Four powerful bombs exploded in Burma last week: in the new capital of Naypyidaw; the second-largest city of Mandalay; and the military town of Pyin Oo Lwin, also known as Maymyo. Bombs are not new to this mysterious military-controlled country, but every time they go off, the blasts and their aftermath demonstrate that Burma lacks a transparent and effective system for guaranteeing security and bringing culprits to justice.

Three of the blasts went off within minutes of each other. The first bomb exploded in a jeep near Zaygyo market, a major shopping center in Mandalay. The second bomb damaged an occupied house near the Gems Museum in Naypyidaw. And a third hit Pyin Oo Lwin, a garrison town as well as a hill resort which is home to four military institutes, including the elite Defense Services Academy. Three hours later, a fourth explosion went off in the same part of Mandalay as the earlier blast, near a rubbish dump.

Yeni is news editor of the Irrawaddy magazine. He can be reached at [email protected].

Like a series of bombing in April 2010—targeting the main China-Burma trade gate in Muse, Shan State on April 14; a pavilion at the annual water festival in Rangoon on April 15; and the Myitsone dam project in Kachin State on April 17—the recent operations appear to have been well-planned. The difference is that this time it appears the blasts were intended to be powerful enough to demolish their targets without causing a large number of casualties.

The bomb blasts last week came as the military is reportedly preparing an offensive to pressure ethnic armed groups in Kachin, Shan and Karen states, and they are not the only guerilla-type attacks that have taken place recently. There have been about half a dozen bombings in Burmese cities in the past few weeks, including explosions in Naypyidaw and the Kachin State capital of Myitkyina.

On May 18, when two passengers were killed and nine were wounded by a bomb that exploded on a train near Naypyidaw, the Burmese government blamed the Karen National Union (KNU), an ethnic armed group engaged in ongoing skirmishes with the government in Karen State.

Another bomb exploded at a Naypyidaw market on June 10, slightly injuring two people. This time, The New Light of Myanmar did not directly name any group in connection with the attack, but said, “Aiming to cause public panic and undermine already achieved peace and stability, insurgents have been committing terrorist acts persistently at crowded places. Now, they are recruiting bombers to commit destructive acts providing incentives.”

On Wednesday, however, The New Light of Myanmar reported that the government issued an arrest warrant for three Shan Nationals who are suspected of involvement in last week’s bomb blasts. In addition, two ethnic Kachin have been arrested in Mandalay, according to local media sources. The authorities have not yet reported which organizations any of these suspects are involved with. 

This was the past regime’s modus operandi whenever bombings occurred: first blaming “insurgents” to justify its ongoing anti-ethnic armed group narrative, and then rounding up a few usual suspects who were usually never linked directly to an attack, but were still put in prison on other convenient charges. For example, after the bombing at Rangoon’s New Year Water Festival in April last year, the five men who were initially arrested were never linked to the blasts, but were sentenced to up to 11 years in prison for different offenses.

Independent observers have pointed out that the perpetrators of the attacks last week appear to have wanted to demonstrate their ability to demolish targets without taking lives. And some believe the level of sophistication displayed is beyond the capacity of the jungle-based ethnic armies.

In none of the previous bombings, and thus far in the current attacks, have Burmese security officers made an attempt to investigate in an accountable and transparent manner—i.e. gathering modern forensic evidence that is made available to the public. This leads many Burmese to distrust the government authorities, and even makes them question whether the regime itself orchestrated the explosions to create instability and justify a crackdown on opponents to extend and prolong its stranglehold on power.

Meanwhile many residents of major cities say they are frightened by the bombing campaign and will now avoid crowded areas such as markets and railway stations.

The bombings have also raised the level of concern among the supporters of pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who has said she plans to take trips outside of Rangoon in July and visit local offices of her opposition group, the National League for Democracy (NLD). Heightening their fears even further is the fact that Burma’s state-run media has recently warned Suu Kyi that there will be a "commotion" if she travels in the countryside as she last did in 2003, when a gang of government-backed thugs attacked her convoy in Depayin.

Of primary concern to all is the fact that the bombings have not diminished, but have rather increased, and the masterminds and perpetrators of all the attacks are still at large. Whoever is behind the attacks, they have demonstrated that they can demolish targets—with or without human casualties—almost at will and without accountability.

The perpetrators could be government operatives wishing either to scare Suu Kyi into remaining in Rangoon, or even more sinister elements wishing to attempt an assassination and use these earlier blasts as cover. They could also be a government attempt to discredit the ethnic armed groups and justify the crackdown that is already in progress. Or they could be the attempt by one or more ethnic armed groups to warn the government that if the offensive continues, urban guerilla warfare will be their response. Finally, they could be the work of extremist pro-democracy elements fed up with the slow progress of meaningful change in Burma.

The point is that unless someone claims responsibility, nobody will find out who is behind the attacks and the public will continue to be at risk, because the “new” government’s response is the same as the old regime’s—blame their enemies and bury the evidence.

In the end, even if the government is not behind the attacks, it seems just too convenient for them to let those responsible stay at large, because then they can use the bombings as an excuse to undertake any number of state-sponsored oppressive measures.

It’s just one more example of how whenever it’s time to put the cards on the table, Burma’s new pseudo-civilian government shows that it is the same players holding the same hand dealt from the same stacked deck as before.