| By DONALD M SEEKINS | Friday, September 19, 2003 |
September 19, 2003—Saying a situation is "complex" is sometimes acknowledged as displaying commendable realism; but at other times, a complex view is dismissed as a sign of moral weakness, especially by those who prefer to see things in terms of black and white. The May 30 attack on Aung San Suu Kyi and her convoy in Sagaing Division, which resulted in her detention and the death of as many as 100 pro-democracy supporters at the hands of junta-enlisted thugs, has made the situation in Burma more complex than ever. We need to come to an understanding about what is happening inside the country that transcends simple moralism or political side-taking. Without it, the international community cannot respond in an effective way. The world has expressed clear indignation over the Black Friday incident. On July 29, US President George W Bush signed into law the "Burma Freedom and Democracy Act," a far tougher measure than the 1997 non-retroactive ban on US investments. This act embargoes Burmese exports and effectively closes off access to US currency by individuals or companies inside the country. To the surprise of those who considered him the junta’s best friend in the region, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad suggested that should negotiations with the junta fail, Burma should be expelled from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean). The Japanese government, which has generally taken a patient, indeed indulgent, attitude toward the junta since 1988, announced that it was halting all new aid, and has apparently frozen on-going projects as well. China, however, weighed in as usual on the junta’s side, criticizing external interference in the country’s domestic affairs. But sanctions are, as Colin Powell once said, a "blunt instrument," and despite the bully-pulpit exuberance of certain Congressmen and activists in Washington, it seems they are hitting the wrong targets. According to the BBC, 400 textile factories, mostly located on the outskirts of Rangoon, employ as many as 350,000 low-paid female workers. In recent years, Burma has exported up to US $400 million in textiles to the United States annually. Since the latest US sanctions ban imports from the country, in Prof David Steinberg’s estimate "some 80,000 jobs have already been lost and this will be followed by another 100,000, mostly young women who provide supplementary income for impoverished families." In the South China Morning Post, Steinberg cited a recent academic inquiry in central Burma indicating that some of those let off are finding their way into the brothels. "There are few other jobs available," Steinberg wrote in mid-August. Small traders who see greenbacks as the lifeblood of their business are also being hit hard, as the sanctions shut Burmese banks off from a supply of dollars. Some advocates of sanctions see them as a way of causing damage to the military-controlled economy in the hope the whole thing will just collapse: apr?s moi, le deluge. Consider the argument from one of them, Philip Robertson of the AFL-CIO, the main American labor federation. He claims that because Burma’s junta controls the economy through Army-owned conglomerates such as the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings, the imposition of trade and investment bans hits hard at its economic interests. But as he wrote in The Irrawaddy ("Sanctions Are Working in Burma," Online Commentary, Aug 26, 2003) "… for this reason, sanctions has a disproportionate impact on the military, not necessarily the people of Burma." As tough sanctions begin to bite, Robertson says, Burma’s ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) will step up oppressive measures such as forced expropriation of land and forced labor to scrape together enough resources to buy the loyalty to the officer corps, the key to its continued survival. This "creates additional popular resentment against the military, and builds support for political change." But, I wonder, what does he expect the people, newly resentful, to do? To refuse to perform forced labor? To march in the streets as they did in 1988, and get shot? It’s hard to believe that Robertson has fully thought through the implications of his words. He seems to expect the people of Burma to be (or to continue to be) a punching bag for an angry and isolated junta. Popular resentment may build support for political change—which, judging by the large crowds who risked the authorities’ wrath by going to hear Suu Kyi’s during her up-country visits, is already huge. But it is undeniably true that the SPDC does what it likes, regardless of what the people think. Ma Thanegi, who made waves in 1997 when her essay "The Burmese Fairy Tale" was published in the Far Eastern Economic Review, but it rather aptly: "you would deliberately make us poor [by imposing sanctions] to force us to fight a revolution?" While I differ with Ma Thanegi on the source of Burmese poverty—it has been the result of SPDC incompetence and greed, rather than sanctions—the pro-sanctions crowd, in an oddly Kantian sort of way, seem to see sanctions as morally good in themselves, regardless of the consequences. But if you accuse them of moral absolutism, they point to a misty apparition, "South Africa," where an evil regime was, not self-evidently, toppled by worldwide sanctions in the 1980s. Close study of the situation in Burma since 1988 suggests that neither sanctions nor "constructive engagement" have had much impact on the SPDC’s behavior. As more time passes, this fact becomes more apparent. In other words, had the international community acted more decisively at the end of the 1980s, when the junta was still relatively vulnerable and disorganized, sanctions might have had some impact. The SPDC has managed to evade the consequences of sanctions by cultivating close economic ties with all its Asian neighbors—not just China, as many believe—while opportunistically taking short-term advantage of constructive engagement. After Black Friday, no one could argue that either sanctions or engagement has led to a real and sustained improvement in the junta’s treatment of the democratic or ethnic minority opposition. During the early and mid-1990s, many observers saw Burma’s future in terms of Suharto’s Indonesia, where an authoritarian state had successfully promoted economic growth through globalization and close ties with the West and Japan. But Black Friday suggests that in 2003, the "North Korean model" may be more appropriate. Lurching from one economic crisis to another, including a famine that has killed at least a million people, North Korea’s Stalinist elite manages to survive, and even thrive. How? North Korea gets by on what it can extract from the desperately poor local population, limited trade and financial support from neighboring countries, and dirty deals selling drugs and weapons abroad. Although Burma’s food security situation is getting worse, largely because of poor distribution, the country’s agricultural potential is far greater than North Korea’s, meaning that self-sufficiency in necessities is a viable option. Moreover, Burma’s economic ties with neighboring Asian countries are excellent, and it has one of the world’s largest drug export economies, with at least indirect pay-offs to the junta. Even if all major countries adopt toughs sanctions like the US, this is no guarantee that Than Shwe and his fellow generals won’t find ways of surviving and clinging to power like Kim Jong-il. Indeed, the fears engendered by global hostility play into the regime’s hands. Pyongyang has been in a state of war since 1950, and in the face of recent American pressure has stepped up hysterical preparations for an Armageddon-like showdown, apparently including the development of nuclear weapons. It’s unlikely the SPDC will get a hold of nuclear bombs any time soon, but it is preparing the people for confrontation with the "neo-colonialists." More than 12 million people have been recruited into the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), and according to a recent report in The Irrawaddy, the junta is ordering civil servants and their families to undergo military training. President Bush’s sanctions may look tough, but Than Shwe can probably tough it out. The shift from an "Indonesian" to a "North Korean" model, a process that seems underway even if the SPDC doesn’t describe it in those terms, reflects the ascendancy of "hard-liners" over "moderates" inside the military elite. Latest evidence of this is the "demotion" of Gen Khin Nyunt from SPDC Secretary One to Prime Minister, which is a ceremonial post. Over the past few years, it has become apparent that the long underestimated SPDC chairman Than Shwe has succeeded to the late Ne Win’s position as "Number One." Whether he can fill the wily Ne Win’s boots remains another matter. Described as stubborn, unimaginative and highly conservative, Than Shwe, through his patronage of the USDA, is said to be the mastermind behind Black Friday. He’s also unenthusiastic about economic engagement with the outside world, preferring a return to some variant of the Ne Win-era autarky. He dislikes Suu Kyi intensely, reflected in his heavy-handed treatment of her supporters. What, then, can the international community do? First, moral and material support remains imperative, as well as continued efforts by the UN and other international organizations to investigate and publicize the SPDC’s human rights abuses. Western or Japanese companies that are complicit in human rights violations must be prosecuted in their home country’s courts, as with the case of Unocal’s participation in the Yadana pipeline project and the US proceedings it spurred. The export of weapons and military-applicable technology, such as Russia’s sale of MiG-29s, must be halted, or at least exposed and sharply criticized. Burma must not be allowed to fall off the world’s radar screen. At the same time, it’s clear that a huge inflow of humanitarian aid is necessary. Robertson claims that it is strange that the "… anti-sanctions camp … believe that providing smatterings of humanitarian assistance will somehow result in a change of heart and policy in the SPDC." But the purpose of humanitarian aid is not to change the political system. It is to alleviate suffering. Birth control seminars and clean hypodermic needles will not get the junta to recognize the results of the 1990 election, but they may halt, or slow down, the spread of AIDS. No doubt some of this assistance will be misused. Tough monitoring is required, but even if only a little gets through to ordinary people, it’s better than nothing. In fact, I would go as far as saying that Burma needs a "humanitarian Marshall Plan" to stave off AIDS, drug abuse, malnutrition and other calamities. Sanctions as a blunt instrument are doing more harm than good. Those who support them seem to combine moral indignation with a large amount of wishful thinking, assuming that things will turn out the way they want, provided they continue to do what they already want to do. The situation in Burma is complex and tragic, and we need fresh thinking on how to handle a regime that on May 30 again showed its determination to shed blood in defense of its privileges. Donald M Seekins is a professor of Southeast Asian history and politics at Meio University in Okinawa, Japan.