Some retired generals and senior officers in Burma have created a storm in Burma’s literary circles by publishing their autobiographies, which are being read with interest inside and outside the country. The books shed light on the inner thoughts of the reclusive military veterans and the famous battles they waged against Burmese communists, the Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) and ethnic rebels.

But the authors aren’t telling their readers all. The draconian publishing laws that followed the 1988 uprising affected them, too, and they can be counted among the victims of self-censorship, with only limited freedom to share their stories with the reading public.

Among the autobiographies that have been well received by the Burmese public is a colorful memoir by Lt-Gen Chit Swe, 75.

Chit Swe was head of the bureau of special operations (South) before the 1988 uprising and a member of the State Law and Order Restoration Council that took power in that year. He last served as forestry minister and was removed from that office in 1997.

Other prominent generals who have published memoirs include Maj-Gen Hla Myint Swe, former transport minister, Brig-Gen Than Tin, deputy prime minister, Brig-Gen Ko Ko, Col Tun Tin, former prime minister, Col Nyunt Swe, former deputy foreign minister, and Major P Kyaw Han, former chairman of Pegu Division.

Their books include impressive accounts of battlefield experiences. On the other hand, their understanding of politics, democracy, diplomacy, economics and the ethnic diversity of Burma is limited. Indeed, this limitation no doubt has led the country to its present state. The generals were trained to repel enemies and defend the nation—and not to run a government.

Brig-Gen Than Tin, who led successful “four cuts” operations against communist insurgents in the Pegu Yoma mountains and ethnic insurgencies in the Irrawaddy delta in the late 1960s early 1970s, was a no-nonsense military officer determined to wipe out the insurgents.

In his autobiography, the general, now in his 80s, proudly claims that he defeated the multi-faceted insurgency and asks whether insurgents dare repeat their past mistakes.

Than Tin recalls that before setting out for Pegu Yoma he breakfasted with the War Office commander in chief, Gen San Yu, finding him gentle and modest. This is the impression of San Yu conveyed in other books, too.

Thus it was chilling to hear the general, handpicked by Gen Ne Win, issue a firm order to turn the insurgent-prone Pegu Yoma into a so-called “White Zone,” free of all insurgents. The Burmese army considered Pegu Yoma to be the enemy’s “brain” and the Irrawaddy delta its “stomach.”

In the next few years, Than Tin applied the “four cuts” strategy against villages and communist insurgents. Two hard-core leaders, Thakin Zin and Thakin Chit, were killed and the insurgency was over.

The “four cuts” strategy—involving forced resettlement of entire communities and confinement of villagers in special camps—had been learnt from the British by another author, Col Tun Tin, while studying in London. Tun Tin became prime minister in 1988.

Tun Tin, veteran of many military actions, including the “Battle of Insein,” set up a three-day war game plan attended by senior officers, including Ne Win. The plan demonstrated “four cuts operations” in practice—resettling villagers, cutting supplies, establishing intelligence, recruiting and raising funds.

It is clear from their writings that the veteran military leaders have little regret for their actions, claiming to have brought law, order and peace to Burma in the 1960s and 1970s.

Aside from their fighting skills, they were loyal to their superiors.

Ne Win invited Than Tin to join him on a trip to upper Burma soon after the general’s successful operation in Pegu Yoma, leaving him in the dark about the purpose.

Ne Win met Than Tin at the airport early in the morning and, addressing him as
“Bo Than Tin” (Ne Win liked to call his subordinates “Bo,” meaning lieutenant), said:  “We are going to the north and today I will appoint you as deputy minister for mining so you are flying with me (to oversee mining projects).”

With those few words, the reshuffle procedure was over. The battle-hardened commander Than Tin, victor over the communists, never questioned his boss’s decision.

In Chit Swe’s books, Ne Win’s name is carefully replaced by “Lugyi,” meaning a senior person or high-ranking official. The reason for the substitution is that the former forestry minister’s books were published after Ne Win’s family members were arrested in 2001, accused of plotting a coup against top military leaders.