The Burmese regime has nuclear ambitions, according to a leading US “think tank,” which supports its claim with photographs of what it says is construction work on a possible nuclear reactor site near Mandalay.

The junta is cooperating with North Korea on possible procurement of nuclear technology and appears to be misleading overseas suppliers in its efforts to obtain it, say two authors of the report, David Albright and Paul Brannan, well-known experts on the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Burmese junta's No 3, Gen Thura Shwe Mann. exchanges a Memorandum of Understanding with the Chief of Staff of the Korean Peoples' Army, Gen Kim Gyok-sik, in Pyongyang in 2008

Their report was published by the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security.

Assistant US Secretary of State for Public Affairs P.J. Crowley said that although he hadn't read the report, “we do have concerns about certain activity and the potential, you know—that risk to the global nonproliferation agenda.”

The report, titled “Burma: A nuclear wannabe; suspicious links to North Korea; high-tech procurements and enigmatic facilities,” says: “Certain equipment, which could be used in a nuclear or missile program, went to isolated Burmese manufacturing compounds of unknown purpose.

“Although evidence does not exist to make a compelling case that Burma is building secret nuclear reactors or fuel cycle facilities, as has been reported, the information does warrant governments and companies taking extreme caution in any dealings with Burma. 

“The military regime’s suspicious links to North Korea, and apparent willingness to illegally procure high technology goods, make a priority convincing the military government to accept greater transparency.”

The report says that evidence shows “Burma and North Korea have discussed nuclear cooperation, but is not sufficient to establish that North Korea is building nuclear facilities for Burma’s military junta, despite recent reports to the contrary,” it says. Nonetheless, the possibility of significant North Korean nuclear assistance to this enigmatic, military regime, could not be ignored.

The report says that because Burma is buying a wide variety of suspicious dual-use goods internationally, governments and companies need to be more vigilant in examining Burma’s inquiries or requests for equipment, whether via Burmese governmental entities, Burmese trading companies, or other foreign trading companies. 

Companies should treat inquiries from Burma no differently than those from Iran, Pakistan or Syria, it says.

Noting that Burma is seeking abroad a large quantity of top-grade, highly sophisticated goods with potential missile and nuclear uses, the report adds that no pattern has yet emerged in these procurements that lead to a specific missile or nuclear end use. Nonetheless, the procurements are often suspicious or highly enigmatic, according to one senior European intelligence official.

The report suggests the Burmese military regime might use North Korean trading entities to acquire overseas sensitive nuclear and nuclear dual use goods. 

“Its military cooperation with North Korea has increased over the last several years, fueling concerns about nuclear cooperation. North Korea could also supplement Burma’s own foreign procurement networks, and it could sell nuclear goods made in North Korea,” it says.

Evidence of North Korean-Burmese cooperation, says the report, includes the reported presence in Burma of officials from Namchongang Trading (NCG), a North Korean trading company that is sanctioned by the UN Security Council. 

“The nature of the Burmese/NCG cooperation remains largely unknown, but NCG has reportedly sold equipment to Burma or provided some type of technical assistance,” the report says—adding, however, that there is no concrete evidence that North Korea is supplying Burma a reactor. Any involvement by NCG in Burma is bound to increase suspicions about such a sale, the report adds.  

“There remain sound reasons to suspect that the military regime in Burma might be pursuing a long-term strategy to make nuclear weapons. Despite the public reports to the contrary, the military junta does not appear to be close to establishing a significant nuclear capability. Information suggesting the construction of major nuclear facilities appears unreliable or inconclusive,” the report says.

Evidence supports the view that the regime wants to develop a nuclear capability of some type, but whether its ultimate purpose is peaceful or military remains a mystery, the report concludes.