Into the Unknown

The junta’s Committee for Drafting of a New Constitution has started the process of drafting the new constitution, the third stage of the seven-step “Road Map to a New Democratic State.” Recently, 54 people were appointed to the committee and no completion date was announced.

When the “road map” was announced in August 2003, the seven steps were listed as: (1) reconvening the National Convention; (2) implementation of a process to allow the emergence of a ‘genuine and disciplined democratic system’; (3) drafting a new constitution; (4) the adoption of a constitution through a national referendum; (5) free and fair elections; (6) convening elected bodies; (7) the creation of government organs instituted by the legislative body.

The first step of the road map was completed in 2007.

Burma watchers say the timeframe provides for a referendum and elections in 2008, with a new, elected government in place by 2009.

However, the September pro-democracy uprising has thrown the entire process in doubt. The brutal crackdown on the demonstrations has placed a roadblock on the map, and, as a result, the regime leaders may not dare to hold an election in the near future for fear of inevitable defeat.

If the military government continues to push forward with its “road map,” it will only complicate the political deadlock, with mainstream opposition groups from inside and outside Burma probably becoming more marginalized.

A peaceful settlement?

The best solution to Burma’s problems, of course, remains a peaceful political settlement between opposition groups and the military leaders. And the “best of the best” would be an agreement to form an interim government including opposition figures.

Junta-appointed delegates to the National Convention [Photo: Reuters]

Despite the regime’s appointment in October of a minister to liaise with Suu Kyi, it remains doubtful that the military leaders are interested in a serious dialogue with her and other opposition representatives, groups and ethnic leaders.

Nevertheless, regime leaders could still enter genuine and serious dialogue with the opposition parties and make political concessions, if they really felt they were under pressure from neighboring countries and from domestic and international agencies.

Some genuine gesture is needed ahead of a political settlement, however—the release, for example, of all political prisoners, including Suu Kyi, Tin Oo, the Shan leader Hkun Htun Oo and the 88 Students Generation pioneer Min Ko Naing; the declaration of a nationwide ceasefire; and peace agreements with non-ceasefire groups among the Karen, Karenni and Shan.

The regime and opposition groups need to create an atmosphere of peace and to call for unity and national reconciliation and preparations for a transition period. 

After the start of serious political negotiations between the regime and the political opposition, the UN and the international community would continue to assist the reconciliation process and offer technical assistance and aid packages to Burma. 

In the event of meaningful moves toward compromise by the junta, Asean, China, the US and the EU should work together to provide assistance to Burma. They could send fact-finding missions and high-level delegations to Burma for talks with both the regime and opposition groups, encouraging further political settlements and signaling an end to visa bans and a partial lifting of economic sanctions on junta leaders and their cronies.

It is still not possible for Suu Kyi and opposition groups to call for an end to Western sanctions—that would be political suicide. However, if substantive progress were achieved on the political front, opposition circles inside and outside Burma could advise the West to adopt a positive approach towards the regime.

The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank could be invited to study and assist infrastructure and development projects and soft loans to help Burma solve its economic ills.

The National Convention could still be a venue to achieve national reconciliation.