With unprecedented intent on display from all of Burma’s major conflict actors to bring an end to hostilities, and two-sided negotiations ongoing with all groups, progress is certainly being made towards peace in Burma.

But with bloody conflict unhalted in the north and continued skirmishes across the east despite new ceasefires, we are yet to see if words can translate into comprehensive action. Even if hostilities are brought to an end, severe political differences will threaten to derail the peace process unless a common strategy to address them can be agreed upon by all sides.

With the exception of the United Wa State Army, and its close ally the Mongla Army, the country’s largest opposition armed forces have demanded the government commits to nationwide political dialogue in return for ceasefires. While the government has agreed in principle, its own three-stage “roadmap to eternal peace” remains starkly at odds with this fundamental demand. So, how successful can this roadmap be, and what are the realistic alternatives being put forward by the ethnic armed groups?

On March 1, President Thein Sein further clarified the basics of the roadmap, as part of his speech to the Parliament. The three stages are to first sign a ceasefire that brings an end to hostilities; second to engage in economic development, work to eradicate drugs, and to assimilate into the state military and political framework; and third to work through the Parliament to “amend the Constitution by common consent so as to address [the government, national races and all citizens’] needs.”

In the case of the ongoing conflict in Kachin State, where the Tatmadaw (armed forces) remains engaged in daily conflict with the country’s second largest armed group, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), even stage one remains distant.

“There are currently clashes and skirmishes every day in Kachin State between our troops and government troops,” explains La Ja, general secretary of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), the KIA's political wing.

“Now, [government troops] are mostly in the northeastern part of Shan State in our 4th Brigade, 8th Battalion area. In Kachin State it is mainly areas east of Myitkyina, in our northern headquarters in the Sittaung area. [There are also government troops on the offensive] farther south in Bhamo, while others are west of the Irrawaddy River in the other special region [areas administered by the KIO for nearly two decades through the 1994 ceasefire agreement with the government].

“The meetings are civil. At the table, Aung Thaung [the government’s head negotiator] speaks very respectfully so the talks go smoothly … but the military’s offensive is now clearly aimed at overrunning our area. They are just aiming to dominate and control the region.”

From the government’s perspective, and indeed at first glance to most observers, it is the KIO that is thwarting the peace process. In successive talks they have refused to sign a new ceasefire as the first step and insist upon immediate political dialogue. However, with no aims to go on the offensive into government territory, and the feeling that their previous 17-year ceasefire gained them very little, the signing of another gestural agreement seems pointless when an end to hostilities depends only on the government pulling back its troops.

“Ceasefires themselves cannot achieve long-lasting peace.” La Ja stressed. “We don’t want to fight but this fighting was started by 'you' encroaching on our territory, so if 'you' withdraw 'your' troops then there will be no clashes and no fighting.”

To show commitment to stage one of the road map, Thein Sein, and the ceasefire delegation should be focusing primarily on its own military, in order to bring troops back out of KIO territory and build trust. Comprehensive action to crack down on human rights abuses on ethnic civilians should also be taken. While routine extortion and destruction of livelihoods continue and regular incidents of extrajudicial killing and sexual abuse are taking place, government demands for the KIO to halt all hostilities are likely to fall on deaf ears.

Farther south, according to David Taw, secretary of the Karen National Union (KNU) Peace Committee, for them also, “the first stage is still not complete. There are many areas where there are still clashes so a ceasefire is not in place yet.” But he remains largely positive saying, “I think it is based on communication. If we can develop good communication, these things won't happen.”

According to anonymous sources in numerous KNU areas, however, tensions are increasing further, primarily due to extensive resupplying by the Tatmadaw on its frontiers, in areas previously isolated by ambushes of the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the KNU's military wing. This is seen by many to indicate intent to begin a mass offensive, if the political situation changes. Across a spectrum of people spoken to by The Irrawaddy, from community workers of different kinds, religious leaders, displaced civilians and the military, mistrust is rife.

However, David Taw, who led the KNU delegation to sign a preliminary ceasefire agreement on Jan. 12, says there are two ways of viewing the situation. “If you look at it from the military point of view, [these fears] are correct. In the past, the [outposts] were isolated and cut off by our troops and it was very difficult for them to send food supplies to the area. Once the ceasefire was signed they sent food, and people noticed it was a lot and started thinking that they are preparing for another offensive.

“On the other hand though, if we don't open up communications with them and don't set up the liaison offices, how can we check how many soldiers are in the military camp, how much food is being sent and whether it more than enough. So, we need to set up liaison offices quickly so we can check whether this is ammunition, whether this is food support or medical provisions and then compare it with the number of troops in the region.”

Essentially, while there is valid rationale for mistrust, David Taw believes further progress with negotiations will be the best way to tackle the issue.

Stage two in the government’s roadmap demands that armed actors must essentially give up arms and agree to full assimilation into the state military and government. Only after this, in stage three, will amendments to the 2008 Constitution be able to be made, through the legislature in full accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

This approach threatens alienating much of the opposition, as they have made it very clear, in agreements that have been accepted by the government’s ceasefire delegations, that political dialogue is a must before giving up arms, or in some cases, even before ending hostilities. Notably, the “substantive political talks” that most major opposition groups have demanded will likely focus primarily on changes to the Constitution.

To almost all observers and even to many elected MPs, the 2008 Constitution is fundamentally flawed, given the amount of power and impunity it affords the military. For opposition groups struggling for greater autonomy in ethnic regions, this disdain is particularly acute, not only for the power it affords to the military, but because it gives the central government complete control over the local administrations.

The particulars of this imbalance are vast, but include the Union Legislature having total control over matters of security and law enforcement, large-scale industry, imports and exports, judicial matters, education and curricula, management of development of border areas, and the ability to void any state laws if they conflict with those of Union.

Furthermore, chief ministers, who then appoint the leaders of all local ministries, are selected by the President and not directly by local election. To those that have been systematically oppressed and abused for decades, and to the leaders that have been shut out of the political process, there is little evidence that anything will change with the 2008 Constitution in place.

Herein lies what will likely prove to the main obstacle to the peace process. While the government insists that amendments to it can only be made in Parliament, the ethnic armed groups, who were largely obstructed from competing the 2010 elections and would need to give up arms if they wanted to in the future, are demanding that such decisions be made outside of the Parliament at a nationwide conference, similar to that of the historical Panglong Conference of 1947.

According to Col Hkunn Okker, a Pa-O representative of the exiled United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) representing the ethnic minorities of Burma, who spoke at a press conference on the Thai-Burmese border in late February, “We reject a dialogue based on the 2008 Constitution. The government requires that the Constitution can only be amended in the Parliament so we reject [it].”

“The political settlement must be made outside the Parliament, at a political convention” further clarified La Ja speaking separately with The Irrawaddy. “This must be something like the Panglong Conference. All of the ethnic representatives, all of the political parties and all those on the government side, should sit together outside of the Parliament at a convention and talk about how to amend the existing situation. Once all have firmly approved what should happen then it can enter the Parliament and it can start from there.”

As was highlighted at the UNFC conference, Naypyidaw's decision to amend the Constitution to appease Aung San Suu Kyi and to encourage her National League for Democracy (NLD ) to register, proves that a top-down decision to make changes can be implemented. But this process was technically done by vote in Parliament and required just a few minor changes that few people would object to.

The kind of amendments that would likely be needed to appease all of the ethnic armed groups, would certainly not be accepted by the entire legislature and could in fact further widen political divides even among the pro-democrats.

According to David Taw, whose  KNU is a member of the UNFC, “I can’t say I agree 100 percent with the UNFC’s calls for Panglong but I agree in principle. Panglong was quite a long time ago and we were under colonial rule. People wanted to get independence and the spirit was very high, so people were willing to sign very easily … At that time, everybody felt like they were suppressed. But now, if we call a big meeting like this then some are benefiting from this system so they won’t agree.

“ I think [changing the Constitution outside the Parliament] will be difficult. Firstly, because all democratic countries change their Constitution in the Parliament and secondly, because the arrangement of the Constitution was done by the regime, so they drew it up to protect them [in a way that] favors them … My honest view is that even if there is a good Constitution for the country, if the government does not act on the Constitution, then it is just paper.

“But at least if the Constitution is there, we can apply pressure, because they will respect the opposition's voice in the Parliament … If we are only discrediting the government and calling for changes, they won't listen. We need to develop some kind of mechanism that can work on how to change the Constitution.”

David Taw did agree, however, that multilateral discussions would be a crucial step to developing a strategy and that this could lead to a settlement in Parliament. “We need a mechanism that can work on how to change the Constitution,” he added. “I think we better sit down together and then work out a strategy that can be useful for everybody—all the ethnic opposition groups and the government… If we can get the government to sign [an agreement] then they can take it to their Parliament.”

According to anonymous government sources, such talks were agreed to in principle by Naypyidaw in their February ceasefire agreement with the New Mon State Party (NMSP), and will likely take place this year. According to Nai Hong Sar of the NMSP, who spoke at the UNFC conference, “we demanded a nationwide conference, a political dialogue, with all leaders of all mainstream ethnic opposition groups to have substantive political dialogue with the goal of solving our crisis in Burma.

“We also made the demand that such talks have witnesses from the international community. Our plan is to talk to the government and the commander-in-chief to make a mutual agreement between ourselves and them.”

“I am optimistic,” said David Taw. “While the government is changing we'd better use this opportunity because if we don't then we'll isolate ourselves. We have nothing to lose … I think there might be some changes [before 2015]. I have confidence in Aung San Suu Kyi and I think that her voice will be heard in the Parliament. I got some inside info that most MPs are not like before and they don't want to go back to military rule so no matter what they will support her.

“I think if we can approach the NLD and other parties who can influence the Parliament, I think the Constitution will change. Not everything, but minor things that don't hurt the generals. I think they will allow it … [The key things to change] are trade and investment … health and education. If they give power to the local governments, people will think more wisely about how the people will fit in [to the plans].

The road ahead looks tough and unpredictable, but from most points of view, progress is being made and the government is behaving differently than ever before. The most notable changes have been in Naypyidaw's tone and we are yet to see if comprehensive action will follow with regard to the ethnic conflict.

However, analysis of the new administration generally and the path it is trying to take does provide a rationale for optimism. It is well aware of the importance of stabilizing the border regions and bringing an end to national discord, both of which are goals that rely on finding a lasting solution to conflict. While the government’s current plan remains starkly at odds with the aims of the opposition, it seems to have the will for change and multilateral talks could begin to close the gap in understanding.

Kim Jolliffe is an independent research, analysis and training consultant focusing on conflict, politics and humanitarian issues in Burma.