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Fourth, even after estimating the size of Burma’s rice surplus how will the MRTLC determine who can export how much rice, given the current practice of cronyism? Will the business arms of the armed forces—such as Myanmar Economic Holding and Myanmar Economic Corporation, which currently monopolize the import and export of some commodities—play a role in the rice trade as well? If private firms, formed by Burmese nationals are able to buy rice directly from the farmers at market rates, then why should rice-trading associations sell to MAPT for the armed forces at cost? Fifth, how can the government justify charging a ten-percent export tax on rice in addition to taking half the earnings from rice exports? Finally, is the government aware that forming too many committees at various levels will create unnecessary layers of red tape and greater opportunities for corruption? These questions can not yet be addressed simply because the new rice export policy remains so vague. According to the government, the new policy was designed to "ensure free trade of the crop in the interest of the entire peasantry and to help develop the market-oriented economy". This shift away from the state-controlled system to allow the market to dictate the rice trade actually began in 1988. Nevertheless, it has taken the junta about 15 years to finally dismantle the government’s total command over the rice trade. The policy shift should encourage farmers to produce more but it is doubtful their incomes will increase significantly any time soon since they must also buy consumer goods and inputs, such as fertilizers and pesticides, at market prices. High inflation, too, will offset any short-term income gains for farmers. Moreover, eliminating the government’s export monopoly would abolish the price differential between the domestic purchase price and export price, but the grossly overvalued exchange rate means the implicit taxation of rice would remain large. This would mainly benefit urban consumers, rice exporters and others with access to foreign exchange. Furthermore, the new policy statement proudly mentioned that it is "the last remaining restriction of the old national economic system". But this is patently not true. There are still many economic issues that need urgent reforms including restrictions on the import-export trade, the overvalued exchange rate, the weak banking and financial system, high inflation, negative interest rates, the budget deficit and high military spending. Also, uncertainties in the business sector and frequent policy changes should be corrected for the rice trade to run smoothly. Even the agriculture sector needs to relax controls over other crops as well as over the transfer, sale and ownership of land. Without addressing these issues, the new policy will help neither the farmers nor consumers. Thus far, the emphasis has been more on the creation of several committees than on clearly explaining the particulars of the new rice trading procedures. The sheer number of new committees at various levels suggests that they will play additional roles outside of facilitating the rice trade, or that they will step back in to control it. In any case, it is still early to assess the actual impact of the new rice trading policy, as many questions await answers from the government. One thing, though, is for certain: mounting political, economic and social crises have forced the military regime to introduce the change. After 15 years of clinging to power, ostensibly trying to move the country towards a market economy, public unease is running high. Lifting controls over the rice trade marks a significant break from the sullied legacy of Ne Win. Whether this policy shift can breathe new life into Burma’s economy and diffuse social tensions, however, remains to be seen. Min Htet Myat is a Burmese scholar living in exile.