Rather than laying the groundwork for the anticipated dialogue, the junta demanded that the ethnic armed groups transform into members of its border guard force and began applying both political and military pressure to force them to do so. This only deepened the level of mistrust and led directly to the resumption of armed conflicts.

Under the current government, the border guard force proposal has been dropped, but the ethnic groups are still waiting for the long-promised political dialogue to be initiated.

Sources said that Thein Sein’s government intends to hold a national level peace conference in the future and political observers speculate that Aung San Suu Kyi will even be invited to attend.

Such a conference is still far from a reality, however, and before any such national level discussions take place, the military and government have to look at the ongoing conflict from a different perspective and no longer stick to their previous, military-dominated strategies and policies.

This may have been what Thein Sein was attempting to do when—in line with what Aung Min told the ethnic groups in his recent meeting with them on the Thai-Burma border—he told reporters at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit in Bali that there was a need for development in the ethnic regions and his government intended to reach out to ethnic groups for peace talks.

Still, Thein Sein has sent mixed-messages over the last several months, in some cases saying he wants peace but in others revealing that his understanding of the ethnic struggle is one dimensional and deeply-rooted in the military’s arrogant view of ethnic minorities and their issues.

The prime example was his remark calling the Kachin rebels Thaung Gyan Thu, which is usually translated as “insurgents,” but to Burmese means a rebel group with no political agenda and has connotations of terrorism.

Thein Sein went on to say it would only take a few hours for the Burmese armed forces to tackle the fighting in Kachin State if it so desired. But even if he is correct that the Burmese army and air force could swiftly defeat the vastly outmanned and outgunned Kachin Independence Army by launching an all out military offensive, it would never crush the soul of the Kachin resistance.

The same could be said with respect to the other ethnic armed groups, including the Karen National Union, which began its armed quest for equal rights and autonomy in 1948 and has waged effective guerilla warfare in Karen State since losing its headquarters in 1994.

Therefore, the military option will never lead to a lasting peace, and if Thein Sein’s new government is serious about building trust with the ethnic armed groups, it should first halt military offensives and call for a nationwide cessation of hostilities, during which preliminary talks can take place at the regional level to understand and resolve local issues.

In the second phase, the government and all of the ethnic groups— including the “ethnic alliance” if the groups so desire—should sit down and identify in an open and frank manner the main issues related to the conflict.

Finally, a national dialogue—perhaps a conference—should take place between the leaders of the government and the ethnic groups, with the goal of reaching a long-term political settlement. 

What should not happen is for the second and third steps to be delayed until the Burmese government implements its supposed plan to develop the ethnic regions.

While the economic development of the ethnic regions is a laudable objective if undertaken with the right motivations, attempts to simply pour development resources into these areas without at least concurrent efforts to reach a comprehensive political solution will at best be viewed with suspicion and could lead to more conflicts, because the government’s efforts will surely run headlong into the areas controlled by the ethnic militias and potentially conflict with the ethnic groups’ desire to make their own decisions regarding local development.

More importantly, the government must send a signal that it realizes that Burma’s ethnic groups are not just asking for new bridges, roads, schools, hospitals and aid. The ethnic minorities took up arms and demanded local autonomy in order to preserve their identity and culture. Until a political solution is found that allows them to do so, there will be no peace in Burma.