Playing Hardball

August 07, 2003—In Burma, those who play hardball dominate the political game. Hardliners in Rangoon deftly maneuver through the political process to achieve the outcome they desire. Whether their opponents are internal or international, bargains are made with winning in mind. The generals have a lot of experience at playing games. In most cases, they give the impression that they agree to the rules. Yet the junta rarely makes concessions in their quest for victory. Past experiences show that all rules are open to interpretation and manipulation, and stall tactics and diversion are the regime’s preferred strategy. A recent casualty of the junta’s manipulation is the so-called "UN Process" initiated by UN Special Envoy Razali Ismail in 2001. Despite winning the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, Razali and the UN appears to have lost the game. Razali was clearly outmatched when facing the generals. Regardless of his willingness and access, Razali has never been able to achieve any substantive settlement to Burma’s political stalemate. Every proposal Razali made in order to earn a victory for openness and democracy was set aside by the generals. The regime merely used Razali to fend off international pressure and de-escalate the conflict. Bringing an end to the political crisis in Burma was never in the general’s game plan. Getting sanctions lifted and aid flowing again after the release of Suu Kyi was. The generals did not, however, count on Suu Kyi making such a strong comeback or the Western nations continuing their punitive measures. Thanks to Suu Kyi, who has never adopted a wait-and-see approach with the regime, the opposition inside Burma launched a vigorous campaign to expand the political space by mobilizing supporters and building morale. Suu Kyi’s tours through the country were instrumental in achieving the opposition’s goals. Western countries praised her courage and refused to reward the generals for releasing her but shunning more fundamental changes. On May 30, the rules changed. Since their maneuvering and stall tactics did not achieve the desired result, the regime openly attacked their opponent. Suu Kyi was detained once again and her party’s offices closed. Anyone watching the games in Burma from the sidelines must scout the regime if they plan on playing with Rangoon. The first note in their book should mention the junta’s military mentality. The generals approach all political games from a military perspective. They only negotiate from a position of strength and security, for in war the cost of weakness is total defeat. If they do not feel strong and secure, they buy time to regroup, like an army waiting for reinforcements. Any process designed without recognition of this fact will give the regime more room for maneuvering and more time to forestall a transition to democracy. In this regard, the "road map" recently proposed by Thailand might run the risk of playing into the regime’s hands. If Thailand is serious about achieving freedom for Suu Kyi and democracy for the Burmese people, they must design their "road map" carefully. With the risk of UN sanctions a real concern for Rangoon, another cheap victory would greatly benefit the generals. Agreeing to the "road map" should not allow the regime to postpone punishment but retain power. If participation alone reaps rewards then more manipulation can be expected. Whether or not the generals will agree to the "road map" remains to be seen. The generals’ response has been cool thus far. Rangoon and Bangkok have clashed recently on the issues of cross-border incursions, drugs and migration, so cooperation is not guaranteed. Many feel the regime prefers US involvement, since early this year they invited the Americans to participate in Burma’s reconciliation process. The Thais also must assure that all parties accept their proposal. Unfortunately, many Burmese view the Thai authorities with skepticism, due to their close links with the generals. Opposition members are approaching the Thai’s proposal with caution. Until concrete details emerge, their mindset will remain one of suspicion. "We prefer that a credible multilateral body address the Burma issue," Khun Htun Oo, the leader of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, said from Rangoon. "I doubt if Thailand has such good record." Padoh Mahn Sha, general secretary of the Karen National Union, which has been fighting for ethnic autonomy since 1948, wonders whether a new proposal is necessary, considering the existing UN initiative. "The UN can play an intervening role with a ‘real stick,’" he said. Many opposition activists inside Burma prefer an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) mission to Rangoon over the Thai proposal. "Instead of Thailand, Asean should take the lead," says Thakin Chan Tun, a veteran politician in Rangoon.