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With the example of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster clearly in mind, the Thais in particular were worried about Russia’s involvement in the construction project, and the nature of the facility that was to be built. Also, Thailand and other neighboring countries feared that Burma would be unable to operate and maintain the reactor. The IAEA team that visited in 2001, to assess the country’s preparedness to use and maintain a nuclear reactor safely, was highly critical of Rangoon’s standards, which were well below the accepted minimum, even for conventional power plants. Burma’s record of earthquakes was also raised. There were security concerns too. Despite ceasefire agreements with most of Burma’s armed insurgent groups, some were still fighting the junta, and posed a potential risk to any nuclear reactor. While doubtless heavily guarded, the facility would still be an attractive insurgent target. Despite the imposition of tight controls over popular protest since the 1988 democratic uprising, there was also a danger of civil unrest, arising from decades of repression by the military government and its inept handling of the economy. A nuclear reactor would represent a potent symbol of the regime’s penchant for costly high-status projects, pursued at the expense of basic services like health and education. With the international terrorist threat in mind, the US State Department has already demanded assurances from the junta that it could safely secure such sensitive facilities and materials. After the initial announcement of the nuclear project, little additional information has been made available about the reactor, its location, or the safeguards being put in place to ensure that it is built and operated according to international standards. This has led to considerable speculation and a number of additional concerns. In particular, fears have been expressed that Burma might become a rogue state, and try to develop a nuclear weapon. Even if a nuclear weapons option was not available, it was argued, the presence of a nuclear reactor would at least give the Rangoon regime the capability to develop a “dirty bomb,” which could spread radioactive material through a conventional explosion. Few objective observers question the ruthlessness of the military junta in Rangoon or its determination to cling to power. But an attempt to acquire a nuclear weapon would be completely out of character for a government that, ever since its independence in 1948, has had a history of active participation in global disarmament initiatives. There was no sign before 2000 that Burma had ever considered the acquisition of a nuclear reactor, let alone nuclear weapons. Indeed, successive governments in Rangoon have consistently sought to counter nuclear threats and enhance the country’s security by opposing the manufacture, deployment and use of nuclear weapons. Burma has an impressive record of supporting international legal instruments designed to limit nuclear weapons proliferation and use. Since 1988, this policy has been confirmed by the junta. For example, in December 1995 it signed the Bangkok Treaty, which included a reaffirmation by the ten signatory states of the obligations assumed under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and contained a ban on the development, manufacture, possession, control, stationing or transport, testing or use of nuclear weapons. Notwithstanding this record, the possibility of Burma acquiring a nuclear weapons capability is now being accorded greater attention. In late 2003, it was revealed that the nuclear reactor deal with Russia had been shelved, apparently because the junta had been unable to reach final agreement with Moscow regarding payment. While no firm evidence is yet available, there have been suggestions in the international news media that Rangoon may have turned instead to North Korea to help build its nuclear facilities. This, in turn, has raised the specter of a Burmese nuclear weapons program. In November 2003 the Far Eastern Economic Review reported that North Korean technicians had been seen unloading large crates and heavy construction equipment from trains in central Burma, near the reported site of the future nuclear research reactor. In addition, aircraft from North Korea’s national airline have reportedly been seen landing at military airfields nearby. These developments apparently coincided with the arrival in Rangoon of representatives of the Daesong Economic Group, which has a record of secretly proliferating nuclear technologies to Pakistan. The clear implication of the article was that Pyongyang was providing equipment and materials to help build a nuclear reactor. The small research reactor Burma was getting from Russia was said to be unsuited for the manufacture of fissile material, but Pyongyang has the expertise to provide Rangoon with other options. These fears were encouraged by an unconfirmed news report in November 2003 that 80 members of the Burmese armed forces had recently departed for North Korea to study nuclear technology. The junta has denied that it has any plans to acquire weapons of mass destruction.