With the arrival of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Naypyidaw, China’s ministry of foreign affairs expressed support for the renewed Burma-US relationship. Below the surface, however, there is growing concern in Beijing about Burma’s outreach to the US.

Burmese President Thein Sein and opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi both gave public assurances that Burma would maintain good relations with China, but given the direction the winds are blowing in the Asia-Pacific region, those assurances may not be sufficient to soothe the giant dragon to Naypyidaw’s north.

Since Burma achieved its independence in 1948, its relationship with China has seen many ups and downs.

In the early 1950s, the two countries agreed to abide by the five principles for peaceful coexistence in international relations: Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; Mutual non-aggression; Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; Equality and mutual benefit; and Peaceful co-existence.

Aung Zaw is founder and editor of the Irrawaddy magazine. He can be reached at [email protected].

In 1988, when a new military regime took power in Burma and subsequently cracked down on pro-democracy demonstrators, threw Suu Kyi in prison and ignored the results of the 1990 election, Western governments dropped almost all support for Burma and slapped sanctions on the junta. China then stepped in and filled the void by supplying military hardware, aid, loans, economic opportunities and foreign diplomatic cover for Burma.

In return, the Burmese generals gave China sweetheart deals on business opportunities inside of Burma, particularly with respect to the country’s natural resources.

Burma also became a geographically important and mostly reliable ally for China, with the Burmese leaders even sharing open sympathy for Beijing during its crackdown on dissidents in Tiananmen Square. This type of mutual support led to the cementing of what the Burmese call a paukphaw relationship, meaning “brotherhood,” with state visits by national leaders occurring frequently.

But to ordinary Burmese people, most of whom had almost no personal contact with the Chinese, the paukphaw friendship meant nothing. In fact, they were repulsed by China’s support for the brutal regime that dictatorially ruled their country, they saw that China did little to help improve the lives of Burma’s ordinary citizens or support the efforts of the pro-democracy opposition, and they became extremely concerned about the fact that their country was becoming a virtual client-state of China.

As a result, anti-Chinese sentiment grew as most Burmese believed that China’s support for Burma was intended only to preserve the brutal regime so that it could exploit their country’s natural resources and gain strategic access to the Indian Ocean.

In contrast to China, the US and other Western governments criticized and isolated the Burmese junta, both politically and economically, and supported the efforts of the Burmese people over the last two decades in their struggle for human rights and democracy.

But while the West’s efforts to help bring democracy and human rights to Burma were welcomed and appreciated by the country’s oppressed population, the isolation and sanctions it imposed had the ironic side-effect of pushing the junta generals further into the waiting arms of Beijing.

 China, however, may have overplayed its hand by attempting to dominate Burma’s economy and natural resources, as well as overestimated the loyalty of the Burmese generals it supported for over twenty years. As a result, just like the West gave China an opportunity to get cozy with Burma following the 1988 military coup, China’s unbridled influence in Burma may now have provided the US and other Western countries the chance to turn the table.

The groundwork for this opportunity was laid in 2009, when the Obama Administration adopted its policy of constructively engaging Naypyidaw while maintaining sanctions on the regime and its cronies.

At first the new US policy appeared to pay little dividends, as former junta chief Snr-Gen Than Shwe thumbed his nose at Washington’s overtures by conducting a clearly rigged election in 2010 that guaranteed the generals and ex-generals would remain firmly in power. But when new President Thein Sein took office and sent a clear signal that he sought international legitimacy and the lifting of sanctions, Obama’s diplomatic moves began to bear fruit as evidence of change appeared in Burma.

Most significantly, Thein Sein and his government invited Suu Kyi to a meeting in Naypyidaw, lifted many media restrictions, released some political prisoners, cancelled a Chinese-backed dam project, began local ceasefire discussions with some ethnic armed groups, passed a new labor law and amended the Political Parties Registration law to allow Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy to register and compete in future elections. In addition, Thein Sein sent his foreign minister to Washington D.C. and welcomed visits by US special envoy Derek Mitchell, who received a warm welcome in Naypyidaw.

Recently, Thein Sein was rewarded for these efforts with several trophies to place on his mantle of legitimacy: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations agreed to give Burma its chair in 2014, Suu Kyi and the NLD agreed to register and take part in the upcoming by-election, Obama agreed to send Clinton to Burma, and the US Secretary of State delivered some carrots in the form of relaxed restrictions on both foreign aid and international banking advice.

 While all of this was happening, Thein Sein’s signals to China were decidedly mixed. He dropped his first—and biggest—bombshell by announcing the suspension of the China-funded Myitsone Dam project in Kachin State. Then he sent the commander-in-chief of Burma’s armed forces, Gen Min Aung Hlaing, to visit China’s historical adversary Vietnam before ever sending him to Beijing, and to sign a defense pact to boot.

Given these actions, together with the Obama Administration’s stated desire to strengthen its presence in the Asia-Pacific region and its clear intention of making Burma one of the focal points of that effort, China has clear cause for alarm that its influence in Burma is beginning to wane.

But Burma’s generals are well-versed in the art of playing international powers off against one another, and just before Clinton arrived in Naypyidaw, Burma sent a counterbalancing message to the US when Min Aung Hlaing flew to China to meet with Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping, the man who is expected to become president in 2012.

In addition, Thein Sein delivered the message to Clinton that Burma would continue its relationship with China while strengthening friendly ties with all countries as part of its independent and active foreign policy conducted in accordance with the five principles of peaceful co-existence. He pointedly called Beijing a strong and geopolitically important partner who had encouraged Burma to improve its relationship with Western countries and even helped it to do so.

In fact, China had previously expressed deep frustration to its allies over the behavior of Burma’s past regime and the intransigence of its generals, who for two decades China could not convince to make changes.

China’s leaders recognize that a peaceful and stable Burma will definitely benefit all countries in the neighborhood, particularly China, and now that Burma has made changes, China will have a more stable partner on its border and will not have to stick its neck out as far, or as often, to defend a rogue ally.

But on the flip side, as Burma improves its human rights record it will not have to rely on China to act as a shield at the UN, and if more international investment comes to Burma then Naypyidaw will have much greater leverage in negotiating deals with China. So Beijing will have to live with a decrease in both influence and bargaining power inside Burma. 

Therefore, if Burma continues on its path to democratic reform and the US continues to make inroads into the country, China will be forced to adjust its policy and approach. In this event, the question will more and more become: What value does each foreign power bring to Burma’s political struggle and progress towards a free and democratic society?

If the question of which relationship Burma stands to reap the most benefit from is framed in this way, and the Burmese leadership buys into it, then China will lose and America will win.