shield at the UN, and if more international investment comes to Burma then Naypyidaw will have much greater leverage in negotiating deals with China. So Beijing will have to live with a decrease in both influence and bargaining power inside Burma.
Therefore, if Burma continues on its path to democratic reform and the US continues to make inroads into the country, China will be forced to adjust its policy and approach. In this event, the question will more and more become: What value does each foreign power bring to Burma’s political struggle and progress towards a free and democratic society?
If the question of which relationship Burma stands to reap the most benefit from is framed in this way, and the Burmese leadership buys into it, then China will lose and America will win.
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