Question: In your new book, “Where China Meets India,” you make the case that Burma has the potential to become a major crossroads in Asia, bridging the world's two most populous nations, which for centuries were separated by a vast area of inhospitable terrain. Although this area is no longer so inaccessible, it is still beset by political instability, particularly in northern Burma and northeastern India. How much do you think this will affect Burma's prospects of assuming greater geopolitical importance in the future?

Answer: Finding a peaceful end to the armed conflicts and instability in northeastern India and northern and eastern Burma is absolutely essential if ordinary people are to benefit from Burma’s greater geopolitical importance. Burma will become geopolitically more important in any case, with the rise of China and with its emerging role as southwest China’s corridor to the Indian Ocean. As I’ve written in my book, it is already set to become an important new Asian crossroads, not only because of developments over the past couple of decades, but also because of centuries-old demographic, environmental and political processes that have finally brought both China and India to Burma’s doorstep. But if there is no real peace or good government, it’s hard to see how the new connections being made will be to the advantage of the majority of people. On the other hand, a peaceful and democratic Burma will be able to benefit immensely from its changing geography.

Q: Some have criticized your recent op-ed piece in The New York Times for describing Burma's ethnic conflicts as “brutal little wars.” Many would say that resolving these conflicts is the key to restoring stability not only in border areas, but also in the country as a whole. How significant, then, are recent “reforms” in Burma, in light of the fact that the government appears to be no closer to bringing peace to these regions, and in fact seems to stepping up its offensives against ethnic armed groups?

A: The actual sentence in my op-ed reads: “It is hard to imagine a successful and democratic transition while these longstanding and often brutal little wars continue.” I think the recent political changes and economic reforms are incredibly significant and represent the country’s best opportunity since 1962 to move in a positive direction. But, as I’ve said, progress in Naypyitaw or Rangoon cannot be divorced from progress in those largely border areas that have suffered terribly from armed conflict for decades. Democracy is impossible without a demilitarization of Burmese society generally. One of the main points I tried to make in my last book, “The River of Lost Footsteps,” was exactly that—the civil war in Burma and the rise of its military dictatorship are closely related, and that what we need are not simply ceasefires, but real peace and a new and more inclusive national identity.

Q: In your book, you say that Burma could go from being an economic backwater to a key regional player, provided it achieves its goals of restoring peace, prosperity and democracy. How optimistic are you that the country will break out of its half-century-old cycle of war, poverty and oppression in the near future?

A: It’s always good to be optimistic and it’s certainly easier to be optimistic now than a year ago. But at the same time it’s difficult not to feel overwhelmed by the extent of the country’s challenges. And it’s not just the legacy of war and poverty and oppression. In key areas we lack the institutions we need to move ahead. The judicial and banking systems are both key for future progress, but these systems will require enormous amounts of work before they are able to function properly. Or take education. Fifty years ago the Revolutionary Council government began to destroy what had been a first-rate system of higher education. We’re still living with the consequences and any improvement will take many years if not decades. And as in much of the rest of the region, corruption has reached levels that will be extremely difficult to reverse.

Q: During your travels to China to do research for your book, you were able to see for yourself how much that country has transformed itself economically. China's continuing rise is also having a major impact on other developing countries. What do you think about China's growing influence in Burma's economy? Do you think that Burma is in danger of becoming completely dominated by China's economic might?

A: For any poor country, being next to the fastest growing economy in the world should be a huge advantage. Chinese trade and investment can be a major asset to Burma in the future. But it’s a relationship that needs to be very carefully managed. There is an urgent need to make sure that China’s growing economic presence in Burma is something that will create jobs for ordinary people and help develop the economy in a proper way, not something that will simply fuel corruption, displace local communities or destroy the environment. But this is easier said than done. Developing the state institutions we need to do this will take a very long time. I suppose it’s possible that Burma could become completely dominated by China’s economic might, but I don’t think it’s likely; nationalism in Burma has long been very strong and if there is to be an end to Western sanctions in the near future, I think we’ll see a more balanced relationship with China. My fear is actually the opposite: that a very negative view of China has crept up over the past many years, and there could well be a backlash, and that would be a tragedy for both countries.

Q: Some analysts have suggested that the Burmese government's recent moves toward reform are aimed at improving relations with the West as a means of counterbalancing China's influence. Do you think there is a danger that, far from benefiting from its key strategic position in the region, Burma could become a battleground for the competing interests of China, India and the West, as well as other regional players such as Thailand and Japan?

A: There’s good competition and there’s bad competition. If Burma is seen as increasingly important, because of its natural wealth or geographic position, and this leads to healthy competition from the West, China, India and elsewhere for access to Burma, then that’s good, as long as new business and other ties are well managed. A good government could make sure that the country gets the best possible deal. But of course it would not be good if Burma actually became a “battleground” in a literal way, or if a corrupt government was unable or unwilling to manage growing international business interests in a way that benefited the majority of people. In general, though, I think moving away from over-reliance on any one country is extremely important.

Q: You have actively argued against Western economic sanctions imposed on Burma. Do you think that Burma's rulers would have made any concessions if they hadn't been under pressure from the West? Couldn't last year's election and President Thein Sein's meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi earlier this year, for example, be attributed largely to a desire to end the sanctions?

A: No, not at all. Nothing the old junta did over the past twenty years suggests that a desire to end sanctions was high on their agenda. We have to be mindful of what the sanctions actually are. They include, for example, restrictions on the international financial institutions providing technical assistance and the effective ban on the UNDP having a normal development program in the country. Even now, it’s not entirely clear that these things would be welcome. I think the old junta always wanted to normalize relations with the West and wanted a relaxation of sanctions as a sign of better relations, but I don’t think they actually wanted many of the things that would come with an end to sanctions, such as more development aid or an increased international presence. There were sanctions they did want lifted, for example the visa ban, but this was never a priority, and in general I think most were very comfortable in the closed economy that sanctions helped maintain. It’s only now, with a new government that actually wants to reengage with the outside world and reform the economy, that ending sanctions becomes more important.

In my last book I tried to argue that two things underpinned the status quo in Burma. One was the absence of peace, as we’ve discussed, and the other was the country’s isolation, begun by Gen Ne Win in 1962, and that has been, in my view, an unmitigated disaster. My principal argument on sanctions has been that they reinforced the isolation that already existed. In the 1990s, at a time when friendly governments should have been trying to help tear down the wall that Gen Ne Win had built around Burma, they instead started building a new one.

Recent positive changes have taken place in spite of sanctions, not because of them. They have little to do with a desire to end sanctions and everything to do with the realization that a military dictatorship was unsustainable and that at least some reform was necessary. Despite sanctions but because of better communications and information technology, more movement of people back and forth internationally, a greater awareness of the outside world, we’ve reached a tipping point in Burma. No one can defend the status quo and everyone, or nearly everyone, can see that a better future is really possible.

Q: US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently wrote that the United States wants to increase its influence in the Indian Ocean through greater engagement with the countries of the region. What is your opinion of President Barack Obama's dual-track approach to Burma, which combines sanctions and engagement?

A: I’ve already said what I think about sanctions and I understand why the Obama administration felt unable to push for a relaxation of sanctions in 2009-10. I think the US government’s engagement is very welcome and I think the new US envoy Derek Mitchell has done an excellent job. A close relationship with the United States is crucial for Burma. We can’t be the only country in the region under sanctions, with essentially no access to US markets and US investment. Burma’s main trading partners—China, India, Thailand and Singapore—have all benefited immensely from their economic and educational ties to the US. If we are deprived of those ties, we’re doomed to second-class status and everything that means for ordinary people.

Q: You recently met with Aung San Suu Kyi, who appears to have taken a fairly positive view of recent developments in Burma. Did you see any change in her approach to dealing with the country's rulers? How far do you think the government and opposition forces can go in working together to establish democracy and improve the lives of the people?

A: I think it’s terrific that she met with President U Thein Sein, I think it’s terrific that there is a much better dialogue now between her and the government through Labor Minister U Aung Kyi, and I think that both sides have made incredibly important concessions and that we are on the verge of an historic compromise. My sense is that both the president and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi are trying to work in the interest of the country as a whole and have had to deal with many tough decisions in recent months, with resistance from a number of quarters. But I think they have both played their hands well and I think the vast majority of people are happy to see compromise and political reconciliation. But the future is unpredictable, and it’s hard to say how different people will be able to work together in future. Generally, there’s a lot of mistrust and there’s not a big history of cooperation in Burmese politics. Future issues may also be very different. Issues like unemployment, inflation, and the government’s trade, fiscal and monetary policies are the bread and butter of government in most countries but we seem to have very little public discussion on these matters, even though they are what affects the ordinary person the most.

Q: You have written three books about Burma and are well-known in the West as an authority on the country. However, some Burmese dissidents have criticized you for not really talking to opposition activists, exiles and others working for change in the country. What is your response to such criticism?

A: Since I left the UN four years ago and began returning to Burma on a regular basis, I’ve met literally hundreds of people, Burmese and non-Burmese, of every possible political persuasion, both inside and outside the country. I’ve also been in regular touch with dozens of mainly younger Burmese, who I’ve never met, but who have contacted me over social media sites, and have been very pleased to discuss and debate with them the sorts of issues we’ve discussed here. I also now travel around the country very frequently, and try to meet people from as broad a range of backgrounds as possible.

Q: Throughout history, real progress has required heroic sacrifice on the part of the people and their leaders. Do you regard figures such as Ko Min Ko Naing and Ko Ko Gyi as heroes in Burma's democratic struggle, or do you feel that their sacrifices have been misguided?

A: First of all, no one should have had to sacrifice years in prison because of their convictions or the peaceful expression of their views. Hopefully this will soon be a thing of the past. And I wouldn’t call anyone’s sacrifice misguided. More generally, though, if we really do see a successful transition to democratic government over the coming years, I’m sure we will be arguing for decades to come over why and how it happened. And if we look at Burmese history there are many things we could easily still argue about. Who was right in 1885, the Kinwun Mingyi who understood the power of the British and sought a protectorate, or the Taingdar Mingyi and Supapyalat who wanted to resist to the very end? My point is that this is the time to release all political prisoners and to respect everyone’s sacrifice, as well as to recognize the tremendous suffering that millions of ordinary Burmese people have faced, as a result of war and poverty, but that it’s impossible to say with any honesty what effect different individual sacrifices may have made.

Q: Your grandfather once served the Burmese people. What will your contribution to Burma be? Do you have any plans to play a political role in the future?

A: I don’t see myself playing a political role at all. And I’ll leave it to others to say that they will “serve the Burmese people.” I would be happy if I could help in a few areas that are of special interest to me and for which I feel I have some competence. One of the legacies of the 1960s and 1970s is the downgrading of expertise and education, and the replacement of many well-educated Burmese by others with no relevant training or experience. I think this needs to change. My background is in writing and teaching history, and in international relations and development, and I’ll look to see how I might be able to help based on this background. I’ve been very happy as well to have served over the past year as a member of the board of the (Myanmar) Livelihood and Food Security Trust Fund, which provided support to 150,000 poor households in 2010 alone and is now working in several different states and regions. I hope that I will be able to contribute to very concrete efforts like this in the future as well.

Q: Last Friday, US President Barack Obama announced that he would send Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Burma next month. What do you think about the Obama administration's Burma policy, and how do you think Burma will balance its relations with the US and China?

A: I was very pleased to hear President Obama praise President U Thein Sein and the Burmese Parliament for the reform measures taken so far and I think he's doing exactly the right thing in sending Secretary Clinton to Burma at this critical juncture. I'm happy as well that he was able to speak directly to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and I hope that a full normalization of relations between Burma and the United States will be possible before too long. I don't think China has anything to worry about from a good relationship between Naypyidaw and Washington; on the contrary, a more balanced set of relations will be in Beijing's own interests in the longer term; a skewed relationship where Burma is too dependent on one country will only fuel Burmese resentment and lead to a backlash, as I've mentioned.

But I think that at this point we need also to think very carefully about what should come next. Nationwide ceasefires are of course critical, as is the further release of political prisoners. But so is the economic direction of the country. Political reconciliation will be near impossible unless we are also able to keep inflation down and reduce unemployment. I am absolutely convinced that efforts towards democratic change will come to very little without a basic economic reorientation as well. It's economics that's going to decide a lot of the political landscape and determine the lives of ordinary people. I fear that we might achieve some kind of democracy before long but that it will be the wrong kind of democracy, where where wealth remains highly concentrated, demagoguery dominates discussion, and where a corrupt gangster-style politics triumphs over everything else. This is far from an unlikely scenario. We need to consider exactly how the provision of technical assistance, a drawing down of existing trade and investment embargoes, and the government's own economic reforms can be properly sequenced, to avoid Burma becoming more corrupt or aid-dependent, and to lay the foundations for broad-based growth. I think a discussion on this should be very high on Secretary Clinton's agenda. The institutions of democracy are not enough, we needed policies that can actually respond urgently, and in a practical and effective way to the needs of ordinary people.