COVER STORY
A Growing Tatmadaw
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By AUNG ZAW |
MARCH, 2006 - VOLUME 14 NO.3
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From its modest origins in the years following independence from Britain, Burma’s Tatmadaw has pushed in recent years to modernize and expand…and to further secure the power of the country’s ruling generals
Burma’s Tatmadaw (armed forces) has always exhibited a vigorous nationalistic quality. In the early years of the country’s independence from Britain, the government faced strong challenges from armed ethnic and political insurgents. The appeal to nationalism, and an emphasis on preserving the sovereignty of Burma, were perhaps more comprehensible at that time than in the country’s modern age of military despotism, which makes a mockery of the generals’ frequent appeals to national unity and its “shotgun” diplomacy with respect to domestic matters.
Since the failed democratic uprising in 1988 and the present regime’s seizure of power, Burma’s armed forces have steadily increased in size and sophistication, an expansion that has always been justified by appeals to national unity and independence. Put another way, Burma’s military growth has been fueled by appealing to the fears of internal or external disruptions.
This point was made explicitly—and ironically—clear during a speech by Snr-Gen Than Shwe at this year’s Independence Day commemoration in January. “Nowadays, brazen annexation of a nation with the use of force is not as popular as before. However, it is found that some big nations are essaying to interfere in the domestic affairs of others and influence their political, economic, social and cultural traditions.”
The junta has always feared its own people and dealt savagely with any challenge from within. A recent top-secret document obtained by The Irrawaddy reveals just how deeply the regime fears external interference—particularly from the West.
The document records the heightened concerns of top military leaders in Burma over the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2003. In it the generals show a marked preoccupation with the US military’s state-of-the-art weaponry, and they assert that the country’s operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have more to do with demonstrating US military might and impressing the world than pacifying rogue nations and combating terrorism.
Army commanders are repeatedly admonished to prepare their troops to be vigilant and to create alternative command posts in the event of an invasion. Portions of the document also exhort regional commanders to bolster their local defenses by stepping up training for fire brigades and organizing local war veteran associations.
According to the document, the junta has also issued small arms and provided platoon-level training for members of its pseudo-political organization the Union Solidarity and Development Association.
Most analysts and Burma watchers believe that a direct US invasion of Burma is unlikely, but the country’s top generals betray in the document their lingering paranoia and an obsession with security—an issue that has traditionally been used to justify the strengthening of Burma’s armed forces.
No available official data exists on the junta’s defense spending, but western defense analysts and independent reports indicate that levels have now reached as much as US $1 billion. The sale of oil and gas to energy-hungry neighbors has produced large cash reserves that could potentially fund further expansion of the country’s armed forces.
In the years following independence in 1948, the Burmese military was poorly funded, ill-trained and faced significant armed opposition from ethnic and political insurgents. Perhaps its greatest challenges came from the CIA-backed Kuomintang forces in northern Burma and the China-backed Communist Party of Burma.
To combat growing instability, the military began to expand in the 1950s and particularly following Gen Ne Win’s military coup in 1962. Burma has purchased weapons from a variety of sources, including India, Pakistan, Israel, France, Italy, Poland, Germany and Yugoslavia. It also received smaller-scale pre-sanctions assistance from the US and UK, though successive government leaders would spurn any further assistance from these sources.
Having acquired equipment to outfit the country’s fledgling air force and navy, Burma’s war machines fell into disrepair in the years leading up to 1988. Warships were incapable of maintaining effective coastal security, and many of the country’s jet fighters could no longer fly. Burma lost considerable ground in military readiness to regional neighbors such as Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, all of whom were outfitted with sophisticated modern jet fighters and warships from western nations.
| Burma’s Arms Suppliers
China
China has provided Burma with nearly 200 battle tanks of various types, more than 200 armored personnel carriers, anti-aircraft weapons and artillery. Beijing has also shipped to Burma 52 Chengdu F-7M Airguard fighters, 48 NAMC A-5C fighters, 14 Karakoum-8 jet assault and trainer planes, and a variety of other transportation and training aircraft. Burma’s navy has received from China 6 Houxin guided-missile patrol boats, 16 Hainan-class patrol boats and an undisclosed number of small gunboats. |
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India
Burma has procured eighty 75mm howitzers and various types of anti-aircraft weapons, including shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles and rocket launchers from India. A proposed deal to supply Burma with British-made BN-2 Islander maritime aircraft is in doubt following official British objections. Burma is also seeking naval expertise from India. |
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Israel
As a traditional arms supplier to Burma, Israel helps research and development programs for Burma’s army and has provided military software, advanced electronic devices and intelligence training. Rangoon has acquired air-to-air missiles, laser-guided bombs and sixteen 155mm howitzers from Israel in addition to other medium and small weapons, including anti-tank guns and rocket-propelled grenade launchers. |
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Japan
Japan has supplied Burma with undisclosed numbers of heavy duty and light all-terrain vehicles and components for military vehicles. |
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North Korea
Although no official diplomatic ties exist between the two countries, Burma has received from North Korea sixteen 130mm artillery pieces and as many as 20 million rounds of 7.62mm ammunition. North Korea is also reported to be involved in the construction of a nuclear reactor in Burma. |
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Pakistan
One of the main suppliers of ammunition for artillery, mortar and small arms to Burma, Pakistan has also delivered five thousand 120mm mortars, rocket launchers, recoilless rifles and machine guns. |
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Russia
Russia has sold Burma MiG-29 jet fighters, training planes and assault helicopters in addition to radar and communication equipment. Moscow has also helped construct a nuclear reactor in Burma, and is reported to be training Burmese military personnel in nuclear science. |
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Serbia
Apart from buying twelve G-4 aircraft from Serbia, Burma is believed to have signed an agreement for the delivery of an undisclosed number of self-propelled howitzers. |
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Singapore
The island state has assisted Burmese military research and development programs, and the state-owned Chartered Industries of Singapore is building a military facility for manufacturing small-caliber ordnance. Singapore also supplies Burma with anti-aircraft weapon systems, ammunition, medium-size and small arms. |
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Ukraine
Fifty T-72 tanks are among the military equipment supplied to Burma by Ukraine. Rangoon has reportedly also acquired air defense equipment and components for 1,000 BTR-3U light armored personnel carriers from the former Soviet republic. |
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Yugoslavia
The former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia supplied Burma with 12 SOKO G-4 Super Gale ground assault aircraft and provided training for Burmese air force personnel. Burma's navy also received PB-90 coastal patrol boats and tactical training. |
In contrast to the military government’s weak coastal and air defenses, the Burmese army gained a reputation as one of the toughest guerrilla forces in the region, second only to Vietnam. The army had gained years of experience in a jungle warfare campaign against insurgents. Their skills in urban warfare, as well, were later honed during a series of nationwide uprisings and student protests that culminated in the bloody crackdown in 1988. It was at this time that the newly installed commander-in-chief, Snr-Gen Than Shwe, began to use the annual Armed Forces Day to articulate his plans to modernize Burma’s armed forces.
Those plans included raising troop strength in the army to some 400,000 active duty soldiers. Recent reports suggest that the generals have achieved that mark, but with one important drawback. Most have little, if any, combat experience, and morale within all branches of the military has plummeted.
American scholar Mary P Callaham suggests in her book Making Enemies, War and State-Building in Burma that the country’s military may not be as effective a fighting force as it was once believed to be. “Officers as high-ranking as majors and in some cases lieutenant colonels today probably have less experience fighting wars than trying to build roads.”
Recent steps have also been taken to bolster Burma’s air and naval forces. The presence of US warships off the coast of Burma in 1988 pointed up the fact that the country had little capability to defend its coasts against military aggressors, let alone illegal fishing vessels from neighboring countries. Efforts have been taken in recent years to improve coastal surveillance and signal intelligence capabilities. Some western defense sources suggest that Burmese leaders have been eager to install radar systems to warn against seaborne attacks. In 2003, Burma considered purchasing two mini-submarines from North Korea, but the plan was subsequently scrapped. Burma has also consulted with China on technical and strategic matters related to the navy.
Most recently, Burma has turned to India for acquiring warships and training in ship-building. In January 2006, Indian Vice Admiral Arun Pradesh met top junta leaders, including Than Shwe, reportedly to discuss upgrading Burma’s navy using Indian technology.
Burma has also attempted to improve the country’s air force. In the last two decades, the junta has purchased jet fighters from China and negotiated with India for other aircraft. Burma’s military acquired 12 MiG-29 jet fighters from Russia in 2001, and analysts believe that the junta is negotiating for medium to long-range air-to-surface missiles—useful for ongoing counterinsurgency campaigns, but also an obvious attempt to upgrade its air defenses against a better-equipped Royal Thai Air Force that has a fleet of more than 30 substantially more sophisticated American-made F-16 fighters. Thailand, however, has far fewer troops.
Despite significant efforts to improve all branches of Burma’s armed forces, the Tatmadaw will require many years to fully update troop strength, infrastructure, maintenance and repair, and equipment of its forces. It is likely that, even under a democratic government, elected leaders will adopt a similar stance as the current military government on the need for a well-trained and well-equipped national army.
Where a democratically elected government will differ from Burma’s current leaders, however, is on the crucial issue of refurbishing the image of the country’s armed forces. No more will they be the pawns of despots, charged principally with perpetuating a military state and subjugating the civilian population.
And if democracy is ever to thrive on Burmese soil, the country needs to establish a truly professional and volunteer army, led by civilians and charged with protecting the national interests of all Burma’s citizens, rather than enforcing the political policies of a ruling elite.
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The Army
The army represents the backbone of the Tatmadaw (armed forces), comprising the largest number of personnel among the three services. Its growth over the course of more than a decade has been effected by the introduction of new units—such as light infantry divisions—expanded armor divisions and artillery forces, and engineering battalions.
As its numbers have expanded, so has its presence throughout the country. Numerous ceasefire agreements brokered during former prime minister Khin Nyunt’s tenure facilitated a much larger presence for the military in Burma’s numerous ethnic regions. In Shan State alone, the number of battalions has increased from 40 to 200 in the last 18 years; while in Kachin State, new artillery battalions have been deployed to neutralize local insurgent groups.
Lacking in the Burmese army of the pre-1988 era were reliable military hardware and vehicles. Burma has acquired new weapons systems from numerous countries, including India, Singapore, Pakistan, North Korea, Ukraine and Israel—to name only a few. The country’s principal supplier, however, has been China. Armored personnel carriers and light all-terrain vehicles have also been imported from Japan.
Arms and equipment from Western nations have also found their way into Burma, usually through third parties, and despite international arms embargoes against Rangoon. In 2004, Ukraine supplied the army with 50 BTR-3U light armored personnel carriers, as part of a much larger deal. This followed the purchase of 50 T-72 tanks a year earlier.
In 2003, Burma purchased eighty 75mm howitzers from India, which is thought also to have supplied significant quantities of mortar and artillery rounds. The Burmese army has also acquired various anti-aircraft installations, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles and rocket-propelled grenades.
In addition, the army has bolstered its communications network. Radio and electronic surveillance systems have been installed at operational and tactical levels. The army has additionally acquired significant computer and software supplies from China, Singapore and Israel—which is also believed by Western military analysts to have sold Burma laser-guided bombs.
The Burmese army has traditionally suffered from a lack of logistical readiness and inadequate or outdated military technology, particularly for military operations beyond its borders or to protect from invasion. Apart from infrequent joint training programs with neighboring India, the Burmese army is a largely inexperienced fighting force—although it is well-trained in guerilla warfare.
The exact size of the Burmese army is not known. A recent top secret government document obtained by The Irrawaddy acknowledges that troop strength for all the country’s armed forces is not at full capacity. Western analysts put the figure at 400,000, still a formidable figure as the number of troops has more than doubled since 1988.
With few recent military successes beyond jungle skirmishes against embattled ethnic insurgents, the junta suggested in its latest draft of the national constitution that the country’s armed forces stand to become “strong, modern and the sole existing brilliant and patriotic Tatmadaw.” Clunky rhetoric aside, analysts believe that the junta’s ultimate goal is to transform the army into a modern, well-equipped fighting force capable of repelling sophisticated external adversaries. — Aung Lwin Oo |
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Air Force
Actions speak louder than words in Burma’s Tatmadaw (armed forces). A military man who pays lip-service to his exploits rather than demonstrating them through his actions is said to be an air force man.
This popular military joke points up the lack of respect generally accorded Burma’s fly boys. Compared to other countries in the region, Burma’s air force has traditionally lacked the training and technical sophistication of its better-equipped neighbors.
The air force can trace its origins back to the United Kingdom’s Burma Act of 1947, which stipulated the terms for Burma’s independence from Britain. In following years, the BAF received assistance from Britain and the US to combat insurgency movements and a growing drug trade.
Successive governments shunned further aid from the West, and the BAF was forced to rely on second-hand and obsolete aircraft—in many cases, modified trainers—that were poorly maintained.
In 1975, the air force received a major boost when the US donated 18 Bell 205A helicopters and seven 206B Jet Ranger aircraft for anti-drugs operations. It was later discovered that the government had, instead, used the helicopters for offensive operations against ethnic insurgent groups. By 1985, only about 50 percent of the Burmese air force’s aircraft could fly.
Following the political upheaval of 1988, and subsequent to international embargoes on arms sales to Burma from the West, the newly installed ruling junta negotiated with countries such as China and Russia to bolster their air defenses. In the early 1990s, the junta purchased aircraft from Eastern Europe.
Clashes with Thailand in the border regions between the two countries in 2001 revealed the disparity between Burma’s pilots and those of the Royal Thai Air Force. Observers noted that while the Thai forces struck their targets regularly, the Burmese side showed a startling lack of skill.
To eliminate the disparity, Burma acquired from Russia 10 MiG-29 fighters and two dual-seat trainers—reportedly at a cost of US $130 million, of which half was to be paid up front, and the balance remitted over the next 10 years.
Spurred in part by Thailand’s increasingly sophisticated air power, Burma’s ruling generals will undoubtedly continue to seek ways to improve their air force. Increasingly close ties with India, and steady support from China, suggest that the military government will have few problems acquiring more sophisticated weapons and training in the coming years. — Yeni |
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The Navy
Burma’s coastline runs 1,200 miles, and its maritime interests cover an area of some 57,400 square miles—a region that comprises one of Asia’s key resources for oil and natural gas. Given its importance, it is perhaps surprising that Burma’s naval forces have lacked the equipment, manpower and training necessary to insure a ready defense of coastal borders.
Recent developments, however, suggest that the government is taking steps to improve the quality of its naval fleet to protect its offshore gas and oil sectors, and fishing rights.
Historically, the Burmese navy has played only a minor role in the defense of the country’s national interests. Navy boats patrol rivers and inland waterways in support of the army’s counterinsurgency campaigns, and they perform limited surveillance of coastal regions.
Compared to neighboring countries such as Thailand and India, the Burmese navy is thought to have limited operational capabilities—prompting fishing fleets from countries of the region to exploit Burma’s rich fishing grounds.
Before 1988, the navy’s fleet consisted of about 100 vessels, acquired mostly from the US and Britain, and most of which were second-hand and nearly a half-century old. In recent years, Burma has acquired more sophisticated hardware and training from China, Pakistan, Russia and Yugoslavia—the US and EU have clamped embargoes on Burma.
In the last 12 years, Burma has nearly doubled the size of its naval fleet, according to Andrew Selth, whose book Burma’s Armed Forces: Power without Glory documents Burma’s recent military expansion.
In 2001, with assistance from Chinese naval engineers, a new radar station was built on St Luke’s Island in southern Burma, opposite Thailand’s Ranong province. This busy seaway is renowned as an avenue for smugglers and illegal fishing fleets, and there have been several reports of clashes between Burmese and Thai naval vessels over fishing in the area.
The expansion of the Burmese navy has drawn the attention of the international community. Some analysts suggest that the Burmese coastline could in future be used as a base for China’s growing nuclear submarine fleet, given the close military ties between the two.
Perhaps concerned over China’s growing influence in Burma, India has made efforts recently to increase strategic relations with the junta. In January, Burma was invited to attend a multi-nation joint naval exercise hosted by India. Indian press reports also stated that Delhi has tentatively agreed to sell second-hand British-made BN-2 Islander maritime aircraft to the junta—a development that has drawn protests from the British government. The junta has also agreed to a memorandum of understanding with India to upgrade the country’s naval technology and increase ship-building projects within Burma. Indian Vice Admiral Arun Pradesh visited Rangoon last January, reportedly to discuss using Indian technology to upgrade Burma’s navy.
The Burmese navy—like the air force—has some credibility among Burma’s civilian population. During the 1988 democracy uprising, many naval officers joined in the student-led movement. Army and intelligence units have since kept a watchful eye on their sea-going comrades.
With the introduction of new vessels and hardware, the Burmese navy has recently faced a steep learning curve to keep the new fleet operational. In 2000, the head of the Burmese navy was dismissed from office, reportedly because the Chinese-made ships under his command performed poorly at a naval exercise attended by visiting Chinese military observers. Many naval officers were believed to have resigned their posts in support of their commanding officer.
Many military analysts suggest that the role of the Burmese navy within the country’s Tatmadaw (armed forces) will expand and diversify in coming years, particularly with regard to protecting the country’s vast coastal oil and gas fields. Such an expansion could lead, according to observers, to increasing tension with their traditional rivals, the Burmese army. In addition, a better equipped and aggressive Burmese naval fleet could run into trouble with neighboring Thailand over the sovereignty of coastal waters. — Khun Sam |
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