| By TONY BROADMOOR | FEB, 2002 - VOLUME 10 NO.2 |
A seven-year-old ceasefire in Mon State is still holding, but just barely. Recent violence could signal a return to civil war in Burma’s southernmost state. Villagers should have had nothing to fear when Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) 550 from the Burmese Army entered the remote village of Kyon Kwee on Jan 28 of this year. A ceasefire agreement had been in place for seven years, the conflict between the Rangoon government and the Mon National Liberation Army (MNLA) was supposedly over and the village was theoretically at peace. Instead, troops arrested, tortured and disrobed a monk and blocked all paths out of the camp before accusing the villagers of being rebel sympathizers. Sadly, this is not an isolated incident, as rape, forced labor and food confiscations have all increased, say Mon human rights workers. When the New Mon State Party (NMSP) entered into a ceasefire agreement on June 29, 1995 with Burma’s military government, both Mon leaders and Mon people thought four decades of civil war had ended. They thought that a political settlement would be forthcoming that recognized the rights of the Mon—the progenitors of Burmese civilization—and more importantly that badly needed developmental infrastructure projects could finally be implemented in this war-torn region of southern Burma. NMSP officials, human rights workers and others along the Thai-Burma border told The Irrawaddy recently that they were increasingly concerned about deteriorating conditions in the Mon State. They said that the NMSP has become weak, with only a few leaders having benefited from the agreement, while life in Monland continues to deteriorate. Burmese troops have also been encroaching on lands once controlled by the NMSP’s military wing, the MNLA, after the party ceded large tracts of land as part of the agreement. All of this has led to a resurgence of fighting between Burmese troops and recently formed Mon splinter groups comprised mainly of former MNLA soldiers. Due to a lack of arms, the NMSP would be hard pressed to rebuild its army to the 6,000 troops they had in 1995. According to some NMSP members, however, if the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) continues to ignore Mon desires to live in peace, there is a real possibility that the party may decide to break the agreement, causing an all-out civil war to return to Monland. "We want dialogue to work but if the SPDC does not want a political settlement and keeps oppressing our people we may fight again," says a NMSP central committee member. A ceasefire agreement is simply the repositioning of troops to minimize conflict and theoretically should lead to a political settlement once a dialogue has begun. Until now, however, little progress has been made in reaching a lasting settlement. The Mon agreed to the ceasefire deal only after being pressured by both Thailand and the generals in Rangoon. The junta made reaching ceasefire agreements with ethnic insurgents a key policy after taking power in 1988. The Thai government and Thai businessmen were eager to invest in Mon State, but a necessary prerequisite was peace. Foreign oil companies had also proposed a natural gas pipeline through contested areas of Mon state: a fact that caused the regime to exert even greater pressure due to its desperate need for foreign investment. Further upping the ante was Thailand’s decision in 1994 to move against a growing Mon refugee population. Fighting had driven thousands of Mon into Thailand’s nearby Kanchanaburi province, creating a domestic headache for Bangkok. Many of these refugees were eventually forcibly repatriated to Burma by Thailand and settled in the Halockhani camp in an area controlled by the NMSP. This move drew heavy criticism from international human rights groups. The Mons are "victims of Thailand’s economic engagement with Burma’s military rulers," Human Rights Watch reported at the time. Shortly after the repatriation, Burmese troops torched the Halockhani camp, thus putting even greater pressure on the NMSP to enter into a settlement agreement. The camp was later rebuilt by the NMSP, which also provides protection for the 6,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) located there. "They [the Thai government] told us if we made a peace agreement with the Slorc [now the SPDC], the refugees would be repatriated and could have good jobs working on the ongoing gas fields projects," said Mon leader Nai Shwe Kyin in 1993, before the party had agreed to the ceasefire. The regime had also promised that if the NMSP entered into a ceasefire agreement it would allow the party to participate in certain business ventures, which along with governmental assistance would help to develop the Mon State. In 1996, the regime granted the NMSP seventeen business concessions, including logging, fishing, inland transportation, trade with Malaysia and Singapore and gold mining. The regime, however, canceled the majority of the contracts by 1998, leaving NMSP leaders with little in terms of economic support, thus weakening the party. These failed investment promises caused Mon people and Burmese analysts to question the benefits of the ceasefire agreement. "At first I thought the ceasefire agreement was a good idea for their party, but then the party became weaker and weaker," says a Karen elder living in Sangklaburi, Thailand. During the two years when the business concessions were up and running, some NMSP leaders were able to benefit personally from the business contracts, causing turbulence and jealousy within the party. This resulted in some rank-and-file members leaving the party, according to a NMSP member. From 1995 to 1997 fighting in the region had been minimal due to the ceasefire agreement. In late 1997, however, the SPDC attempted to conscript local farmers into forced-labor development projects including work on the natural gas pipeline and the Ye-Tavoy railroad. Some of these farmers were ex-MNLA soldiers who after the agreement had put down their weapons and begun farming. Many of these former soldiers refused to participate in the projects and instead chose to fight. "If you were a soldier and I forced you to construct a railroad, what would you do? I think you would fight," says a Mon human rights worker regarding their decision to take up arms again. Since the birth of these splinter groups, the central government has used them as an excuse to further encroach on NMSP-controlled areas. The splinter groups have had little success in stopping the Burmese army but continue to proliferate. In November 2001, former MNLA Col Nai Pan Nyunt formed the Honsawatoi Restoration Party (HRP) and the Monland Restoration Army (MRA). According to a statement released by the party, "the worsening conditions of forced labor, land confiscation and human rights violations, as well as the suppression of the Mon culture and literature, had led to the decision to break with the party." NMSP officials, however, claim that Pan Nyunt illegally collected 1.5 million kyat (US $2,100) in taxes from NMSP-controlled villages and then refused to return the money to the party, causing him to break away along with some 100-150 troops. Pan Nyunt and members of the HRP or the MRA were unavailable for comment. The MRA has been involved in numerous conflicts this year around the Three Pagoda Pass area of the Mon State, which is also in close proximity to the Halockhani IDP camp. As a result, the sprawling borderless camp has become increasingly insecure, with fighting between SPDC troops, the MRA and battalions of the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), which is also active in the area, occurring just eight km from the camp. One village not far from Halockhani was recently burned down by SPDC troops due to suspicions that the villagers sympathized with the MRA and had provided them with food and housing. Tee-Wa-Doe village was torched in late November, sending some 600-700 people to Halockhani overnight, according to foreign aid workers in the area. The real threat to the camp’s existence, however, revolves around whether the Burmese Army will begin to see Halockhani as a sanctuary for the MRA and other splinter groups. "The NMSP party does not have enough power to repel the SPDC if they decide to come to Halockhani to look for Pan Nyunt," says an aid worker familiar with the camp. The NMSP blames the presence of Col Pan Nyunt’s troops for the torching of the villages, which the MNLA had protected before the ceasefire agreement. "[Since the ceasefire] it has been difficult for us to protect villagers from the SPDC troops," admitted the NMSP central committee member cited earlier. With no single group controlling these areas, the villages are left to pay protection taxes to up to four separate groups. This quadruple taxation is not easy to manage. Villages oftentimes have to pay taxes to troops from the SPDC, MNLA, MRA and another splinter group led by Nai Hlein, according to Mon insiders. NMSP officials feel that one benefit of the ceasefire agreement was that it enabled them to interact with other ethnic groups and the central government, something that was not possible before the ceasefire. "Before the ceasefire agreement we could prevent human rights abuses but could not communicate with other ethnic groups," says the central committee member. The party is split on where to go from here. Not everyone agrees that a return to fighting is the answer to the problems of the Mon. But they do agree that a change is necessary in order for the Mon to achieve internal peace. After almost seven years, the ceasefire has come no closer to a permanent settlement, and given the regime’s track record, a substantive dialogue is unlikely to occur in the near term. "I think more fighting is coming to Monland," says one NMSP member.