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Brad Adams, Asia director of the US- based Human Rights Watch, in an interview with The Irrawaddy says that despite efforts by the Thai government to achieve reconciliation in the southern border provinces, Thai security forces maintain a policy of extra-judicial acts of violence, undermining official efforts to win the support of local communities.
 
Question: Gen Surayud has, from the day he took office, said the right things about the South. He said the main reason that the insurgency started was a lack of justice in the South, and he has continued to talk about respecting human rights and reconciliation. The problem is that there are many factions in the Thai military and police who simply don’t agree with him; who think that force is the answer; who act on nationalism and think that if only the Thai State reacted more strongly a solution would soon be reached.
 
Answer: We have done our own investigations in the South, which show that disappearances are a widespread problem. We put out a report in February documenting that. The Thai government doesn’t dispute what we are saying, and frankly, we underplayed the severity of the problem in the sense that we only put cases in where we had very clear facts about state responsibility. There are many more cases where it is likely that the state was involved.
 
We know that there are certain units that are essentially death squads, and we know that the army has consciously sent in the Rangers, who are poorly disciplined, to do some of the dirty work—as well as knowing that in different periods they have used different tactics when they want to instill fear into the community.

There are hundreds of people in military custody as we speak. They’ve not been charged with any crime—and we’re aware of some of the places they are being held. This is government policy.
 
Q: Are you saying that these squads are still operational even since September 19, 2006 (and the coup d’etat)? 
 
A: Yes, September 19, 2006, has had no influence on the fictionalized Thai army politics that exist in implementing policies in the South. So, there have been periods that have been worse and there have been periods that have been better. But yes, these abuses continue.
 
Q: On the other side are the crimes that have been carried out by the insurgents and other groups. What’s your assessment there? Is it simply the insurgents pursuing the idea of a jihad (holy war) for an independent Pattani State, or is it in response to the disappearances? 
 
A: It’s very clear that a new generation of militants is in the ascendancy in the South; that they have embraced violence for its own sake because they believe it will create the kind of polarization in society in the South that will lead ultimately to independence.

They have embraced attacks on civilians—these are intentional; beheadings of monks for example, the targeting of teachers and civil servants, attacks on police—all of which are prohibited under international law.
 
What the militants want is an overreaction from the Thai government and the Thai military, because they want to demonstrate to the community in the South that they should not have any loyalty, allegiance or hope with the Thai State. So, there is a vicious cycle, which is intentional.
 
Q: What needs to be done to translate these issues into effective policy?
 
A: What we have said to the Thai government and the Thai army is, “You’re the only one who has an interest in breaking this vicious circle. You have nothing to gain from this, because it's making you less and less popular, and ultimately could lead to the outcome you most fear—which is people really wanting to separate from Thailand.
 
The Thai government has to end extra-judicial killings, arbitrary arrests, torture and disappearances. It needs to fight a counter insurgency within the law.

That may seem a contradiction in terms to some of the people in the Thai army and police who are charged with countering the insurgency. [But] if you meet force with force— unless you can win that battle very quickly—you actually make things worse.