Reviewing the Junta’s Strategy

April 26, 2004—The Burmese military regime has perfected the art of combining naked force through harsh crackdowns with political offensives to defeat the opposition movement and defuse international pressure.

A brief history of the regime’s maneuvering strategies illustrates this well and will be elaborated upon below: the 1988 killings and large-scale violence followed by a military coup and the promise of elections; the post-1990 election crackdown on the winning party and the National Convention ploy in 1993; renewed repressive measures including the second house-arrest of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi in late 2000 and the propagation of secret talks with her in 2001; the resurgence of widespread crackdowns on opposition members which culminated in last year’s May 30 violent attack on Suu Kyi’s convoy at Depayin; and now "the road map" initiated by Prime Minister Gen Khin Nyunt. The strategies may appear to be smart, but they smack of the tactics espoused in Sun Tzu’s "The Art of War."

But the military does not have much in the way of ability to actualize their strategy. This is because Burmese generals habitually miscalculate what they can get away with in the way of repression, through only exercising their containment policy against the opposition and the international community. Since they have failed to see that their interests can be better served in compromising with the legitimate opposition, their political offensives are never backed by a genuine desire to change the substance of the status quo. Over reliance on containment and a refusal to make any real commitment towards a shift in power, even at the minimal level, are recurrent failings in the junta’s strategy.

In 1990, the election results were very different from those the generals anticipated. The National League for Democracy, or NLD, won a landslide victory despite its leader, Suu Kyi, being effectively contained under house arrest at the time.

Again, after some economic successes and its ability to contain the NLD throughout the early nineties during the government-led National Convention, the generals overestimated their muscle power and released Suu Kyi, without having made any preparations for a political solution. A reversal followed as the NLD withdrew from the convention and Suu Kyi renewed her calls for sanctions. When both sides became deadlocked, the regime resolved the dispute by putting Suu Kyi under her second house arrest in 2000.

As international criticism against the regime’s crackdown intensified, the generals signaled a new political game in 2001 saying there were talks between the lady and the government. Without striking any political deal with Suu Kyi and by sustaining "confidence building" measures, the generals decided to release the lady, hoping Western sanctions would be lifted and aid resumed. The military expected the containment of Suu Kyi could be done in the same way as that of the ethnic insurgents, by merely engaging in a truce and a de-escalation of the conflict.

However, their maneuvering and stall tactics did not achieve the desired result as Suu Kyi, who has never adopted a wait-and-see approach with the regime, launched a vigorous campaign to expand political space in the country by mobilizing supporters and building up a morale. Western countries praised her courage and refused to reward the generals for releasing her until more substantial changes became visible. It was around this time that the generals took off their gloves once again, resulting in last year’s May 30 government-backed attack on the opposition at Depayin.

In an effort to recover from the May 30 nightmare, the regime has assumed a new look by appointing Khin Nyunt as prime minister and allowing him to spell out his "road map," of which the first step is the reconvening of the National Convention that has been adjourned since 1996.

The new PM managed to succeed in persuading almost all ethnic groups—ceasefire and non-ceasefire—to climb aboard the road map bandwagon. Moreover, the regime has been trying to market this most recent push for legitimacy to the regional powers, such as Thailand and China. This is evident particularly in the so-called "Bangkok Process," a Thai-initiated international forum to discuss Burma’s political future. The generals have been quietly confident that their game plan is injecting new life for regime apologists and lobbyists—including some newly converted former dissidents living abroad—in an effort to persuade the international community to support the PM’s road map initiative or at least to take a "wait and see" approach. If successful, the maneuvers could sideline the opposition movement and its international allies, such as the US and the UN.

Then the regime set May 17 as the date for resuming the National Convention.