The Irrawaddy News Magazine [Covering Burma and Southeast Asia]

November 16, 2004—It is truly a large number of prisoners, fourteen thousand and three hundred! No country in the world has ever pardoned these many prisoners, save for the military regime in Burma.

After the regime’s announcement of the amnesty, I phoned friends in Burma to gauge their reaction. They were overwhelmingly excited about the possibility of their friends and family members regaining their freedom and returning home. Even those who had doubts remaining in their hearts stressed that the current generals could be different from the ousted Gen Khin Nyunt and his NIB lackeys. They were reassured by the newly appointed generals’ remark that “all these prisoners were wrongly detained by the NIB, and they will be released.”

I guess the people inside Burma, close as they are to the generals, would know more than an exile like me. In the end, their optimism may prove justified, and the current generals may take a different path to solve our national problems. While I’m writing this, 14,318 prisoners have regained their freedom. It was shocking that the NIB recklessly imprisoned these many people. Like many others, I felt that the regime was showing signs of positive improvement.

Unfortunately, many people’s hopes began to flag and eventually faded when families soon found out that only a handful of political detainees would be released. According to all available reports, the prisoners that were newly freed appear to be those sentenced to one or two years for criminal offences.

What is this all about? Did the junta leaders do it in accordance with their astrologer’s advice to avert impending misfortune? Or do they want to hear praises from their fellow Asean members and gain international acceptance?

Too bad for the junta that the world is not blind like the profits-seeking Thai prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who prioritizes pleasing Rangoon’s generals before solving his internal problems in the South. It is obvious that every caring person wants to see sincerity and not ploys from the military regime. And everyone knows that the political conflicts in Burma would be solved if the regime releases Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the generals have a genuine political dialogue with the opposition. The regime cannot keep using force to achieve national reconciliation, peace, and development.

Sr-Gen Than Shwe expressed at the World Buddhist Summit’s Opening Ceremony his loving kindness (metta), compassion (karuna), joy and equanimity (upekkha). He and his loyalists should have their actions follow their words – they should put an end to their evil thoughts, purify their minds, and pursue the good of the Burmese people. Otherwise, it would be a great sin for them to repeat the Lord Buddha’s teachings without taking the right action – immediately release Daw Suu and the remaining political prisoners, and having a meaningful political dialogue on democratization and national reconciliation.

October 28, 2004—Gen Khin Nyunt envisioned himself more pragmatic than the paramount leader Sr-Gen Than Shwe and other tough men. Khin Nyunt claimed he steered the country into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; that he succeeded in brokering ceasefires with 17 of Burma’s armed ethnic insurgent groups and endorsed a “road map” to democracy. He seemed to be smart in such a move, building his own popularity and glory as a moderate only by comparison to the rest in the regime.

It is in fact not wise to outpace others, especially the tough master Than Shwe, who is still enjoying his supreme power surrounded with a pack of loyalists. The cold-blooded and spiteful master has not appeared to renounce his lavish life. Khin Nyunt foolishly got the wrong idea about claiming himself the best of all. Probably, Khin Nyunt did not study history of those unfortunate individuals who outplayed their masters, and eventually got into trouble.

Khin Nyunt assumed he was smarter and more capable than the rest. He underestimated his superiors and tried to manipulate their interests. He apparently believed that his ideas and works were more creative and successful than those of his masters. Since he had more space and opportunities to move, he had vaunted his brilliant talents and went too far to become the center of attention at all times. He seemed to ignore the others, and did not realize his master was no longer pleased with his popularity.

Than Shwe desires Burma to be a modern empire and seems to build his own dynasty. He started feeling insecure and threatened from Khin Nyunt. Than Shwe discovered his power would not be shaken by outside force, but from within his own ranks, particularly the cunning Khin Nyunt. Than Shwe’s glory has been offended by Khin Nyunt; it was perhaps the costliest mistake Khin Nyunt had committed. He miscalculated and outshone the master who secured his position before.

By all accounts, Khin Nyunt fell out of favor for his daring to outshine his master. The cost of outshining the Than Shwe is heavy—Khin Nyunt is disgracefully now under house arrest and has lost everything he had built.

We, the Executive Committee of the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), would like to clarify the commentary, written by Wai Moe, published in your magazine on 20th August, 2004, named “Burma’s Fractious Political Culture”.

We found out that the commentary which is focused on schisms of historical Burmese political organizations starting from 1920 to was written only within the limited scope of the author’s

knowledge. The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma) is a unique association that has been standing unified with its policy since its founding on March 23, 2000.

It is not true, as is stated at the very beginning of the commentary that, “one faction attempted to remove joint secretary Bo Kyi” during the annual meeting. Bo Kyi, as a member of the

executive committee, has been undertaking the duty of joint secretary of the association, since he was democratically elected to the position by the members of the AAPP.

We believe that the media should not publish writings and commentaries on confidential and internal affairs of organizations, such as meetings, without verifying the facts with the organization in question. Although we affirm the rights of a free and non-aligned press, to publish anyone’s writings that make comments on policy, objectives and resolutions of any organization. And in doing so, to examine and search for the truth.

Therefore, the editor of the Irrawaddy is humbly requested to seek an official and prior confirmation from the association whenever commentary (and writing) on internal and organizational affairs are to be published, which would otherwise not be made public.

We, all the executive committee members of the association, have decided that both the writer and the editor should be accountable for publishing a writing that has tarnished the image of the

June 30, 2004—I am writing in response to the article about the Burmese American Association of Texas, or BAAT [“The Burmese American Association of Texas”, Vol.12 No.5, May 2004], claiming it is an SPDC-affiliated organization.

First, I wanted to inquire as to why this article was not properly researched. Without proper research, you are doing incredible damage. Let me explain.

The BAAT has been around for 40 years. It is a social organization that organizes Burmese parties, cultural ceremonies and concerts. It is not a political organization, although different members like myself are free to organize political work on our own.

Many members have lived in Texas long before the 1988 demonstrations ever occurred. Some old-timers have been in Texas for 20, 30 or 40 years. From my experience, some people have been disconnected from Burma for so long and others have little or no interest in politics. Even if there are relatives of the regime, they are remotely connected or disinterested, and have never affected what others like myself may do socially or politically.

Having been a member of several other Burmese social (or political) organizations in other places, it is amazing to me that BAAT has been around for so long. The reason is that they have strictly maintained their non-political stance for the good of the community here in Texas. People are accepted regardless of political affiliation, religion or ethnic group. Buddhists, Muslims and Christians have all co-mingled and participated in the community graciously for a long time and many ethnic groups are represented. It is a great place to meet other Burmese with similar interests or to work on personal projects, such as politics or volunteer work.

There are many former refugees in the organization, along with people who came here for jobs or people who grew up in the US. Many members of BAAT, me included, are actively involved in supporting and helping refugees find jobs and get on their feet once they have been resettled. Today, many former refugees and student activists remain active members of BAAT. Any accusation that BAAT is government-sponsored or related is simply false and ridiculous.

June 25, 2004—The European Union, or EU, made the right decision by canceling its upcoming meeting with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or Asean, due to Burma’s membership in the group.

The EU’s decision should send a major signal to Asean that Burma is a thorn in the side of the region. Recently Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar said that “constructive engagement” would be more successful in promoting democratic reform in Burma than the harsh sanctions imposed by the US and EU.

It is regrettable that Malaysia believes in the mistaken policy of “constructive engagement” especially with a country so uncommitted to human rights as Burma. Under Asean’s current policy, it only engages with the illegitimate regime. It is only with the ruling State Peace and Development Council, or SPDC, that Asean has any economic ties or investments.

This is despite the National League for Democracy’s, or NLD’s, overwhelming victory in the 1990 elections. The elected NLD members are the true representatives of the people and future of Burma. Real “constructive engagement” on the part of Asean would entail dealing not only with the SPDC, but the NLD and ethnic groups as well. The way things are being run now, Asean is not only engaging the SPDC; Asean is supporting it.

In 1997 when Burma applied for Asean membership, the US and the EU urged the grouping to deny the military-run country that violates human rights and disregards political freedom so blatantly. But Asean accepted Burma and declared that through a policy of “constructive engagement” it would facilitate democratic change and political openness. Since then however, the junta has continually oppressed democratic forces within the country, including Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi.

There are currently more than 1,400 political prisoners in Burma, including 17 Members of Parliament-elect. Asean still supports the junta even though it has reneged on promises to release Suu Kyi and to allow the NLD to attend the constitution-drafting National Convention. In fact, NLD offices remained shut, Suu Kyi and U Tin Oo remained under house arrest and did not participate in the convention. Asean is doing business with a regime that does not keep its promises.

Burma is one of the largest exporters of opium and refugees in the world. Human rights organizations have recently published reports on child soldiers, forced labor, and the systematic rape of women in ethnic minority areas by government soldiers. The list goes on and on. It has been nearly seven years since Burma joined the regional forum, and Asean is still struggling to understand why its method of “constructive engagement” has yet to deliver the positive results that have been promised. The recent EU withdrawal from the ASEM meeting should be the wake-up call to Asean member states that the military regime of Burma is a problem for each of them. Asean leaders should realize that Burmese junta is a thorn in the region.

June 18, 2004—I can still hear our national leader’s voice: “Keep moving,” she said. It has been fifteen years since Aung San Suu Kyi and our National League for Democracy, or NLD, members narrowly escaped death in Danubyu in April 1989. Still today we keep moving, in the hope that Burma will eventually see democracy and freedom.

In that spring of 1989 we had just returned from a political organizing tour along the Irrawaddy River. When we arrived back in Danubyu, the local army captain issued orders to block our way and to shoot dead Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD members. The rifles were pointed at us, but Suu Kyi commanded us to “keep moving”

She was calm, almost serene, as she faced down death. Suu Kyi maintained her composure both towards the soldiers who stood with guns pointed—waiting for orders to shoot—and towards her colleagues. She told us to keep walking towards the troops. When we passed the line of soldiers, a crowd of hundreds burst into applause and began to chant: “Long live Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.”

Local authorities had told townspeople that they would face imprisonment if they supported the NLD. They were ordered to shutter their windows and doors when we came to town. But our supporters ignored the threats. We received a truckload of flowers; people stood up to the threats because they hoped for a future in which there was freedom and democracy. We were not killed because of the hundreds of supporters that stood near us. We could overcome because we had the power of the people with us.

Today we face different conditions than we did fifteen years ago. Last year in Depayin, five hundred miles north of Rangoon, a junta-orchestrated mob attacked unarmed NLD supporters and Aung San Suu Kyi. Dozens, perhaps hundreds were killed in the massacre that went on for hours. Thugs attacked the peaceful crowd with wooden clubs, steel bars and sharpened staffs.

Suu Kyi was put under house arrest for the third time since 1989 while the government conducted National Convention circus opened at Hmawbi township, not far from Rangoon, to rubber-stamp a regime-written constitution.

Most citizens continue to side with “The Lady” and the NLD. I believe that international governments, regional countries in particular, clearly see the junta’s regressiveness—both politically and economically.

Regional governments should be aware that this government is not only bad for Burma’s citizens, but a threat to regional stability. The question needs to be asked: “Is it in the long-term interests of Burma’s neighbors that the current regime remains in place?”

Aung San Suu Kyi turns fifty-nine on Saturday. on her 44th birthday I listened to her speech at the Shwedagon Pagoda. She told the crowd: “I will pay my life for the country and people until we are free from fear and unfairness.” For the last 15 years Aung San Suu Kyi has kept her word and maintained her faith.

February 04, 2004—The article "Could Another Burma be Possible?" by Aung Thu Nyein (Online commentary, Jan 26) appears not have been written by a Burmese political activist, as claimed, but by an alien or anti-National League for Democracy (NLD), if not pro-State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), analyst. In any writing by an advocate for democracy, the condemnation of the military regime can be read. That article elaborately blamed the NLD and the movement. As a matter of fact, the issues raised at the World Social Forum (WSF) are not new to any activist with over a decade of experience.

The NLD can and will address the issues of concern to the people of Burma. Translating these issues to NLD party policy was addressed by the author. I wonder if any political party in this world, which is under such enormous pressure, can have written policies on a thousand issues. Did the African National Congress? Did the people of East Timor? Under British rule, the Indian National Congress had no time to address all contemporary global issues. The author and the participants of the WSF he quotes may know if the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League had addressed all issues under colonial rule or not. After all, there was more breathing space under the British than the current regime.

I also wonder if the assertions made by the participants were correctly cited. one of the participants mentioned in the article, when I personally asked about his comments, said he did not mean what was written. Again, the other participants in the WSF did not point the finger at the NLD and they are fed up with in-house fighting.

Yes, as an NLD member, I did speak of "accountability, transparency and monitoring" for any assistance to Burma. I did so when an official from UNICEF, at a WSF seminar, argued with us. It is our policy and the NLD has said it has not changed.

Maybe the author stayed at only one corner of the WSF and did not participate in other events organized by Burmese where we brought up the Burma issue and sought not only solidarity but also actions against the military dictatorship. The other labor union members, students and youth, men and women of different ethnic backgrounds did not speak against the NLD. The same is true for a former Indian Prime Minister and the distinguished Socialists at the conference at the outset of the forum.

As invited, I, as an NLD member, spoke and my message was "say no to the roadmap." I read the author’s message: forget dictatorship and leave democracy alone and immediately solve the humanitarian crisis in Burma. I am not afraid to disagree because killing the microbe is more fundamental than bringing down the temperature. A few Burmese who got a so-called education from good institutions abroad and have been exposed to the outside world may tend to forget the reality of politics at home.

Similarly, some foreign-trained analysts squarely blame the SPDC and NLD, but the playing field is extremely unequal. Will the SPDC allow the NLD to hold workshops to talk about globalization, poverty eradication, HIV/AIDS or public health?

We left clear messages at the WSF: Military regime, don’t do bad things. International community, don’t say that bad is good. Yes, the humanitarian impacts of globalization will not wait until democracy is restored. If that is so, is it recommended to bring over 500 Burmese to an international forum to wear forehead banners and shout slogans about global issues but nothing about democracy in Burma?

January 13, 2004—Re: "Activists Divided By FBC’s Choice," by Min Zin (Online, Jan 10); excellent, excellent reporting and analysis. This article gives real insight into the workings of exile groups. It is unfortunate that such a predictable move by the junta should be able to throw opposition groups overseas into such disarray. Dr Zarni seems to be positioning himself as a "player"—ie, someone who thinks it is possible to beat the junta at its own games, as opposed to those who refuse on principle to play along (Daw Aung San Suu Kyi et al). If Dr Zarni thinks this is being realistic, I would say he is a naive realist. Far from outsmarting the junta, it would seem that he has played into their hands. once again, The Irrawaddy has done an outstanding job of providing balanced coverage of issues important to those concerned about Burma’s future.

Best Regards,
Peter Ramsey [Top]

November 18, 2003—"Your religion is poison" was what the Chinese communist leader Mao Zedong told the Dalai Lama when he visited Beijing. Mao insulted the Dalai Lama hoping he would respond with violence, and give him reason to send Chinese troops to take over Tibet.

Mao was using the carrot-and-stick strategy. He went to great lengths to convince the Dalai Lama and his government to agree on accepting Chinese sovereignty over Tibet.

Now Burmese leaders are using a similar strategy to force pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi to agree on a National Convention. They’ve used carrots and sticks in the past by releasing Suu Kyi from house arrest and allowing her to travel outside Rangoon to reopen offices of her National League for Democracy. She was tempted with a small degree of freedom, but the carrot was just a trap; now she’s back under house arrest.

The generals also tried to soil her image, by blaming the riots in Depayin in May on her and her party. When they realized she got her strength from the people, they locked her away again.

When Suu Kyi was released from house arrest last time, she was like a lion just freed from its cage. The keeper turned a blind eye and the lion was able to wander free and build up its strength. Energy from freedom gave the lion new hope, and the keeper began to worry. The lion became a threat; it was time to go back in the cage.

Prime Minister Gen Khin Nyunt offered more carrots in his road map to democracy announced at the end of August. At the center of the military government’s seven-point plan is the resumption of the National Convention. Since the Convention was announced, ethnic groups and pro-democracy campaigners have been unable to make any headway on their own plans for democracy for Burma. Thus, some people have called Khin Nyunt’s road map a road block.

It brings to mind a story about a bet between a king and his followers. The king asked his subjects to predict whether he would walk up or down while standing in the middle of ladder. But the bet was rigged. If the people said he would walk up, he would simply walk down or vice versa.

The situation is similar for ceasefire groups hedging their bets against the Burmese military today. If they attend the National Convention, they will be confronted by Khin Nyunt’s difficult questions. Khin Nyunt will try to convince ceasefire group that the military should control at least 25 percent of the seats. If they fail to agree to his terms, they will be jailed just like the NLD members who didn’t agree to take part in the National Convention in 1992. Khin Nyunt’s stick is that he can send troops into their operation areas any time he wants.

The road map will be poison for the ceasefire groups, and their fate is sealed in the same way Buddha’s was. Buddha knew that he would die if he drank the medicine that monks gave to him, but he had to drink it. The ceasefire groups know what will happen if they agree to Khin Nyunt’s demand for a quarter of seats for the military. Ceasefire groups will assume they have no choice. They will feel they have to eat Khin Nyunt’s carrot, and will be stuck in his road map trap.

October 07, 2003—Rangoon is a verdant city and it is easy to miss the shade and gradations of gray that all of the green hides. I think it is even easier to do so when looking at the city from the outside. Aung Zaw’s recent commentary, "The Junta’s Colorful Apologist" (Online, Sept 25) illustrates that particular pitfall quite well. I cannot claim to be unbiased—I recently ended a one-year stint at the Myanmar Times—but my bias also allows me a unique perspective.

I worked with Ross Dunkley, the editor in chief, for over a year, and have never heard him say that the newspaper is autonomous. Agence France-Presse refers to the Myanmar Times as a "semi-official weekly" a phrase that Dunkley agrees with, openly. Aung Zaw’s leap from this stance to the conclusion that the paper says it is independent is impressive.

I think that his central complaint that "the paper is not free, although it claims to be", is unfounded. Nevertheless, addressing Aung Zaw on his terms I would suggest that half a moon, as they say, is better than no moon at all.

In one of the most isolated intellectual environments on earth, the Myanmar Times provides a badly needed dose of international news. It gives a more honest look at the country’s political situation than any other internal publication. The editors are very careful to attribute comments and reading between the lines of the paper can give you an accurate idea of what is going on there. In a nation where, literally, annual weather patterns are a state secret, it serves as a paper of record.

More importantly, the paper trains a dozen reporters a year. It teaches them to ask questions, to express themselves in English, to write in a coherent and linear manner. There are more than 50 reporters and editors on staff at the paper, all of whom have daily chances to improve their English and have access to information, in a country where the only gifts I was ever asked for were books. The paper employs 300 people a year in a dismal economy. This may not seem like much to Aung Zaw, who gets US $100,000 a year from the US government, but in an economy of Burma’s scale, it is no mean trick.

There is a reason that Ross was "brimming with optimism." He and his team have fought and survived for three years, trying to push the limits of censorship in the country and bringing a nascent publishing industry to new standards. They have engaged.

I would ask Aung Zaw to engage, not to distort. Ross Dunkley is certainly colorful but an apologist he is not.

September 26, 2003—Ross Dunkley seems to be the only person who does not realize his magazine is funded by the SPDC. He is a paid mercenary and is no different than "Tokyo Rose."

I am not surprised that Dunkley called for an end to sanctions and the resumption of foreign aid. I am not surprised that he suggested Khin Nyunt needed a 100-day honeymoon period. What I am surprised of, however, is that BBC journalist Larry Jagan thinks Khin Nyunt is a "moderate" who will restore freedom and democracy in Burma.

There are no "moderates" in the Burmese leadership. I am in full and complete agreement with Madeleine Albright’s recent statement that the Burmese regime "has no intention of changing on its own."

Dictators do not voluntarily give up power. Political change in Burma will have to be forced. We do not need American or UN troops. We simply need weapons and training for 50,000 Burmese freedom fighters. This is the next step after sanctions.

September 26, 2003—I agree with Dominic Nardi ("Sanctions are the First Step," online Commentary, Sept 23) that "with the latest sanctions, the US has injected some much needed dynamism into the situation." I fear however that the results may be less helpful than he believes, and may well be counterproductive.

The fact that the US has, at long last, frozen Burmese assets in the US—the EU already did so some time ago—is of no real consequence. I doubt that there have been Burmese assets of any significance in US banks anyway. There is no problem about Burmese individuals and corporations operating US dollar accounts and holding US dollar assets in any country in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), and indeed in most other countries of the world. There are no technical difficulties about the transfer of US dollars into and out of Burma, but normally transfers must not be routed via New York. By mistake, such routings will no doubt be made, transfers will be blocked and funds seized. Provided traders have taken steps to issue appropriate instructions to banks, it is the latter who will have to pay compensation when mistakes are made.

When the latest US sanctions were imposed, there was quite a flurry in Burma and in the region as traders and local banks sought to clarify the situation. With the typical banking caution, some foreign banks, even those represented in Rangoon, declined to accept Letters of Credit denominated in US currency. For purely practical reasons there has been a move to euros, but this is likely to be only a transitional arrangement as banks and traders around Southeast Asia will work out alternative routing procedures to avoid US controls.

Burmese experience with the euro as a trading currency may well encourage them to persist with this alternative. There has been some temporary disruption, but the panic is already over. I discount altogether the prospect that the EU might, under British pressure, seek to disrupt the utilization of the euro by Burma. Britain, which is not even in the euro-zone, would not waste its time on such folly.

Vietnam faced far worse US sanctions until 1994, but US foreign asset control regulations issued under the 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act failed to stop, or even seriously to inhibit the transfer of US currency to Vietnam.

US sanctions, designed to be punitive, will however have disturbed some countries, in Southeast Asia particularly. They are aware that some of the sponsors of the latest sanctions are dead keen on regime change, not only in Burma, but in Cambodia as well. There is also a lobby in the US in favor of regime change in Vietnam and Laos. Asean countries will be increasingly wary of US intentions. Malaysia’s Dr Mahatir will no doubt have some crisp words to say at the right time. Britain has already had its fingers burnt over its uncritical acceptance of the US case for war in Iraq, and must be wondering whether they would be wise to join up with the US over Burma as well.

Germany continues to be doubtful of the effectiveness of further sanctions against Burma, while France, Austria, Portugal and Italy continue to feel some unease. The latest US intervention will have increased their doubts. In this, they will be joined by China and Russia. It would be very sad if the main result of US sanctions against Burma were to be a line-up reminiscent of the split over Iraq—with the US and UK at odds with the rest of Europe, and with China and Russia as well.

The latest US sanctions against Burma have indeed stirred things up, but when the waters eventually settle you may well find that the US is now perceived in Southeast Asia primarily as the bully-boy bent on regime change, with Burma as its first target. Some Asean countries may well be wondering whether they might be next in line.

It would have been more sensible and constructive for the US to have nurtured Asean misgivings over Burmese intransigence than to have raised doubts in Asean minds about US interventionist intentions. Asean countries no doubt feel that they need to continue to exert political pressure on Burma to resolve the impasse over Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, but I think it unlikely that US and UK endeavors to persuade them to apply economic sanctions as well will have any success. Vietnam, Indonesia, Cambodia and Laos have already experienced "punitive" US sanctions. Burma has now joined the club.

The Burma activist lobby in the US has, I fear, overplayed their hand. So determined were they to get back at the regime at almost any cost that they failed to look at the broader regional picture and put things in a balanced context. The sanctions card has now been played. Their initial elation will, I predict, be followed by growing disillusion.

Derek Tonkin, Guildford, UK [Top]

September 23, 2003—Pho Thar Aung’s commentary "Tango with China" (Online, Sept 16, 2003) gives an interesting historical background on China-Burma relations. Or since the Chinese called Burma "Mien Tint", should we say the tango of the Chinese and Myanmar (Burmese) regimes?

Gen Ne Win’s speech at Rangoon University on the occasion of a worker’s seminar on April 30, 1965 is well-known among those who followed the late dictator’s speeches.

Apart from speaking about his ears being pierced as a boy, Ne Win stated in his speech that his father—who actually died the year he made the speech—had Burmese tattoos. He told the audience that the nats (spirits) his family worshipped were not the Chinese spirits, but the traditional Burmese spirits. And when Ne Win’s grandmother died, the family did not inter her in a grave.

Ne Win, then Chairman of the Revolutionary Council, claimed this was proof that his family did not practice ancestor worship and were therefore not ethnic Chinese. But all this was mentioned in a somewhat light-hearted and not jingoistic manner. When the speech was printed in newspapers, it was interspersed with lines like "laughter from the audience" indicating that the audience did not react "jingoistically" to Ne Win’s speech. Ne Win even said that if he was of Chinese descent he would openly acknowledge the fact, since one shouldn’t be embarrassed about the race of one’s parents.

So I don’t think it was his speech that roused "anti-Chinese fervor" in Burma. The discontent in the rainy season of 1967 had been brewing because of rice shortages and anger over economic mismanagement.

Military intelligence (MI) officers tried to "channel" and displace the increasing restlessness and discontent of the people. The wearing of Mao badges by students in a Chinese school in Rangoon provided an opportunity for MI to make the Chinese, or some Sino-Burmese, the scapegoat and the riots against the Sino-Burmese broke out in Rangoon in late June 1967.

But the junta couldn’t channel all of the public unrest and anger. In Arakan State, up to 100 rice looters were reportedly shot on Aug 13, 1967. As with the ambush at Depayin on May 30, the anti-Chinese riots of late June 1967 and the 8.8.88 massacres, we may never know the real number of casualties.

I do not believe that there was even a causal link between Ne Win’s speech of April 1965 and the anti-Chinese riots that took place more than two years later.

The militant Red Guardism which was sweeping through China at the time spilled over, in a diluted form, to a few Chinese schools in Rangoon. This might have given MI and Ne Win’s government an opportunity to "redirect" the people’s anger by encouraging the anti-Chinese riots.

Pho Thar Aung acknowledges that China’s current "non-interference" has not always been Beijing’s way. China’s apparent brokerage of the failed 1963 peace talks with the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), and the even less successful mediation in 1980 (where Ne Win and the late CPB Chairman Thakin Ba Thein Tin met secretly in Beijing) are given as examples of China’s "will to interfere."

But the mediation—if it can be termed that way—of China in 1963 and 1980 was on behalf of a "fraternal" communist party who was then in an armed rebellion or insurgency against Rangoon. I do not think the Chinese party and state authorities will consider the National League for Democracy as a "fraternal" party, nor will they see Aung San Suu Kyi as a comrade.

The fact that China’s current strategic competitor and erstwhile ideological enemy, the United States, has spoken out strongly against the junta and imposed sanctions will give China reason not to criticize the SPDC. Moreover it is clear that China would not even help "mediate" between the SPDC and Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD as another of China’s strategic partner ASEAN has been doing—albeit somewhat feebly—these past few weeks.

I also suspect that many of China’s elites would consider Aung San Suu Kyi as a "Western tool," or at least see the US and the West as an ally of Aung San Suu Kyi. on this ground alone, far from "helping" or "promoting" reconciliation talks between the junta and the NLD, Chinese leaders might even actively try to hinder Burma’s democracy movement.

The realities of international relations, Chinese, Burmese and regional power politics, are all forces that would militate against China forcing the generals to face up to their misdeeds. China’s support for the junta is totally unsurprising and is fully expected. Indeed, considering the above factors and the nature of the two regimes, one can ask—how could it have been otherwise?

September 15, 2003—I found your online editorial, "Two Years Later" [Sept 11, 2003], to be one-sided against the United States. I am originally from Burma. However, I’m now a citizen the United States of America.

I lived and worked in the Persian Gulf region for over two years during the early 1990s, but have been in the US for the past eight years. Sure, there is discrimination against immigrants and ethnic minorities here in the US, but all in all, I have been treated better here than anywhere else I have lived and worked—including my own native country, Burma.

I agree that the policies of the current US administration are very much unilateral in dealing with terrorism, much more so than the previous administrations of Presidents Clinton or Bush (Senior). But even then, there were extremists who hated the US.

Many Muslim radicals blame the US for any and all of their misfortunes. It seems to me that the editorial takes this approach too, and I think that’s unfortunate and unfair.

I wonder if the editorial writer has ever heard violent preaching from a Muslim fundamentalist. I wonder if the writer has ever lived in the Gulf.

In my opinion, the main reason many Muslims hate America is because of US support for Israel. But what choice does the United States have in this?—even though the US knows that there are extremists on the Israeli side too.

Supporting the state of Israel, on first examination, seems to have only negative consequences for the US. However, does the editorial writer ever ask himself the question "What would have happened to the Israelis, to the Middle East and to the world if the US stopped supporting Israel?"

I’d also like to ask the writer’s opinion on how to make Muslims like the US better? I don’t think the writer has an answer. I don’t think anyone knows. It’s a complex problem requiring many elements, and so the military aspect is sadly necessary. However, military might from the US alone won’t solve it. But neither will blaming the US for all of the world’s problems.

September 02, 2003—Philip S Robertson Jr’s article, ["Sanctions are working in Burma," online, Aug 26, 2003] argues that because the military controls the economy through bodies such as Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings, tough measures such as the US Burma Freedom and Democracy Act will have a "disproportionate impact on the military, not necessarily the people of Burma." But can "military" and "people" be so neatly divided?

It is common knowledge that the new US law, by embargoing textile imports, will put tens of thousands of female factory workers out of work. Small traders, who are experiencing real hardship since the new regulations, will find it next to impossible to acquire greenbacks, the lifeblood of the Burmese economy.

Robertson’s oddest line of reasoning is that, once tough sanctions cause the "economic pie" in the state-capitalist sector to shrink, the junta will accelerate expropriation of land, forced labor and other harsh practices in order to generate enough resources to buy the loyalty of the officer corps. Such economic repression in turn will increase popular resentment. No doubt it will, but what does Robertson want the people, newly resentful, to do? March in the streets as they did in 1988 and get shot?

I don’t know whether he has fully thought out the implications of his words, but it seems he expects the people of Burma to be (or rather, to continue to be) a punching bag for an angry and isolated junta. Popular resentment, he alleges, "builds support for political change." But it is undeniably true that the SPDC does what it likes, sanctions or not, regardless of what the people think.

Robertson wonders "why [David I] Steinberg and the anti-sanctions camp ... believe that providing smatterings of humanitarian assistance will somehow result in a change of heart and policy in the SPDC." But he entirely misses the point. The purpose of humanitarian aid is not to change the political system, but to alleviate suffering. Birth control seminars and clean hypodermic needles will not get the junta to recognize the May 1990 election, but they may halt, or slow down, the spread of AIDS.

The fact is that neither sanctions nor constructive engagement have worked to change the behavior of the SPDC: the argument between proponents of one or the other has become irrelevant. And sanctions won’t work now, because Burma’s economic and other relations with its neighbors are better than ever.

Compare 2003 with 1983: twenty years ago, China was still backing the Communist Party of Burma; India, now emerging as a regional economic force, was too poor to have an impact on its eastern neighbor; and the Thai government, regarding the Ne Win regime as a nest of communists, backed insurgencies such as the Karen National Union.

It is only with western countries and (possibly) Japan that relations are worse now than they were in 1983. The junta is promoting smooth ties not only with China, but practically every other East and Southeast Asian country.

It may be the case that, short of direct military intervention, there is very little foreign countries can do under the circumstances to promote democracy in Burma. To me, this is too pessimistic an assessment, but the international community needs a smarter, more coordinated policy that takes full account of the complexities of the situation over the long run. And over the short run, it needs to provide the kind of humanitarian aid that Burma’s people desperately need.

Donald M Seekins
Okinawa, Japan [Top]

August 29, 2003—Derek Tonkin ["SPDC Not Listening to Sanctions", Reader’s Opinion, Aug 27, 2003] suggests that sanctions by the marketplace rather than international pressure forced South Africa to end apartheid. But he fails to realize that Burma’s present financial crisis was precipitated by the bankruptcy of private banks in Burma after crony capitalism and inadequate banking supervision. The market discipline imposed on the Narco-Dictatorship of Myanmar will also, in the final analysis, destroy the regime.

Tonkin exhibits utter ignorance when he states "Burma only has Daw Suu Kyi." We started the sanctions campaign in the early 1990s when Suu Kyi was detained for the first time. The Burma lobby is now one of the best organized lobbies in Washington DC. We have defeated million-dollar campaigns financed by major oil companies and very expensive lobbying firms retained by the Narco-Dictatorship of Myanmar.

The CIA was born in Burma. The Flying Tigers with 99 planes operated in Burma six months before Pearl Harbor. The Ethnic Resistance Armies under a unified command, and with assistance from covert operations, can field 50,000 troops to help restore freedom and democracy in Burma.

August 27, 2003—There is, I fear, too much wishful thinking in Philip S Robertson Jr’s commentary in The Irrawaddy ["Sanctions Are Working in Burma" online, Aug 26, 2003].

Economic sanctions are only seriously effective if they command broad international support. At present Burma’s neighbors are not interested. only Japan has undertaken to suspend new economic aid, possibly the least they could have done without incurring US and European displeasure. Asia is doing quite well picking up abandoned Western assets in Burma for a song.

When Daw Suu Kyi’s motorcade was attacked on May 30, the SPDC knew exactly what they were doing. She had become too popular, and represented a serious political threat. Their efforts to curry favor with the West by allowing Amnesty International to visit, by signing an agreement with the ILO, by releasing Daw Suu Kyi from house arrest and by other specific measures since April 2002 were not sufficient to persuade the West to relax sanctions, so they decided to close the book and remove Daw Suu Kyi from the scene.

We should have seen it coming, but didn’t. The SPDC knew full well that if Daw Suu Kyi disappeared, there would be an international outcry and sanctions, long mooted in the US, would certainly be imposed. However, without international support, the effects of US sanctions remain limited.

Vietnam survived US sanctions for many years, and the US dollar has long prospered inside Vietnam as an alternative currency. The Vietnamese had no problem in avoiding the effects of US sanctions, and have probably already told the SPDC how to handle the situation. At the height of US sanctions, the Fund of which I was Chairman transferred some US $50 million into Vietnam without any difficulty. Burma can do the same.

There is a mild obsession about a parallel with sanctions and South Africa. The situations of Burma and South Africa are totally different. South Africa is both a first world and a third world country, Burma is only third world. South Africa had a vibrant political opposition in Parliament, and anti-apartheid activists within the country of world class renown. Burma only has Daw Suu Kyi, whereabouts unknown. Trade and investment sanctions against South Africa, despite popular conviction, were largely ineffective. What brought change in South Africa was first, the internal political opposition which became unstoppable, and second, the refusal of overseas banks, particularly US banks, to roll over loans to South African banks, which brought the country to its knees.

South Africa under apartheid simply became bankrupt as overseas banks were no longer willing to accept the financial risks associated with the economic nonsense of apartheid: sanctions of the marketplace, not sanctions imposed by governments. Burma is bankrupt, but it doesn’t matter. Forget the South African model. It simply isn’t relevant.

Without international support, sanctions become largely ritualistic. They "send a strong signal", but the SPDC unfortunately isn’t listening.

Derek Tonkin
British Ambassador to Vietnam 1980-82
Minister, British Embassy in South Africa 1983-86 [Top]

I wonder why Germany’s attitude is totally off-topic when it comes to the Burmese democracy movement and also very rarely mentioned in The Irrawaddy magazine. Nobody doubts that Germany achieved democracy, but it is very silent when it comes to convincing other countries to join the "Democratic Club."

Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s recent trips to China covered a wide range of topics, but like his visits to other non-democratic countries, human rights and democracy issues were never raised. While Schroeder has never visited Burma, the last high-ranking visit by a German was by the former President Richard von Weizsaecker. We all know his visit was not of any benefit for the citizens of Burma. Would the Generals let a leader ride on a white elephant if he was there to criticize them?

During a time when Burma is now under immense pressure, the country also enjoyed a visit by German ex-MP Friedhelm Ost, who is the former head of the right wing CSU party. And under the unspectacular headline "Documentary Film on Naga Briefed" in the New Light of Myanmar [26th June 2003], we can read nothing about this film, only about the praise the German federal government has bestowed on the Tatmadaw for its efforts to maintain peace and stability. The German government knows the price for this peace and stability: fear and oppression.

Recently, The Irrawaddy reported about the deportation of the Burmese Ko Tun Kyaw, who I have met personally at a friend’s house. The fact that Germany violated its own laws by deporting him was never mentioned. The Potsdam district court declared deportations to Burma are illegal, because just the act of applying for asylum can lead to severe repression, even torture, if the asylum seeker is deported. But who cares for a Burmese?

The point is that the Germans know Burma only as paradise. The German government serves up this image and behind closed doors it does business with the Generals. Than Shwe’s private cars are even maintained by Germans. While Japan seems to have changed its mind, and Australia was never really that involved in Burma, why is Germany silent? Why does Germany have the right to undermine our fight for better conditions in Burma?

July 03, 2003—If the international community is sincere about pressuring the military in Burma to give up power, and as sanctions are proving to only have a limited impact, I recommend the UN and its affiliated agencies and organizations revoke Burma’s seat.

That seat does not belong to the regime anyway. They took it and it was never theirs to take. The international community can issue a firm rebuke and designate the seat for Burma’s elected representatives. It should go to the National League for Democracy or the exiled government in Washington, or should be unoccupied.

The world can do much more than financial sanctions. It is time to end the illegitimate occupation of Burma’s seat at the UN.

I have seen in the news on the Australian Brodcasting Corp that Razali Ismail has business connections with the Burmese government. I notice on his last visit to Burma he did not give fair answers to the press in regards to questions about Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Why? If we do hear that she has been man-handled, injured or intimidated in anyway, I think it would be time you replaced Razali. There has been no progress for too long.

J D Thompson
Melbourne, Australia [Top]

June 09, 2003—I am writing to correct a reference in the commentary by Kavi Chongkittavorn in the 8 June on-line edition of The Irrawaddy regarding the international reaction to the repression in Burma. While we usually appreciate Khun Kavi’s analysis, in this particular case, Canada’s policy towards Burma was seriously misstated.

Let me state categorically that Canada has been and continues to be second to none in our firmness towards the regime in Burma. For a number of years, Canada has had in place numerous strong measures against Burma in an effort to move Burma towards national reconciliation and democracy. We have consistently urged Burmese authorities to engage in a substantive dialogue with democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi and have urged them to release all political prisoners.

On June 2 2003, Canada’s Foreign Minister Bill Graham issued a statement deploring the detention of Aung San Suu Kyi and her colleagues and demanding their immediate release. Mr Graham also called on Burmese authorities to investigate the attack on Aung San Suu Kyi's convoy and identify those responsible. Canada's serious concerns about the detention of Aung San Suu Kyi and her colleagues and the attack on her convoy have been communicated at senior levels directly to Burmese authorities.

The reference in the article to Canada's position regarding humanitarian assistance is also very inaccurate. There has been no change of policy in regards to humanitarian assistance. We share the view of Aung San Suu Kyi that such assistance should only be provided when it is accountable, transparent and reaches the intended recipients. In this regard, Canada has provided a very limited amount of humanitarian assistance inside Burma, mainly to deal with the HIV/AIDS crisis in Burma; this assistance was provided through UNICEF. This assistance has been provided only after consultations with Aung San Suu Kyi and only when it is meets the criteria set out above.

The vast bulk of Canadian assistance has gone to refugees in neighboring countries. Since 1991 and 1992, Canada has provided over (Cdn) $18 million in aid to Burmese refugees in Bangladesh and Thailand.

May 19, 2003—May 27, 2003 is the 13^th anniversary of Burma’s multi-party election. The election proved to the world that the Burmese people wished for a peaceful restoration of democracy in the country. The National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide victory in that election, and though the international community recognized the result, the military regime did not respect the genuine desire of the people of Burma.

The United Nations wants to solve the problem by using a diplomatic solution and has sent its envoys in various ways—but no advantages are so far evident and there have been further challenges created by the regime. The latest development by UN envoy Razali Ismail has initiated great hope for both the Burmese and international communities. The regime has taken action, like unconditionally releasing of Aung San Suu Kyi, allowing her to take political tours in the country to open new party offices and setting free political prisoners.

After Razali’s last visit, I was deeply disappointed. The SPDC did not move an inch. It built an anti-Suu Kyi movement and imposed tough restrictions on political parties. Razali was himself disappointed and his future visits were delayed.

According to diplomatic sources in Rangoon, Razali will be permitted to visit Burma again on June 6. It is my opinion that after thirteen years of patience with the situation in Burma, the Burmese people will soon get to enjoy a peaceful and democratic life as our intelligent military leaders will cooperate to form a parliamentary government.

May 19, 2003—The article "Wannabe's Chalabi's" by Satyar Sagar is an enjoyable, thought-provoking and indeed provocative read. The article, however, has two factual errors.

Firstly, the claim by Satyar Sagar that "a general election in 1990 … saw the opposition National League for Democracy winning a landslide victory with over 92 percent of the votes polled" is incorrect.

In fact the NLD won just under 60 percent of the votes and around 85 percent of the seats in the National Assembly, which was never convened.

Secondly, "Suharto rode to power in 1964 on the back of a genocide, killing over a million Indonesians as 'suspected Communists'."

Suharto did not come into power in 1964. He crushed an attempt coup on Sept 30, 1965. In fact Suharto did not formally assume the presidency and become Head of State of Indonesia until about March 1967 when Sukarno was forced to retire.

April 08, 2003—This letter is in response to the War or Peace special feature, which has over the past few weeks presented comments from Burmese on the war in Iraq.

Harn Yawnghwe appears to say, at least implicitly, that United Nations Security Council resolutions over Iraq are mild in comparison to the annual UN General Assembly resolutions regarding "the situation in Myanmar". UN Security Council resolutions are enforceable even if some of them, perhaps most of them, are not enforced consistently and uniformly. Compare the differing "enforcement" of UN Security Council resolutions on Iraq with those on Israel, for example. I know there are some legal and factual differences regarding the resolutions on Iraq and dealing in part with Israel, but in a generic manner the "double standards" of the US—and perhaps even the UN—as far as enforcement of Security Council resolutions are concerned is a legitimate point. UN General Assembly resolutions are not enforceable. They do not have the same status legally and politically as resolutions from the UN Security Council.

Myint Thein states that they, the Burmese "Resistance" or his group of the Burmese Resistance, would "lobby" for—and the implication was that the US will willingly oblige—"swift American military action" if there was another "genocide" a la 1988 in Burma.

I recall that the same person in Nov 1992 claimed or predicted in a letter to the now-defunct Asiaweek magazine that SLORC/SPDC will be gone by "this time next year" (Nov 1993). Does he really think that his "lobbying" as "senior advisor" of the "Burmese resistance" (Query which one?) for swift military action against the junta in the event of another uprising in Burma would be heeded by the US administration? This confidence is as misplaced or tainted with wishful thinking, just like his Nov 1992 letter in Asiaweek.

And however deplorable, ruthless and savage the Burmese military’s crushing of the 1988 uprising was, legalistically speaking it did NOT amount to genocide as per the provisions of the 1951 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

A few, may be some will almost inevitably assume that I am a SPDC "sympathizer" by these comments. Needless to say I am not. Superficial, perhaps even shallow, as the above comments—and a few others of the external Burmese resistance or opposition, which I have not mentioned here—are. I would state that they are not the moral equivalent of the puerile rants and ravings of the military literary hacks in such junta publications as the New Light of Myanmar. And I write this also not necessarily to please or antagonize either the SPDC hacks or the "Burmese Resistance".

March 25, 2003—The United Nation’s performance is mixed. Several UN agencies like the WHO, UNICEF and UNHCR have a good record in humanitarian activities. But the UN has a poor record in dealing with evil regimes. The UN's record in Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo is shameful. And the UN has failed in Iraq and Burma.

Saddam Hussein and the SLORC/SPDC have for more than a decade been hiding behind the skirt of the UN with a campaign of "delay and deceit". Both have ignored repeated UN Resolutions for the past decade and engaged in delaying tactics to deceive the international community. The failure of the UN has forced the "Coalition of the Willing" to use military action to restore freedom and democracy in Iraq.

Operation Iraqi Freedom will in a matter of a few weeks accomplish what a decade of UN Resolutions has failed to accomplish. And an American Aircraft Carrier Battle Group with a Marine Expeditionary Force can help restore freedom and democracy in Burma within 72 hours, which repeated UN Resolutions have failed to accomplish during the past decade.

Force will have to be used to facilitate regime change in Burma. There is no other way.

March 20, 2003—The Iraq war is a preset and selective war, yet it seems to be a US led New Global Order. However, the Burmese regime may see it with a different and more cautious view. Burma's generals have to change their game plan in order to prevent the United States from becoming interested in them over the next few months. The United States interest in Burma is not an economic interest or strategic interest but one of human rights and democracy. If the United States keeps its policy of liberating countries that lack human rights and democracy, Burma will be one of the next targets.

Saddam unleashed chemical weapons on his own people, and Burma’s generals slowly tortured the Burmese without using these extremes measure. Shan human rights groups, however, have shown the world community that the SPDC uses sexual abuse as a weapon against them. Indeed, Saddam is known to be worse than the current Burmese leaders, but the suffering felt in both countries has not been much different.

We may have a hope of restoring freedom and democracy in Burma after a post Iraq war if the United States looks at human rights and democracy in Burma. Liberation of the Iraqis might affect the Burmese regime's current policy towards its citizens and opponents.

Burma might never face the US military force but increased economic embargoes will come. The democratic forces should seek the US diplomatic pressure on the regime to change the deadlock. If the Burmese regime does not want to face the US, it has to find its exit. The SPDC cannot play the US card without improving human rights and democratic principles.

March 20, 2003—When America engaged in war against Germany, the Frankfurter became known as the Hot Dog. Now, the three cafeterias of the United States Congress have re-named French Fries as Freedom Fries and French Toast as Freedom Toast. This trend started at a small store in North Carolina and has even impacted the US Congress.

Yes, there will be pay-back time against France. We see on TV, people pouring French wine down the street. Boycotts of French products can be expected. And you can bet the Bush administration will not permit significant French participation in the re-building of the oil industry in Iraq.

But what is more important is the message it sends to the evil regimes of the world. Force will now be used to facilitate regime change.

American Special Forces have been used to hunt down the Abu Sayyaf terrorists in the Philippines. Do not be surprised to see American Special Forces and the "Coalition of the Willing" hunting down the UWSA Drug Warlords. Permission from SLORC/SPDC is not needed since it is not the legal government of Burma.

Myint Thein
Texas, USA [Top]

March 03, 2003—This letter is in response to the on-line commentary: "No Dialogue without Real Pressure".

While I sympathize with Aung Naing Oo’s frustration at the lack of progress towards a political solution in Burma, his call to ratchet up sanctions ["No Dialogue without Real Pressure", online commentary, Feb 26] will meet no response at all from those best placed to influence Burma, namely China, Japan, Australia, Russia, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the countries of Asean.

China’s reluctance to upset North Korea despite the growing regional threat to stability which North Korea represents makes it even less likely that China would contemplate action of any kind against Burma. China is well satisfied with the opportunities for expanding its influence in Burma which Western ostracism provides.

Like it or not, Burma can get by with Asian-Pacific aid and trade, and if Western companies are badgered into handing over their assets to their Asian competitors—in the way that Malaysia’s Petronas has recently benefited from the withdrawal of Britain’s Premier Oil—this is unlikely to cause the SPDC to lose much sleep. The real losers are Western companies and the Burmese people whom they were supporting with social welfare projects.

Unfortunately, the name of the political game over Burma seems to be inflexible political posturing. No wonder so little progress is ever made. The SPDC may not yet be willing to talk to the NLD, but they are willing to talk to Western governments, which is a move in the right direction.

Western governments are indeed well placed to influence the SPDC towards a political solution. But if Western governments—under constant pressure from Burma activists to ostracize the SPDC—see no domestic political benefit to them in dialogue, then quite simply the impasse will continue.

This letter is in response to the on-line news story: "Burmese Exiles Split Over War".

I strongly disagree with Richard Aung Myint, and he should think before he starts flapping his mouth.

This is the quote of what he said, "Removing dictatorship from power is the morally right thing to do," says Richard Aung Myint, a Burmese activist who has been living in America for over 30 years. "I equate the Iraqi government with the military regime in Burma. I support the war against Iraq. The only thing I am upset with the current administration is that they didn't include Burma in the axis of evil."

If the US government put Burma in the axis of evil group we will be considered like Iraq people, and we will never be able to live in the US. Did he not know that this action will not hurt the Burmese government, but only the exile students living in the US and abroad? Did he not know that a lot of people from Iraq in the US condemned Saddam, but they still get treated poorly by this US government.

This letter is in response to two on-line news stories: "On The Side of Peace" and "Burmese Exiles Split Over War".

One of the alternatives to the "war on Iraq" which has not been exploited is the removal of supportive structures which dictatorships depend upon for their survival.

There are those who nurture a relationship with Saddam in the interests of mutual benefit. In the same way the regime in Burma is sustained, despite their imcompetency, by their relationship with governments around the world. Invading Burma to change the regime would be a futile exercise. The most likely outcome would be another regime of similar ilk.

We should always be aware that peace cannot be won by war. All we get is respite from tyranny.

This is in response to your on-line Commentary "Economic and Social Chaos of the State" [Dec 26, 2002].

Danu Maung presents a depressing spectacle of Burma today in his impassioned article "Economic and Social Chaos of the State" [Dec 26, 2002]. Yet the comparison with the collapse of the Soviet Union might even give cause for hope.

The Soviet Union collapsed because reformist measures introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev—notably through perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness)—designed to revamp the economy and root out corruption and inefficiency, led to pressure for political reform. In August 1991 Kremlin hardliners attempted a coup against Gorbachev, but they were defeated by an alliance of reformist and democratic forces under Boris Yeltsin. In other words, the collapse of the Soviet system was engineered from within the Soviet state, just as the collapse of apartheid in South Africa was led by the verligte (enlightened) Afrikaner politician FW de Klerk, against the verkrampte (reactionary) PW Botha.

In Russia today there is clear continuity with the former Soviet regime. It is no coincidence that Vladimir Putin, a former intelligence officer from the KGB, is now president of Russia, and that the restructured KGB is as efficient as ever.

Sadly, the "social chaos" which Danu Maung speaks of in the context of Burma, is now worse in the new Russia than it was in the former Soviet Union. Back then there was a universal health-care system, there were no beggars on the streets, prostitution and pornography were suppressed, mafia killings were unknown and life expectancy was higher than it is today. In Russia, it was not social chaos which led to the Soviet collapse, but pressure for economic and then political reform which were taken up by Soviet leaders who saw which way the wind was blowing. At all times, the Soviet Army was under strict Communist Party political control.

Imagine if the same forces were at work in Rangoon today! Or perhaps they are. Who would have guessed that FW de Klerk, an Afrikaner politician of the old school, would in 1993 share the Nobel Peace Prize with Nelson Mandela? Is there perhaps an SPDC leader who might one day share with Aung San Suu Kyi the Nobel Peace Prize which she so richly merited?

Whatever the solution to Burma’s present problems, the Tatmadaw will be around in one form or another for a long time to come, as Suu Kyi recognized long ago.

This is in response to your on-line Editorial "America Stands at Ground Zero" [Sept 12, 2002].

What is your agenda in criticizing America’s right to defend itself? The US is an open society which, by its nature, is susceptible to the fanatic terrorism such as the events of 9/11. The only way that America can protect itself is to seek out and destroy terrorism and its roots before they grow. Saddam Hussein is a known terrorist supporter with biological and chemical weapons, and possibly very soon nuclear weapons aimed at American cities. America must act right now, because if it waits until Saddam possesses nuclear weapons, it will be too late.

Why does America need the world’s approval to defend itself? As for "the oldest and closest allies" you mention, most of them exist today because America has saved their behinds multiple times over the past century. President Bush must do whatever it takes to protect its citizens; that is why we elected him to be our President. Of course American interests must come before the (rest of the) world’s, because it is America that is the target of these fanatic terrorists. Think about it; how would Russia, or China react if more than 3000 of their citizens were killed instantly by terrorists? America has shown much more patience than it is obligated to. Now is the time to act and get rid of Saddam and other terrorist supporting regimes. As for the Muslim public opinion, who cares?

The Irrawaddy claims to be committed to bring about democracy in Burma. First, it should try to recruit an editor who can understand the realities of the world today and who supports the very country that is the foremost exporter of freedom and democracy throughout the world. It should look for an editor who is not ignorant enough to write: "After more than a decade of sanctions that have taken an enormous toll on Iraqi citizens, one would think that he’s a lame duck, no more of a menace to the world at large than the regime in Rangoon. Or perhaps he’s just a sitting duck: Another easy target that’s more of a household name than Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines".

The "one" who thinks that way is either stupid or has a hidden agenda. Is Irrawaddy becoming dependant on funding from Osama bin Laden, Abu Sayyaf or Saddam?

Alexander Thein
San Francisco, Ca